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1INTRODUCTION
A p r e c i s e  d e f i n i t i o n  and t r a n s la t io n  o f  the term kongsi i s ,  as 
Schlege l  has pointed out ,  almost imposs ib le .^  However, i t  i s  o f  n e c e s s i t y  
in t h i s  in troduct ion  o f  the t h e s i s  to s e t  out various ways in which the 
term has been used and, in con tras t  to them a l l ,  the p a r t i c u la r  sense  that  
I w i11 use.
Old and new usages o f  the word sprang to l i f e  a l l  over Islands  o f  
Southeast Asia,  with waves o f  Chinese immigration and the evo lu t ion  o f  the 
Chinese ways o f  l i f e  that  have become the Chinese i n s t i t u t i o n s  - the kon gs i . 
Of a l l  the general usages ,  the account given by Beknopte Encyclopaedia van 
Nederlandsche Oost-Indie  i s  so far  the b e s t ,  the c l e a r e s t  and the most 
d e t a i l e d : 1 2
"Kongsi i s  a Chinese word which in d ic a te s  a f irm,  
partnership  or s o c i e t y  in a very broad sense .  The 
word has been commonly used in the archipelago  
over cen tu r ie s  and has become current in both 
Dutch and various nat ive  languages.  L i t e r a l l y  i t  
means government by a general publ ic  or adminis tr­
at ion o f  publ ic  a f f a i r s .  The word, k o n g s i , i s  
derived from the d i a l e c t  o f  the Hokkien people who 
have e s t a b l i s h e d  themselves throughout Java and 
commercial ports o f  the outer  i s l a n d s .  In the 
Hakka d i a l e c t ,  i t  reads as Kung-sze. In Riouw 
and Java,  administ  rators  o f  a f irm are customarily  
addressed and referred  to as kongsi . Chinese 
o f f i c i a l s  a l so  used t h i s  t i t l e .
Owing to the unt ir ing  pursuit  o f  the Chinese o f  the 
means to r a i s e  c a p i t a l ,  the Chinese kongsi i s  numerous 
not only in our colony but a l so  in the Malay Peninsula ,  
in the outer  i s lan d s  o f  Indonesia and in the P h i l ip p in e s .
The s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  the kongsi for the f lowering and
1. S c h l e g e l , p .451.
2. T. J.  Bezemer, Beknopte Encyclopaedia van Nederlandsch Post Indie 
(Leiden,  1921),  p.254.
2development of Chinese industry,  commerce and 
navigation is hard to overestimate. The kongsi 
were en t i re ly  established to hold people of the 
same home countries and clans in a closer t i e  or 
rela t ionship .  In the family kongsi, no one, 
because of the t rad i t ion ,  could have private 
fortune so long as th e i r  father  lived. All the 
family capital were a t  the disposal of the patr iarch.  
Undoubtedly, i f  under closer examination, many 
kongsi would no longer be family kongsi as they 
at  f i r s t  seem to be. The Chinese kongsi have, 
however become more and more divorced from the 
above-mentioned origins over time, more especially 
r e c en t ly ."
This is not a l l .  In fac t ,  almost every Chinese in s t i tu t ion  during 
the 19th century was called kongsi. A temple patron god, a clan society or 
a provincial club of the Chinese in overseas was often named kongsi on 
foundation. Nevertheless, during the l a t e r  part  of the 19th century, they
3
became be t te r  known as hui-kuan, a name that  was actually much older than 
kongsi, appearing in the 16th century.
Chinese ' s ec re t '  soc ie t ies ,  however, were also called kongsi. This 
had caused a great deal of confusion in the mind of the colonial au thori t ies  
The British  administration in the S t ra i t s  Settlements, for example, had been 
confusing hui-kuan with hui or ' s ec re t '  soc ie t ies  until  1892^ when i t  began 
to draw a c lear-cut  line between them. But then this  attempt to separate 
the goats from the sheep was only real from the point of view of the admini­
s t ra t ion .  As for the Chinese, as Purcell observes, no such d is t inc t ion  was
5
made between good and bad.
3. Ho Ping-ti has gone a great length into the research of the evolution of 
hui-kuan, which he t rans la tes  as hostels for examination candidates and 
goes only thus far .  But already by the end of the Ming dynasty, something 
of modern unionism came of the hui-kuan movement of the Ssu-chou weavers. 
This, however, is not included in Ho's defin i t ion of hui-kuan.
see Ho Ping-t i ,  The ladder of Success in Imperial China (New York, 1962), 
p.208-9, and his Chung-kuo Hui-kuan Shih-lun.
4. S.S.B.B. , 1892, 02,3.
5. Purcell ,  1962 edit ion,  p.272.
3Hui or brotherhood is more proper a term to the vehicle of Chinese 
self-government as i t  was than the term 'secret soc ie ty1. The term 'secret 
society'  is a l l  the more misleading fo r  the object ion raised by Purcel l ,  
whatever the precise implicat ion of  secrecy may have been:^
"All  Chinese social organisation was necessarily 
'secret '  wh i ls t  i t  was not recognised or was 
banned by the Government. The Chinese municipal 
organisations in Borneo, the kongsis, were, and 
are, referred to as 'secret soc ie t ies,  as are 
a l l  Chinese p o l i t i c a l  organisation in Siam 
where they are i l l e g a l . "
Modern scholarship has now widely recognised the so-cal led 'secret '  
societ ies as the vehicle o f  Chinese autonomy with in the colonial rule in 
Southeast Asia. '6 7 8 But despite th is  recognit ion, the term 'secret society'  
remains.
Chinese konqsi that emerged in Southeast Asia in the 18th century, 
rooted as they were in both Chinese partnership and brotherhood t ra d i t io n s ,  
were only new in the regions. Their o r ig ins ,  unlike the Chinese brotherhood 
in an attempt to overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty, were e n t i re ly  with the r ise 
of overseas Chinese mining industry. But although some o f  the Chinese konqsi 
in Southeast Asia may have carr ied over the r i t u a l  oath-taking ceremony and 
even the name of T ' ien-T i  Hui, they general ly evolved from a small partner­
ship, e i ther  in commerce or mining. On foundation, they were cal led hui 
or union, a term which was commonly misused in early colonial days to mean
o
a 'secre t '  society. Later, when they grew in to  large organisations with
6. Purcel l ,  1952 ed i t ion ,  p.328.
7. M.F. Somers Heidhues, Southeast Asia's Chinese Minori t ies (London, 1974) 
p. 48.
8. W. Blythe, p.552.
A perfect example of how a colonial w r i te r  would view a hui was Cameron 
who has said th is :  "Instead of  forget t ing th e i r  national prejudices, or
postponing th e i r  indulgence o f  them t i l l  t h e i r  return to China, the people 
o f  each province clan together and form a hoey or secret society. The 
avowed object of these hoeys is  to afford mutual protect ion,  but they are 
often used fo r  the i n f l i c t i o n  of  wrong, and have been found a great 
stumbling-block to the perfect administrat ion of jus t ice  in the law courts 
of  the S t r a i t s ."
see J. Cameron, Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India (London, 1865), 
p . 142.
4hundreds or thousands of members, they were known as kongsi. The T'ien-
" Q
Ti Hui in Penang was a partnership in orig in .  Much the same thing, how­
ever, can be said of the early Chinese community in the S t ra i t s  Settlements 
and Malay States ,  which was made up of a number of hui or kongsi. ^
Recent writers  have offered a variety of defin i t ions of kongsi.
Kongsi is understood by Blythe any partnership or group with a common 
i n t e r e s t . ^  Barbara Ward defines i t  as ' the large po l i t ica l  groups in the 
mining d i s t r i c t s ' ,  which seems ra ther  vague. J.C. Jackson is much more 
specif ic .  He only uses the term kongsi to signify all iances of mining unions 
and th e i r  farming and mining members. I myself define i t  neither simply 
as partnership or brotherhood, nor a combination of both. Rather, my def i ­
nition of kongsi is tha t  i t  was a form of open government, based on an 
enlarge partnership and brotherhood. I ts  purpose was to protect  economic 
gains as well as to r e s i s t  outside powers. In th is  form of government, 
every member had equal r ights in the process of government as everyone was 
an equal partner and brother to the other. The administration is open to 
public c r i t ic ism ,  par t ic ipa t ion ,  e lect ion,  or dismissal by a general meeting 
in the kongsi-house. This new pol i t ica l  organisation provided a foundation 
for the social and economic l i f e  of the overseas Chinese.
The newness of kongsi government, pa r t icu la r ly  i t s  representat ive 
function, public access ib i l i ty ,  and direc t  democracy, did not go unnoticed 
by Western observers in the early 19th century, and by the Chinese a century 
l a te r .  The westerners who saw kongsi through the dis tor t ing  lens of western
9. The Toa Peh Kong in Penang, i t  seems, in the description of T.S. Lewis, 
was the Brotherhood of merchants and traders who were closely connected 
in business transactions with Europeans, th e i r  friends and dependents. 
Lewis spoke of the T'ien-Ti Hui in Penang being the Ghee Hin, Hysan and 
Hoh Siang, who are a l l ,  i t  is said,  under one and the same partnership 
although acting separate bodies, see K.K. Khoo, The Western Malay States 
1850-1874 (London, 1972), p . 113.
10 , teoj< S t o n y  has c learly  understood tha t  clans or Pan formed by secret
socie t ies  provided the foundation of early Singapore's Chinese community. 
Many Chinese temples were during that  time only the smoke screens of 
private associat ions or hui or brotherhoods and controlled by members 
of brotherhoods. Even those non-hui temples were also i n f i l t r a t e d  by 
brotherhoods' members so much so that  they were not unlike hui temples, 
see Lin Hsiao Sheng, Ssu-la Ku-chi, p . i .
11. W. Blythe, p .553.
12. B.E. Ward, 'A Hakka Kongsi in Borneo', Journal of Oriental Studies ,
Vol.l ,  p.359, n.12. f> ^4.
5concepts found there something o f a repub lic . S im ila r ly  those Chinese 
scholars using the same lens, have also found Republic elements in kongsi. 
Such an approach to the h istory o f kongsi is ev idently  Eurocentric. Kongsi, 
no doubt, bear some resemblance to western democracy and republicanism, but 
th is  resemblance l ie s  only in government by elected representatives. Beyond 
tha t, an equation o f kongsi government w ith western democracy would be 
completely misleading. Kongsi government was essen tia lly  a synthesis of 
extended partnership and sworn-brotherhood, which was uniquely Chinese.
13No western democracy, however open and d ire c t ,  was or is such a system. 
Nevertheless, my thesis does not pretend to present a Chinese point o f 
view from inside. Although as fa r  as possible, I have t r ie d  to enter the 
minds o f  the Chinese in the kongsi in West Borneo, my v is ion remains that 
o f an outsider who looks at i t  from a great distance o f time.
Kongsi government is  here presented as genuine Chinese "democracy" 
w ithout western influence. This approach derived from a consideration of 
i t s  roots , which were deeply buried in the Chinese past. I ts  o r ig ins  - 
the Chinese partnership systems - had grown in to  maturity as early as the 
12th century when the huo-chi system gave r ise  to a managerial class. By 
that time, the system had already spread from the mountains in China to 
the seas to Japan and to Southeast Asia. Throughout the Sung dynasty, the 
Chinese partnership systems, though important economically, had no major 
p o l i t ic a l  s ign if icance. At leas t, they did not lead to a d is t in c t  and new 
p o l i t ic a l  system. During the Ming dynasty, however, Chinese partnership 
systems grew much more complex and became the foundation o f Chinese economic 
l i f e .  P a rt icu la r ly  two social groups, who were most adventurous and freedom 
loving, the sea-merchants and i l le g a l  miners, began during that period to 
construct th e ir  own government on the basis o f  partnership systems. In 
bu ild ing th e ir  democratic self-government, they combined
13. Bertrand Russell has mentioned a 34 year old experiment of partnership 
fo r  a l l  by J.S. Lewis who made a l l  the workers in his enterprises 
partners who share in p r o f i t  and share a c t ive ly  in the government of 
the whole enterprises. This as well as the move towards Industr ia l 
Democracy in the present day is  something along the same l in e  as the 
Chinese kongsi perhaps. But in d u s tr ia l democracy goes only as fa r  as 
the regulation o f industry and not the whole process o f government, 
which was open to a l l  members in Chinese kongsi.
Bertrand Russell, Authority  and the Individual (London, 1974), p.76.
6the partnership systems with Brotherhood. Consequently, ever since 1455, 
when the rebellion of Teng Mao-chi pioneered a new way of l i f e  based on 
the equality of partnership, i l lega l  miners rose up incessantly to fight  
for the i r  Brotherhood government. There were also Brotherhood governments 
of sea-merchants who were called 'p i r a t e s '  in o f f ic ia l  history. Such sea- 
merchant kingdoms in which the king was the leader of the whole Brotherhood 
and partnership,  provided another kind of po l i t ica l  partnership.
I t  is clear that  the Chinese people had begun to think in earnest 
about the p oss ib i l i ty  of Brotherhood government as a po l i t ica l  a l te rna t ive .  
After the fa l l  of the Ming dynasty, what the Chinese people was actually 
trying to do was not to put the clock back. Instead, they attempted to 
in s t i tu t e  a new form of government, the Brotherhood government. .This was 
the basic purpose of nation-wide r is ing of the T'ien-Ti Hui and of the 
Taiping Revolution. Unfortunately, the T'ien-Ti Hui has all  too often 
been misinterpreted as a res to ra t io n i s t  cause and a secret  societ movement, 
and the Taiping Revolution as only another peasant uprising. This obscures 
the fundamental sh i f t  of Chinese po l i t ica l  thinking towards Liberalism since 
the la te  Ming. I t  i s ,  moreover, saddening to observe that  the Chinese people 
did not succeed in establishing a las t ing Brotherhood government to replace 
Chinese monarchy in China. Among a great variety of complex reasons, the 
chief one, I think, is that  they t r ied  to fuse th e i r  Brotherhood government 
with the old po l i t ica l  framework - Chinese monarchy. Kongsi government, 
typif ied by those in West Borneo, was, on the contrary, completely free 
from such conservatism. Equality of partnership in i t  found full  expression 
in d irec t  "democracy" and the open process of government. This very special 
kind of Brotherhood government was undreamt of in China, and perhaps, e lse ­
where in the world as well. The seeds of i t  lay in China, but i t  only bore 
f ru i t s  in West Borneo, then throughout Southeast Asia.
By the end of the 19th century, the t rad i t ion  of Chinese kongsi or 
Chinese self-government had been uprooted by the determined e f fo r t  of the 
western powers who came to dominate Southeast Asia. The term kongsi 
survived the western impact, but i t s  original po l i t ica l  function as Chinese 
self-government had been so diminished i t  now meant no more than a commercial 
company. Once the kongsi was reduced to shadow of i t s  former s e l f ,  the 
great significance of i t s  emergence throughout Southeast Asia in the 18th 
and 19th century seems to have been forgotten, even among his tor ians .  Some
7of them s t i l l  c l ing  to the image of  kongsi as a secret society, whether 
criminal or leg it imate . Others, notably those who use the d is to r t ing  
lens of western concepts, ca l l  them republics. These misunderstandings 
lead to a s ta t i c ,  undynamic pic ture not only of kongsi but also of much 
of  Chinese h is tory .  To date, scholarship has suggested that the Chinese 
people never created any form of democracy, never experienced democracy 
or democratic l i f e  as part o f  th e i r  h is to r ica l  t ra d i t io n s .  The general 
p ic ture is s t i l l  a very conservative one, in which Western contact or 
impact alone have revolut ionised Chinese values and society as a whole.
The demoli tion of such conscious or unconscious conservatism in the under­
standing of  Chinese h is tory  can only be done by co l lec t ive  e f fo r ts  and to 
th is  end I contr ibute my own part.  This thesis is  not an attempt to revive 
the glory of  the Chinese kongsi, nor to recover a paradise los t .  I t  is 
simply a reconstruction of  the Chinese past connected with kongsi in a 
way tha t ,  by d i f fe r in g  sharply from the standard views, i n s t i l l s  a fa r  
greater sense of  dynamism into  h is to ry ,  and in to  our past and present.
8CHAPTER I
Kongs is Roots In The Organ isa t iona l  
Framework I t s e l f  and Yünnan
I. The Background of Kongsis Origins
De Groot's theory that the village institution in China held the 
origins of the Chinese kongsi s t i l l  goes unchallenged as the standard view.
J .  C. Jackson, Barbara E. Ward and Tien alike inherited this view. Even 
De Groot's most severe c r i t ic ,  Schaannk, never challenged this theory.
According to i t ,  the autonomous Chinese village institution embodies
the western principle of democracy by a general election of the village
head.'*' It  also argues that most of the Chinese in West Borneo came from
the countryside of China, and only an insignificant number of them were
from the c i t i e s .1 2 345 After their arrival,  clan and family ties formed the
basis of unity. They elected a head or patriarch who served as a rallying
point in safeguarding their well-being. The Chinese village institution
3
was thus replanted in a foreign land. This theory goes hand in hand with 
a traditional view that the Chinese peasants were driven overseas by wars, 
poverty, natural disasters and varying forms of exploitation.
Another widely accepted interpretation is the secret society theory 
which is more sophisticated and divergent. Wen Hsiung-fei and Wang Chia-chien 
regard the kongsi as the overseas branches of the T ' i e n - t i - h u i V e t h  agrees 
with them in part, but he places more emphasis on the local relevance of
5
the kongsi. To Schaannk, the kongsi were not a proliferation of the 
T'ien-ti-hui at  al l .  They were secret societies entirely founded for local 
aims. Local aims were of particular importance to the formation of the 
kongsi. For instance, long before 1854, secret societies of Montrado's
1. J .J .  De Groot, Het Kongsiwezen van Borneo (Leiden 1895), p. 84,85.
2. Ibid, p. 117.
3. Ibid.
4. Wang Chia-chien, "Wei YUan, his concept on the Maritime Defence and his 
understanding of the West" (Taipei), 1964), p. 37.
5. P.J. Veth, Borneo's Wester-afdeeling (leiden, 1856), v. l ,  p.311.
9g
kongsi were formed with an aim to overthrow the Ta-kang kongsi. In 
addit ion,  within the kongsi themselves, the half-caste  Chinese organised 
the i r  own brotherhood against the pure Chinese.^
Instead of plunging into a debate with al l  these prevailing views,
I would rather  f i r s t  t ry  to find out what the kongsi were about and how 
they were formed.
Chinese sources in regard to the kongsi organisation are woefully 
sketchy. S t i l l ,  they are indispensable.
1. Wan-kuo t i - l i  t 'u -chih^
"The Chia-yinese went into the mountains to open up the goldmines.
They themselves established a country and selected the elders called 
kongsi to run the administration for a period of one or two years."
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2. May-yüeh tung-chi chuan
"Tens of thousands of Cantonese had come to Larat opening up the 
goldmines and washing the gold-dust. For fear of the f ierce  barbarians, 
they established the i r  own heads in the same way as the local chiefs 
ruled the i r  subjects."
3. Ying-huan chih-lüeh^
". . .They elected the elders to be the k'o-chang who administered the 
kongsi for one or two years."
These sources only t e l l  us that  much. The chronicles of Lan-fang 
kongsi adds l i t t l e  more to them:^
1. Ta-ko, headman or eldest  brother.
2. Fu- t ‘ou-jen, a s s i s tan t  headman.
3. Wei-ko lao - ta ,  a ss i s tan t  headman, elder brother.
6. Schaannk, "De Kongsi's van Montrado" in TITLV, Vol. XXXV, Nos. 5&6, p.587.
7. Schaannk, p. 487.
8. Wei Yuan, Hai-kuo t 'u -ch ih  (Ann i l lu s t r a te d  t r e a t i s e  on the maritime 
kingdoms) chuan 12, Hai-tao-kuo 2, p . l  orig. pub. 1841.
9. Ibid. p .3.
10. Ibid. p .5.
11. Appendix in Lo., p .141.
10
Ta-ko presided over the whole kongsi as the head of state. 
Fu-t'ou-jen and wei-ko lao-ta were elected to both the d is t r ic t  and 
central positions of leadership. But, while fu-t 'ou-jen was paid by 
the kongsi, wei-ko lao-ta only held an honorary position.
Unlike the Chinese sources in China, the English sources provide
first-hand information. Earl, who had personally visited Monirado,
12called the leaders kongsi and the ordinary goldminers 'coolies' .
In Takang kongsi, each d is t r ic t ,  according to him, was governed by 
several representatives who were also called kongsi. They, in turn, 
elected the governor to the central leadership. Important matters were 
not left  to the governor alone. He was expected to consult the d is t r ic t  
representatives. ^
Although Crawfurd himself had not been in Montrado, he was informed 
by the Chinese that there were 13 large goldmines and 57 small ones. The 
large goldmines were in general operated under the wage system. Monthly 
wages were given to the workers by the capitalists.  In contrast, the 
small mines were operated under the kongsi system. The labourers conducted
., 14the operation and shared the proceeds on terms of perfect equality. 
Generally, the large mines employed 100 to 200 men, including both
15labourers and overseers. The work force of small mines was 10 to 50.
Finally, Dutch sources: they are the best informed for the obvious
reason that they were derived from a long and direct contact with the 
kongsi. Therefore, we are able to draw some diagrams of the organisation 
based on them:
District Kongsi
2 or more clerks (Djoeroe-toelis) 
in charge of finance, daily adminis­
tration and police.
1 or more overseer (ma'1im) who super­
vised the miners at work and collected 
the gold from them. (4 month's office)
12. G.W. Earl, The Eastern Seas (London, 1837), p.279.
13. Earl, p.290,291.
14. J. Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, (London, 1820), 
Vol.III, p.474, 475.
15. Ibid.
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Central Kongsi
1 general head ( Kapitan or Panglima)
2 c le rks , one fo r  f inanc ia l adm inistr­
a tion , the other fo r  provision.
1 ma11im keeping money and accounts 
7 t s 1 a i - k1u or orang tuah, represent- 
atives from the subordinate kongsi
Source: Veth, v . l  p. 319, 320
O ff ice r o f 
4 months
o f f ic e
1 huo-chang or inspector, who ruled the 
labourers, saw to the steady progress 
o f work, regulated work hours and sett led  
disputes in the mines and taking care 
o f the waterwork.
O fficers of 
4 months 
o f f ic e
Source: De Rees; Montrado p.82
Great mines
Small mines
2 Djoeroe-toel is or administrators who 
kept accounts, purchased a l l  the 
necessities, dealt with correspondence 
and legal proceedings.
3 t s 1a i - k 1u mandoors or foremen. They 
were the heads o f lower rank.
2 huo-chang mine heads
3 t s ' a i - k 1u including 1 book-keeper,
1 money keeper and 1 storekeeper
8 ting-kung foremen
1 huo-chang
2 t s ' a i - k 1u
4 ting-kung
Source: Schaank p. 571
From a l l  the above sources, we may put a whole p icture o f kongsi 
organisation together in a l i s t .  I t  w i l l  enable us to see very c le a r ly  
that many d i f fe re n t  terms and t i t l e s  were used by those holding the 
same position in the adm inistra tion.
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Position Tit ies Sources
1. The highest leader Kapitan Veth
ta-ko Yeh Hsian-yün
Po Yeh Schaank
2. Head kongsi Wan-kuo t i -1i ,
Earl
tung-shih Yeh
k'o-chang Hsu Chi-yu
Hsien Ch'ing-kao
f u - t ' ou-jen Yeh
huo-chanq De Rees
Schaannk
3. Cl erk Djoeroe-toelis Veth, De Rees
t  s 1 a i - k1 u Schaannk
4. Foreman ma11 i m Veth
t s ' a i - k 1u De Rees
t i  ng-kung Schaannk
5. Ordinary worker coolie Earl
kung-jen Yeh
huo-chi Schaank
The term kung-jen is used by Yeh when he related the episode of
Lo1's conquest of the gold l a k e . T h e  workers under tung-shih Chang A-
were won over by Lo and treated as his brothers.* Such brotherly t r e a t ­
ment was not a strategy nor limited to Lang-fang kongsi. Brotherhood was 
a t rad i t ion  of kongsi. I t  was a way of l i f e  in the pioneering kongsi 
which could not survive otherwise.
Ts1 a i - k 1 u was not a foreman. Obviously, De Rees has made a 
mistake here, because the term i t s e l f  in Chinese means treasurer .
There seems to have been two modes of production in Montrado.
In the big mines, the division between capital  and labour was d is t in c t iv e .
16. Appendix in Lo., p. 138.
17. Ibid.
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The smalT mines, however, seem as yet to have evidence of class 
polarisation. In the Chinese tin mining kongsi of Banakoin the early 
18th century, fraternity and equality were a living reality. In the 
words of Thomas Horsfield:
"No difference of rank or conditions amongst the workmen 
at one mine; the work is undertaken in fellowship and 
they share equally in the produce; the labour connected 
with the process of mining is performed by all indiscrimin­
ately.
Nevertheless, in West Borneo, i t  was equally true of the small 
or pioneering kongsi. There, those who worked at a daily rate were 
called kuli-kongsi. Of course, they were the wage labourers in a modern 
sense. On the other hand, those workers who participated in the gain or 
loss were called hun (Hokien dialect) or fen. ^
All the terms which we have pieced together are very significant. 
In fact, they are the living organism in the body of kongsi. Each term 
represents an origin or history of a system. Each system is closely 
linked with the rise of Chinese private enterprise, which was already 
afoot as early as the 12th century.
18. Thomas Horsfield, "Sketch of the Process of Mining" in Journ. of 
Ind. Arch. , 1848, Vol. 2, p.811.
19. Posewitz, Borneo: i ts  Geology and mineral Resources (London, 1892),
p.359.
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2. Links with Yünnan's Private Copper Mining - K'o-chang, Mi-fen and Coolie 
The fen system
When and where were the k'o-chang, coolie and fen systems born?
Before they had found their ways overseas, what were they all about? 
Certainly, they were not the sea birds that could themselves migrate over­
seas. Their migration instead was done by the bearers of the systems - the 
miners. What were these people then? Were they originally peasants? 
Merchants? Or miners? Were they from the countryside or the cities of 
China? Whatever they were, one thing is sure, they were the people who 
had learnt at least something about mining technology and organisation in 
China.
In the Yünnan copper mining which began to be of national signific-
o n
ance abOL,t 1685, all these systems could be found. But the fen system
i ts e l f  seems to have already been operative in organising copper mining in
21Yünnan two centuries earl ier. Wang shih-hsin tes tif ies  as follows:
"Everywhere Yunnan is rich with mine ore. Where the mines are yet 
to be established, the small people go to dig the ore freely. They only 
make a bare subsistence for themselves. But once the mines are already 
established the mine-heads or tung-t1ou report them to the
official to apply for licenses. Depending on the size of the mine, the 
mine-head decides how many miners or i-fu to be recruited. All
of them are under his control.
Before the mine has got going, every expense is borne by the mine- 
head himself. For a big mine, the expenses amounted to thousands of 
taels. When the ore is already dug out and ready for processing, the 
official inspects i t .  Everyday, the miners go into the mine to work. In 
the evening, they bring the ore out and pile i t  into heaps which they 
divide into four. One heap goes to the official tax, one to the common
20. Yen Chung-p'ing, Ch'ing-tai Yun-nan tung-cheng-kao, (Shanghai, 1948), 
P-1.
21. Wang Shih-hsin, Kuan-chih - i - i  v.5 in Lee Lung-chien, "A tentative 
view on the elements of capitalism in the Ming mining industry", in 
£KTP, v.2, p.230.
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expenses, one to the mine-head, and one heap is  divided again by the 
miners themselves on a equal basis."
This was legal mining. Meanwhile, the o f f i c ia l  records were 
crowded with a lo t  o f i l le g a l  mining a c t iv i t ie s .  Some i l le g a l  minings 
were carried on secretly  and q u ie t ly  in the remote mountains beyond the 
reach o f the o f f i c i a l .  But a number o f them took the form of armed 
resistance, openly challenging the a u th o r i t ie s .  From 1442, the o f f i c ia l  
monopoly po licy  on s i lv e r  mining touched o f f  incesiant miner uprisings which
pp
ended only about 1639, with the Minq dynasty.
The upris ing o f Yeh Chung-1 iu in 1455 was inaugurated with a note 
o f warning which the miners sent to the Ming o f f i c i a l :
"You be tte r le t  us have the s i lv e r  mine or ch'ang at Pao-feng (in
23the border area o f Fukien and Chekiang ), otherwise, we w i l l  k i l l  you."
And so they openly seized the o f f i c ia l  s i lv e r  mines one a f te r  another
by force, f lo u t in g  the a u th o r it ie s . The actual uprising i t s e l f  was sparked
o f f  by an attempt o f a Ming o f f i c i a l ,  Chu-yen, to a rrest the miners.
24Chu-yen was k i l le d  by them and Yeh proclaimed himself a king. Yeh's
forces are said to have been only a few hundred, although i t  seems more
25probably to have been 2000 at least. However, th e ir  ranks were soon 
swelled with followers who were given the confiscated property o f corrupt 
o f f ic ia ls  and landlords. As a re s u lt ,  county a f te r  county f e l l  in to  th e ir  
hands, and the whole border area between Fukien and Chekicmg was con­
t ro l le d  by them.
A Revolution blazed away in 1448 when they a l l ie d  themselves with the 
more powerful insurgent groups comprising merchants, miners, poor c i t iz e n s , 
and peasants led by Teng Mao-chi. Teng Mao-chi, who is  said to have been 
an i l le g a l  miner himself, f led  to Lin-hua o f Fukien and established himself
22. Pai Shou-i, "The development of the mining industry in the Ming period" 
in CKTP, p.964, 965.
23. Ming Yin-chung S h ih - lu , 136;1.
24. Ming-shih, 172;60; 12, 'H is tory  of Ming'
25. Ming-shih chi-sh ih Pen-mo, 31;1, Hung C hiu- lu , 10; 121
Lee Lung-chien, "The characte ris t ics  o f the upris ing of Yeh Chung-liu
and Teng mao-chi", in L i-sh ih  chiao-hsueh, (Peking, 1957), no.3, p.12.
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as a leader o f the merchant union there. As a way to public ise his
revolutionary manifesto, he proclaimed himself the King o f Equality and
27vowed in public  to demolish every inequa lity  in the imperial ru le .
Within a year th e ir  forces had snowballed in to  hundreds o f thousands, and 
they had complete control over the whole o f Fukien province. Although 
the regime o f miners and merchants was very s h o r t- l ive d , i t  d id , in that 
period, mark a turning point.
I l le g a l mining promised no success, no secu rity , no comfort. None­
theless, to the miners i t  offered something l ik e  a paradise. Private
28mining, both legal and i l l e g a l ,  was a l l  based on the fen system.- But in 
i l le g a l  mining the p r o f i t  was shared only among the miners, inc lud ing the 
leader, and o f f i c ia l  tax was out o f the question. I t  offered freedom from 
the o f f i c ia l  exp lo ita t io n ,  the equa lity  o f p ro f i t -sh a r in g , and the brother­
hood in which they l ived .
The fen system in the early Ch'ing period had u lt im a te ly  grown in to
a synthesis o f the coolie and huo-chi systems. I t  was th is  synthesis which
contributed considerably to the YUnnan copper boom so well known in Chinese
mining h is to ry . Wang Shung re lates how in  general the copper mining got
29started in great d e ta i l :
26. Lee Lung-chien, p.16.
Hung c h iu - lu , 9; 119, 10;121
Teng's r ise  to influence in the local community derived much from his 
command of two very important o f f ic e .  His presidency o f a v i l la g e  
market which he had personally founded gathered increasing numbers 
o f followers among the merchants, peasants and peddlers. His o f f ic e  
o f the Tsung-hsiao-chia (the superintendent o f v i l la g e  guards)
enabled him to command the local defense forces fo r  his armed backing. 
The two positions were indeed the ladder to success fo r  the men with 
no p a r t ic u la r  social status nor great means and wealth l ik e  him.
M. Tanaka, in Mindaishi Konso Henshniikai (Tokyo, 1962), p.642.
27. Fu-chien t 'ung-ch ih , (Provincial gazetteer o f Fukien) Comp, by Ch'en 
Shou-sh' i , 1968. 8;5.
28. Pai has mistaken Yeh chung-1iu as the employer of the miners whom he 
led in seizing government mines. Yeh was, I believe, ac tua lly  a tung- 
tou or a leader o f the miners who raised the common fund. c f .  Pai, 
p.985, 986.
29. Wang Shung, "Kuan-ch'ang chai-len pen" in YTCK Vol.9, chap. 73, p . 14.
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"As a ru le ,  the mining settlements or ch1angs are situated in 
remotest mountains. . .The miners or ch'ang-mins opened the Copperfields 
by digging tunnels through the mountains. . .The leader who supplied 
capita l and recru i ted workers was cal led kuan-shih. Everyone in the 
sett lement regardless o f  status is cal led t i - h s iu n g , brother, or hsiao- 
huo-chi, small partner. "
Much overlapping o f  terms often occured w i th in  the same system.
Kuan-shih was also cal led huo-fang by Tang Chui and w o- t1ou by
Ni Chen-shu. Ch1ang in the pioneering period was cal led huo-fang, which
was establ ished by twenty or t h i r t y  people who brought some provision
and b u i l t  tents there. Oil and r ice were the most important things to
31them, o i l  fo r  burning lamps in mines, r ice fo r  meals. As fo r  es tab l ish­
ing a huo-fang, as Yen suggests, i t  required only a small amount of 
32cap i ta l .  Since the head man who poineered the huo-fang had the job 
of ra is ing cap i ta l ,  i t  was not surpris ing that he was cal led huo-fang 
or wo- t 'ou .
The fen system to which the o r ig in  of the Chinese kongsi in
Southeast Asia is re ferred,  was a way to share capital and p r o f i t .
O r ig in a l ly ,  i t  was cal led mi- fen. This could be a group of people who
gathered together to launch a mining enterprise. Mostly, they were
fr iends or re la t ions of each other. Each of  them went around to borrow
r ice and pooled th e i r  resources together. The p ro f i t s  were divided by
each one in accordance with how much r ice he had contributed to the 
33common fund.
34Mi-fen could also be one such case described by Ni Lui as fo l lows:
"The news of the discovery o f  a new mine-f ie ld  brought people with 
capital  from far  and near to YUnnan. These people are cal led ch1ang-ko. 
Sometimes, one person alone and sometimes a few people together choose a
31. Wang Shung, p.65.
32. Yen Chung-p'ing, p.67.
33. Yuan Yuan, comp. YUn-nan t 1ung-chih-kao (A General Gazetteer of 
Yunnan), (1835), hereafter YNTCK, Vol .9, chuan. 74. Kuan-ch'ang
2. p .22.
34. Ni Lui, "A l e t t e r  in discussion of  the matters of mining sett lements" in 
Huang-ch'ao chih-shih wen-pien, (1873) chuan 52, ch'ang-chi, p.14.
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mine, estimate the needed number of miners and the cost of daily necess­
i t i e s .  Then, accordingly the fund or capital is raised. When the mine 
makes a p ro f i t ,  i t  is s p l i t  into ten shares a f t e r  tax. One goes to the 
technician and foreman, three to the workers, and six to the ch1 ang-ko. 1
The coolie system
The original meaning of the term coolie is quite the opposite of 
the present usage. Far from being a derogatory term for the unskilled 
workman or porter ,  i t  was a term that  gave everyone involved in the mining 
partnership an equal s ta tus .  I t  was all  embracing, as Wu Chi-chüan 
stated:
"Gathering partners to open up a mine together is cal led sh ih-fen . 
Shih-fen is actually mi-fen. The coolies call the tung-fu (the one who 
raises capi ta l )  wo-t 'ou. The tung-fu ca l ls  the coolies t i -h s iung . The 
t i t l e s  of coolies d i f fe r  widely according to the jobs and respons ib i l i t ie s
Coolie here meant hired labour and tung-fu the people of the mine. 
The reason why the one who founded the mine was called wo-t'ou is already 
explained above. But i t  is s ign if ican t  that  the tung-fu called all  his 
coolies brothers and they called him wo-tou. Coolies included the 
manager, kuan-shih, the ins t ruc to r ,  hs iang- t1ou, the overseer, 1 in-pan, 
the profi t-sharing worker, ch'in-sheng and the monthly wage worker,
0(T
yUeh-huo and so on. The term coolie embraced a wide spectrum of 
workers, sk i l led  and unskilled, employed on a basis of wage or partnership
The mi-fen system combined the cool ie and huo-chi systems together. 
Thus, everyone in the mine was called t i -h s iu n g , brother or hsiao-huo-chi, 
small partner.  This is a fact  which I have already mentioned, a fact  
that  speaks for i t s e l f .  Although cool ie was apparently never used by the 
'employer1, ch'ang-ko, but only by the employees in calling themselves, 
both the ch ' ang-ko and his coolies were partners to each other. They 
were equal to each other soc ia l ly ,  although ch'ang-ko had a bigger share
35. Wu Chi-chun, in Peng, ed. SKYSCL (1840-49) Vol. 1 (Peking 1967), 
p. 338.
36. Ibid.
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in the profit. The brotherhood in the mine was actually based on the 
mi-fen system which bound the ch1ang-ko and coolies together.
The k'o-ch1 ang system
Ko-ch'ang played a pivotal role in those self-ruled mining
37settlements. As Tang-Chui related:
"In every mining settlement, the people elect an honest and 
experienced person as their head. He is called k1o-ch1ang. With the 
consensus of the people, he sets up the severest rules. Anyone who 
offends the rules, takes the punishment and humiliation without complaint."
He acted as the arbitrator to sett le  disputes over mining rights 
38as well. With such a power and prestige invested in him, he embodied 
the self-government of the mines. His power to enforce the law and order 
set up by the miners themselves was identical to that of the leaders of 
the kongsi in West Borneo.
But, his power was reduced to the shadow of i ts  former self , when
the government exerted i ts  control over the mines. In cases like big
mining settlements too big to avoid official control or big mines
financed by big capital, an official was appointed by the government to
39rule the settlement. This official was called ch'ang chu responsible 
for jurisdiction and taxation. K'o-chang was but one of the seven heads 
who served as the administrators under him. The power of k'o-chang was 
reduced to controlling the merchants in the mining town. Consequently, 
the autonomy of the mining settlement had lost in the eclipse of 
k1o-chang.
Small mines in the remote mountains were outside the government's 
control. In order to remain independent, they used the tactics of 
guerilla warfare against the Ch'ing government. Some of them like 
Ch'ing-1ung-shan (Green Dragon Mountain) and Fung-huan-p' o (Phoenix Slope)
37. Tang Chui, p .3.
38. Wang Shung, p. 15.
39. Ibid. On the administration of mines, see also
Bt ■1 ix).y.nl
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were situated in deep and remote mountains. Some o f them l ik e  Chien-chu 
(Arrow-bamboo) and Chin-sha (Golden-sand) mines were joined with the 
borders o f neighbouring provinces. The tracks there were spreading l ik e  
the veins o f  leaves to everywhere. The i l le g a l  miners always hid there 
to dig the mines or process the copper. They had chosen the high 
mountains or deep forests fo r  escape. Once, the government troops 
attempted to track them down, but they a l l  disappeared qu ick ly w ithout 
a t r a c e . W a n g  Tai-yüeh, a Ch'ing o f f i c i a l ,  thus described them as 
cunning and stubborn without any o f f ic ia l  id e n t i f ic a t io n  o f th e i r  o r ig ins . 
To them, there was no way that the Ch'ing government was going to success­
fu l l y  exert i t s  con tro l.
They, nevertheless, did not refuse to pay tax. What they resisted
was the o f f i c ia l  con tro l. Out of a tank o f copper, 20 to 30 ca tt ies
went to the government, and a few ca tt ies  to the k 1o-chang and h s i- t 'o u ,
the leader o f metal workers. The rest o f i t  was shared by the miners
41who brought i t  to trade in elsewhere fa r  fa r  away. The number o f the
42autonomous mines is  said to have amounted to twenty or t h i r t y .
In fa c t ,  the so called 'sm a ll ' mines were not small at a l l .  When
the copper boom was in i t s  beginning, the big mines are said to have
employed tens o f thousands of people and even in the small ones the
43miners were counted by thousands. The workers in both big and small 
mines increased tenfo ld in the f u l l  bloom o f the copper boom.^ The big 
mine was counted by hundreds o f thousands o f people and the small mine 
by tens o f thousands. A mine which employed thousands to tens of
40. Wang Tai-ylieh, in HCCS, 52;8.
41. Ib id .
42. Ib id .
43. Ni Sheng-shu in YTCK, 74; Kuan-ch'ang 2;26
The Ch'ing court set a price to buy copper from the 20 over small 
mines around the Green Dragon mountain. The price was that 4 taels 
fo r  a hundred ca tt ies  o f copper. Whereas in other provinces, the 
price fo r  a hundred ca tt ies  o f copper was 9 or 10 taels or even 
more. On the other hand, the Ch'ing o f f i c ia l  gave the big mines 
a much be tte r p r ice , 6.4 tae ls per hundred ca tt ie s . Such a d is ­
crim ination surely fu r the r fueled the resentment of the small mines. 
No wonder, the small mines fought desparately to withhold th e ir  
autonomy and to smuggle out th e ir  copper, 
c f.  Wang Tai-yUeh in HCCS, 52;6,7,8.
44. Peng, ed. SKYS (1840-1949) (Peking, 1957), p .339.
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thousands o f people is  not small by any standards especia lly  i f  compared 
with those Chinese mining settlements in Southeast Asia.
Soon, the copper boom attracted big cap ita l from everywhere. Big
merchant groups from Hunan, Hupei, Kian^sw, Kiangsi, Chekiang, Szechwan,
Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces poured in th e i r  investments. To open a
45mine, they usually spent 100,000 to 200,000 tae ls . Meanwhile, labourers 
from a l l  these provinces were also a ttracted by the booming industry in 
Yünnan. As a re su lt  o f the in f lu x  o f these people, the to ta l number o f the 
miners amounted to more than a m i l l i o n . ^
During the hey day o f the boom (1736-1821), there was said to have 
been well over 300 mines in Yünnan. Though the small mines were fa r  more 
numerous, th e ir  production in to ta l was less than h a lf  tha t o f the big 
mi nes.^
In general, the economic foundation of the big mines was the monthly 
wage system, and as a ru le , they were d ire c t ly  contro lled by the government. 
The small mines by contrast, s t i l l  retained the mi-fen system and th e ir  
autonomy.
In respect of s e l f - ru le ,  the small mines in Yünnan had foreshadowed 
the Chinese kongsi overseas. The synthesis o f the mi-fen and coolie systems 
had found a new form o f existence in these kongsi. The Chinese miners in 
early Ming had b u i l t  a democratic l i f e  on the basis o f brotherhood and 
partnership in th e ir  mines. Already in 1448, a new social force headed by 
Teng Mao-chi pioneered a new way o f l i f e  based on equa lity , on new social 
values. Although the miner uprisings ended with the Ming dynasty, the 
incessant struggle fo r  democracy and equality  of the miners went on q u ie t ly  
in the i l le g a l  mining a c t iv i t ie s  during the period o f Ch'ing. The feudal 
regimes were only able to put down miner uprisings. But, they could never
45. Ib id .
46. Ib id .
47. Wang Tai-yüeh, p.8.
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suppress the ro o t .o f  democracy and equal i ty  in the mines —  the fen system 
that had gone deep in to  every single aspect of  the Chinese pr ivate enter­
pr ise, alongside with the wage system.^
48. So fa r ,  no Chinese Marxist his torians have had any good words fo r  the 
k'o-chang system. Al l  see i t  as an instrument of the feudal regime to 
oppress and exp lo i t  the miners. They are too biased to see that the 
root of autonomy in small mines lay in the system, to appreciate i t s  
revolut ionary s ignif icance.
Li Shu , in CKCS, Vol.4, p.6.
Liu Yung-ch'eng , in CKCS, Vol.2, p .318.
Wang Ming-lun , in CKCS, Vol.2, p .197.
He accuses the mi-fen system fo r  exp lo i t ing  the miners more than the 
wage system.
Ch'ung Han-hsian in CKCS Vol.4, p.53.
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CHAPTER I I
A H e r i ta g e  From the Chinese P a r tn e rs h ip  
Systems in  the Land and Sea
1. Equality o f Partnership in the Land - the Huo-chi System.
We have derived, from YUnnan mining ch* 1angs, the answer to where 
the k 1o-chang, coolie and mi - fen systems f i r s t  arose. They seemed, 
however, to have l e f t  no trace as regards the o r ig ins  o f the huo-chang 
and t s - a i - k 1u systems. Where were the o r ig ins  o f the systems? And is  
there any connection o f s ign if icance between the o r ig ins  o f the two systems 
which seemed so d is jo in ted  and developed separately?
I th ink , there is .  The in d ire c t  but essential "b lood-t ie " is  the 
huo-chi system. As mentioned above, in the coolie system, everyone was 
called t i-hs iung  or hsiao-huo-chi. This fac t forges a l in k  between the 
huo-chi and coolie systems. The l in k ,  in fa c t ,  is  not only in terminology. 
Both had so much in common in the most fundamental aspect —  the sharing 
o f cap ita l and p ro f i ts  — and in the sense o f partnership as w e ll.  Though
I am not very sure as to which system derived from which, I have more
evidence to show tha t the huo-chi system came e a r l ie r .  The term huo-chi
may have only come to l ig h t  in la te  Ming, but the system i t s e l f  went back
as early as the Tang Dynasty. The system had already become widely used
by d i f fe re n t  social groups during the Sung times. We are to ld  that not 
only the sea merchants, especia lly  those from Fukien, the i l le g a l  tea 
merchants and s a l t  merchants, but also the wine shopkeepers and the farmers 
used the system to get th e ir  business going.
By the time of Ming, the system grew dominant. I t  had sp i l le d  
over to almost every aspect of Chinese economic l i f e  ever since. I t  
had been recognised as the key to Shansi merchants' success in commerce 
by both Chin-1u and shao-i-ch ih :
"The big merchants of Ping-yang and ch1ih-1u were the r ichest in 
China. Unless th e ir  wealth well passed the mark o f  hundreds o f thousands
24
tae ls , they would not regard themselves as r ich . In doing business, they 
had an exce llent way. Their method valued personal in te g r i ty  above every­
thing else. Everyone o f those who worked together on a basis of partner­
ship was called huo-chi. One o f them supplied the cap ita l and the rest 
shared i t .  Though no oath was taken, none o f them would cheat each other. 
I f  someone had borrowed money with in te re s t  and died, even long a f te r  
his death, his children or grandchildren would never f a i l  to repay i t .
This u n fa i l in g  repayment of debt was done even when i t  involved much 
sweat and t o i l .  Therefore, other people w ith cap ita l a l l  scrambled to 
have them as commercial partners. The reason was that i f  they could 
honour the debt o f the dead, ce r ta in ly  they would not betray the l iv in g .  
Once in a partnership, by paying only a l i t t l e  in te re s t  f i r s t ,  they could 
la te r  have great p ro f i ts  f a l l  in to  th e ir  laps. With or w ithout ca p ita l ,  
everyone o f them was thereby able to have a means o f l ive l ih o o d . The 
r ich , furthermore, did not keep th e ir  wealth id le  at home, but instead 
dispersed i t  among commercial partners or in to  huo-chis. Only the number 
o f big or small commercial partnerships he had was thus counted when 
assessing an in d iv id u a l 's  wealth. In th is  way, many m il l io n a ire s  could 
be counted. Thanks to partnerships, the r ich  could not suddenly plummet 
in to  poverty, whereas the poor could shoot up to wealth immediately.
Their commercial practice was so excellent and th e ir  personal in te g r i ty  
noble indeed."^
Shao-i-chih has also to ld  another success story of the big merchants 
o f Shin-tu whose riches had reached the standard o f hundreds o f thousands 
of tae ls . Their success was by no means a single man's e f fo r t .  Very 
o ften, the big merchant had some assistants whose honesty in money won his 
complete t ru s t .  When the day o f d is t r ib u t in g  the in te re s t and p ro f i ts
p
came, the assistants then began to s ta r t  th e i r  own business.
While i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to determine in what province the system was 
popular in the 12th century, we can pinpoint those in the Ming period 
with confidence. The huo-chi system was current among the merchant groups 
o f Fukien, Kv^rwjtung,K»«ngsu and Chekiang, although Fu I - l in g  has only
1. Fu I - l in g ,  Ming-ch'ing sh ih -ta i shang-jen chi shang-yeh tzu-pen 
(Merchants and mercantile cap ita l in Ming and Ch' in g t im e s ) ,  (Peking, 
1956), p .86.
2. Hsi Ta - l in  in CKTP, p.912.
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pointed out those o f Shansi and Anhui.
Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, the huo-chi system rose 
to a new peak o f strength with the s ig n if ic a n t  growth o f  private enter­
prises not only in commerce but also in  mining. A good example o f i t s  
expansion was the private coal mining at Hsi-shan Ment-tou-kou in Peking, 
which started in 1596. As a re su lt  o f angry demonstrations by investors, 
workers and porters against the o f f i c ia l  e x to r t io n , the Ming court had 
in 1603 adopted more l ib e ra l po licy  towards private coal m ining.^
However, what contributed most to a rapid growth o f pr iva te  coal mining 
a f te r  tha t,  was not only these o f f ic ia l  concessions; i t  also flourished 
on the strength o f the huo-chi system which gave i t  the framework o f 
l i f e .  A contract o f 1655 throws some l ig h t  on the way the system worked:
"Entering upon a new partnership with Kao I and Yang Wen-hua, the 
contractor, Chiao Yun-lu was prepared to w rite  o f f  a l l  the past expenses. 
Chiao is  the landlord o f the coal-mine and his grandfather had been, in 
the Ming dynasty, a partner o f Kao's grandfather in coal mining. Now, 
in Ch'ing's time, Kao and Yang renewed the partnership by supplying the 
ca p ita l .  I t  was agreed that the proceeds should be s p l i t  in to  60 j ih s  
or d iv is ions . Chiao is e n t i t le d  to 10 j i h s , Yang and Kao 30, and the 
Ching government 20. I t  was also agreed tha t p ro f i t -sh a r in g  be on a 
basis o f equa lity  when the coal is  produced and the cost o f production 
deducted.
Nov. 11 the second year o f Shun Chih 
Signatories o f the partners 
Yang Wen-hua 
Kao I
Chiao Yün-lu 
Witness
Sun Chien 
Liu Ch'en-fang 
Ch'ao Yin-feng
3. The huo-chi system was widely practiced in the Chinese junk trade 
notably carried by the sea merchant groups o f Fukien and Kwangtung. 
I t  w i l l  be dealt with in de ta il presently.
4. Teng Tuo , From Wan Li to Ch'ien-lung in CKCS v . l ,  p.255.
5. Ib id , p .258.
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I t  is one out o f  the 137 contracts of the pre-Ch1ien-1ung period 
(previous to 1736), col lected by Teng Tuo as a f r u i t  of his f i e l d  work.
The underlying signif icance is well brought out by Teng's own words:
" I t  indicates that the system o f  fen-ku ho-huo, or the partnership 
system, was preva i l ing in coal mining of the time. Obviously the pre- g
dominant cha rac te r is t ic  of  pr ivate capita l in those days was th is  system.
A l i v e l y  s p i r i t  o f  partnership also features those contracts. The 
signatories repeatedly swore th e i r  loya l ty  to the partnership. Words 
l i k e :  "No p r o f i t  was possible without partnership"; "Be one heart and
one mind and one partnership fo re v e r " !6 7 were not untypical o f  th e i r  
vows which sealed the contracts. They sounded remarkably l i k e  p o l i t i c a l  
slogans of working class s o l id a r i t y ,  although they were nonpo l i t ica l  in 
nature and only involved the merchants. Yet, they were a l l  f i l l e d  with 
the vigour, the dream, and the s p i r i t  of partnership, the very substance 
that formed a new age in China.
6. Ib id .
Teng's refreshing approach and work did break a new ground in th is  
f i e l d .  A great p i ty  is that he only published about 20 out o f  his 
co l lec t ion .
7. Ib id . , p.261.
The c r i t i c s  of Teng, T'ang Li and Chang interpreted j i h  as the pro­
portion of ra t io  in the share of p r o f i t ,  which is correct. But they 
tended to overlook the sign if icance o f  the l i -huo or partnership 
system. Moreover, the extent of  the government control and the 
importance of o f f i c i a l  accounts seem to be overstressed.
27
2. Chinese Democratic Life on Seas - A Tradition of the Overseas 
Chinese Trade
This was the age of great po l i t ica l  and social change. This was 
the age when the sea merchant groups, especial ly those of Fukien and 
Kwangtung, rose to importance and power in Chinese history. Their r ise  
defeated the notorious maritime in te rd ic t  of Ming and early Ch' ing by the ir  
piracy and smuggling on the basis of the partnership system. Overseas 
adventure was the order of the day which highlighted a new orientat ion 
and the r is ing  expectations of the Chinese people towards freedom and 
wealth. Chou Hsien-wei has noted with envy:
"The wicked merchants of Fukien and 
Kwangtung used to have commercial 
intercourse with foreign countries 
i l l e g a l ly .  Usually of a ship, the 
r ichest  was elected as the head to 
loan i t  with cargo. The res t  of the 
merchants followed him to overseas 
with th e i r  own goods and cap i ta l .
The p ro f i t  was so marvellous, ag
thousand-fold sometimes."
The gazetteer of Chang-chou prefecture in the Ch'ung-chen reign 
(1628-44) confirmed th is :
"The men of Chang-chou often build 
great vessels and trade with foreign 
countries far  away. Those of moder­
ate means pool th e i r  capital and i t  
also happens that  those of means lend
9
money for the purpose."
8. Chou Hsien-wei , Chien-lin shü-chi in Han-fen Ion mei-chi
, chi 8, p .37-
9. Quote Mark Elvin, p.224.
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However, as a matter o f fa c t ,  the partnership system sailed 
with the Chinese junks overseas long before the 16th century. As early 
as the early  11th century, i t  had already gone in to  the record o f Chu Huo:
"The sea vessels, the big ones had 
several hundreds of people and the 
small ones hundred over in general.
The big merchants were elected as 
kan-shou or the captain, fu-kan-shou 
or v ice-capta in, tsu-shih or the admin­
is t ra to r .  They were given red seals by 
the maritime o f f i c i a l ,  and entrusted 
with the power to administer ju s t ic e  
on the s h ip ." ^
During that period and throughout the Sung dynasty, the Chinese
overseas trade basked in the o f f i c ia l  patronage. Many measures were
taken by the Sung court to encourage foreign trade. I t  dangled an
o f f ic e  before any captain who could induce foreign ships with a cargo
11worth no less than 50,000 str ings to China. I t  provided to the foreign
traders, apart from conceding low custom duties (only 10%), big feasts
12
on th e ir  a r r iva ls  and departures. So successful was the po licy tha t
foreign trade had, from the second h a lf  o f the 10th century to the 12th
13century, risen from 2% to 20% of the annual revenue.
The ov't'n-door po licy  was, however, abruptly ended w ith a ban on 
the overseas trade by the Ming emperor Hung-wu in 1394. Nevertheless,
10- Chu Huo, Ping-chou k 'o - ta n , (Shanghai, 1941 re p .) ,  p.18.
See also Needham, v.4, p t.3 , p .461.
11. Kuan L i-chüan , 'The spice trade in Sung's Canton' in SLC, vo l.2 ,
p. 82.
12. Ib id .
13. Li Chien-lung , Sung-Yüan-Ming chinq-chi shih-kao, (a d ra f t  o f
the economic h is to ry  o f the periods o f  Sung, YUan, Ming dynasties.) 
(Peking, 1957), p .163, 166, 170.
I ,  therefore, th ink that the two centuries long depression o f over­
seas trade did not ac tua lly  happen. This mistake o f Mark Elvin 
however, does not diminish the fac t that his work remains a landmark 
fo r i t s  imaginative and refreshing q u a l i t ie s .
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the maritime in te rd ic t  was never e f fe c t iv e  in r e a l i t y .  When seduced by
14the great p r o f i t ,  the people forgot a l l  about the ban. Thus, the Ming 
court had to repeatedly proclaim the ban which was a v ir tu a l  dead le t te r .  
Despite the death penalty, the pr iva te  traders s t i l l  went ahead with th e ir  
overseas adventures. An early example o f th is  was the f i r s t  commercial 
expedition to L iu -ch ' iu  by some 500 priva te  traders in 1414. Everyone 
in the ship had a share o f p r o f i t ,  8 to 10 taels at the least and 30 to 40 
taels a t the most. The second expedition was making much smaller p r o f i t  
although the partners were s k i l le d  a rt isans . They were the reputed sea- 
merchants o f Chang-chou and Ch'üan-chou who had long been taking the leading 
role in the Si no-Japanese trade ever since the Sung dynasty period.
Through piracy and smuggling, the Chinese overseas trade expanded 
fu r th e r in the Ming dynasty period. Despite i t s  ups and downs, the 
expansion on the whole was on an even keel. I t  was on the same basis o f 
the partnership system. But, by now, i t  had on board a new set of terms 
fo r  the organisation. For instance, the captain was no longer called kan-shou 
but p1o-chu or ch1uan-chu. I t  was th is  period tha t the terms kapitan and 
huo-chang and t s 1a i- fu  made th e ir  debut in Chinese h is to ry . Here we h i t  
upon the missing l in k  between the k'o-chang and huo-chang systems. Accord­
ing to Tung-hsi-yang-k'ao, p'o-chu was the captain, and huo-chang the
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navigator or p i lo t  who had absolute command on navigation.
Tung-hsi yang-k'ao speaks o f the ch1uan-chu as the leader of the 
ship-merchants. But according to a Japanese source, the ship-merchants had 
th e ir  own leader called k 1o-chang and huo-chang was the leader o f the crew.
Ch1uan-chu, t s 1a i - f u , k 1o-chang and huo-chang constituted the top leader­
ship o f the shipboard organisation, as well as the partnership o f the ship.
The seamen were a l l  called kung-chüeh. This term in Nagasaki was wrongly 
pronounced as kuo-sha and in Ch'üan-chou where i t  derived from was actua lly  
called kung-sha. ^
14. c f .  Mark E lv in , p.224.
15. Wang Chih-chen and Hsia Tse-yang, Shih L iu -ch 'iu  lu (The mission to Liu- 
ch 'iu )  (Taipei rep., 1969), p.55.
16. Chang Hsien, Tung-hsi yang-k'ao 'An investiga tion  o f the Eastern and 
Western Oceans" Orig. Pub. 1618 (Taipe i, 1962), p.346,347.
17. Ura Ken 'ich i, 'A study o f Concerning Chinese Ships' in Hayashi Shunsai, 
ed. comp, p .16 Kai heatai (Tokyo 1958).
18. Ib id .
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The re la t ionsh ip  between the o f f ic e rs  and the seacrew was remarkably
democratic. As Jennifer Cushman and Tien have observed, they were not
governed by a s t r i c t  ru le o f hierarchy. Their difference was only one of 
19re s p o n s ib i l i ty .  Regardless o f one's pos it ion and status, everyone o f
on
them called each other hsiung-ti or brother. The essence o f that t ra d i t io n  
was tha t a democratic s p i r i t  o f partnership and a strong sense o f brotherhood 
were united in th is  ca l l in g .
Ch1uan-shangs or ship-merchants were the largest group in a ship,
which usually made up 80% or more o f i t .  They were en lis ted  or s o l ic i te d
by the captain who could benefit in many ways by having them and th e i r  cargo
aboard his junk. Normally, they numbered several hundred in a reasonably
big junk. They were a l l  k 1o or guests from everywhere in China and a l l
were u lt im a te ly  under the command o f the captain. They themselves were
d ire c t ly  under the k'o-chang or guest-leader, who was elected by them.
Smuggling and piracy had seasoned them as f ie rce  and bold swordsmen apart
from being merchants. I t  was against th is  background that Cheng Chih-lung
emerged from among them as the greatest legend in the age o f romantic
maritime adventurism. K1uai-shangs were also involved in the trade. They
were the agent merchants working fo r  some kind of specialised commercial
guilds with o f f i c ia l  approval which were known as ya-hang. Until 1686 when
foreign goods were separately taxed under hang tax and domestic goods under
chu tax, there was no separation o f foreign trade and omestic trade in China.
21The traders, e i th e r k'o-shang or k'uai-shang, engaged in both trades.
They were much smaller in number than k'o-shang in the Chinese junk
trade. A Chinese junk from chang-chu, fo r  example, arrived at Batavia on
February 24 1625. The Dagh Register speaks o f 40 quewijs or merchants, 60
22o f f ic e rs ,  and 360 passengers who came with th e ir  own goods aboard. Kobata
19. Jennifer Cushman, Fields From The Sea PhD thesis *unpubl.), Cornell 
Uni., 1975, p .141.
Tien, Shih-chi s h ih -c h i, in CKCS, v.3, p.280.
20. Hsia-men-chih 15;5.
21. Chang Hsien, p.279
P'eng Tse-i, C h 'ing-ta i Kuang-tung, 'The o r ig in  o f the hangs fo r  foreign 
trade in Canton' in CKCS, v.4, p.232
22. Het Departement van Kolonien Dagh-Register gj^hopfden in t  Casteel Batavipr 
Anno 1624-1629. (The Hague 1896) v . i .  p.130.
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?3Atsuhi in te rpre ts  quewijs as k1uai and the passengers as ship-merchants.
I think he is  r ight .  With only few exceptions, the passengers had all 
been independent private traders with th e i r  own goods. K'uai merchants 
were thus the agent-merchants to be contrasted with them.
In a broader sense, the off icers  and crew should also be considered
24as a merchant group, as they were all  merchants f i r s t  and sa i lo rs  second. 
All of them had a stake in the partnership. They were, in general, not 
paid by s a la r ie s ,  but allowed a cer tain tonnage of personal goods in the 
ship.
The partnership system in Fukien province was so popular that  i t  had 
become a custom deeply rooted in economic l i f e .  A new term, or a new 
standard name for firms or ships which were founded on this  basis,  was thus 
called into being:
"Gathering several people to open a firm
or to build a ship called chin . Chin
meant combination. Such a practice was
25universal in Taiwan and Hsia-men."
The practice was carried down to the 19th century in Southeast Asia 
by the Fukien people. Amongst those shipowners from Singapore, there were 
Chen Chin-chung, Chen Chin-sheng, Chin Hsieh-te, Chin I-sen, Chin Fu- ta i , 
Chin Chang-fa, Chin Fung-fa, Chin Ching-lei,  and Chin Yuan-lung. As a rule,
n r
the majority of the ships' names began with Chin as well.
23. Kobata Atsuhi, "Chang-chou and Chuan-chou merchants in Ming's overseas 
trade" in Toa Ronso, 1941, v.4, p.140. Coincidentally or not, the Malay 
sea-merchants were also cal led kiwi. I think i t  must have connections 
of some sorts  with the Dutch term quewij and Chinese term ku' a i . See 
Mei 1 ink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence (The Hague, 1962), 
p.46,47.
24. Cushman, p .137; Gutzlaff,  Two Voyages, p.46.
25. Hsia-men chih , 15;10-
26. Chen I-shung, 'Preface to the Chinese tab le ts  in Singapore' in Nan-yang 
hsueh-pao, (1971), v .26,no.2, p.27.
See Jennifer Wayne Cushman, p.148.
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The sinkheh (Hokien) or hs in-k 'o  system under which the penniless 
Chinese were recruited in large scale to overseas as cheap labour in the 
19th century, evolved from th is  po int. Chen Tse-hsien holds in my view 
c o r re c t ly ,  tha t the or ig ins o f the system belong to the Ming-Ch'ing trans­
i t io n  period or e a r l ie r .  In th e ir  o r ig in a l form, they were the k'o-chang
system. The system had been widely used by the Fukien and Kwangtung f is h e r ­
men and sea-merchants in those days. I t  was th e ir  practice to make a 
contract fo r  the partnership. The contract included the e lection  o f  the 
k'o-chang who was very often the one ra is ing  the ca p ita l ,  and the repayment 
to him w ith part o f th e ir  p r o f i t s . 2  ^ When the k'o-chang system was changed 
and reduced to the indenture labour system, the birthmark was completely 
lo s t  in the la te r  evolution. The c re d i t - t ic k e t  was not quite the same as 
the contract fo r  partnership.
Ship-build ing was ce r ta in ly  expensive, especia lly  fo r  ocean vessels. 
For bu ild ing  an ocean vessel, i t  usually cost several tens o f thousands of 
tae ls , and 4 or 5 thousand taels fo r  the small s h ip .28 Although not many
could a ffo rd  an ocean vessel, i t  was not impossible fo r  men with small means
to raise 5000 taels e ith e r through partnership or a w indfa ll from the over­
seas trade. Thus, there was a large number o f captains who owned ha i-ch1uans 
p a r t ia l ly  or completely. As fo r  those who could not even have a ha i-ch1uan, 
an a lte rn a t ive  was to work fo r  a t s 1a i- tu n g , who afforded both the vessel 
and cargo. This kind o f agent-captain was called ch'u-hai meaning going
27. Chen Tse-hsien, 'The C re d it - t ic ke t System in the 19th century' in CKCS, 
v .2, p .334.
The Hsin-k'o system, as a system o f assisted passengers, was, accord­
ing to Schaannk, already in use in West Borneo even as early as the 18th 
century. Some of the Lao-k'o or old members o f small mining unions belong­
ing to the same surnames or clans went back to China to re c ru i t  new members 
by ass is ting  th e ir  passage. I t  was thus only natural tha t the assisted 
passengers of hs in-k 'o  joined the mining unions to which the recru ite rs  
belonged. They however had to pay back the cost of the passages to the 
rec ru ite rs  by working in the kongsi-mines afterwards. They were provided 
with food and clo th ing and accommodation by the kongsi-mines which every 
4 months paid them 16 f lo r in s  each. There were however assisted passengers 
who owed th e ir  passages e ithe r to junk masters or to k'o-chang (Kheh-thau 
Hokien) (headmen), who, as pointed out by the Report o f the Labour 
Commission of 1876, were specialised re c ru it in g  agents of Chinese 
coolies. This, nevertheless, was a la te r  development of the 19th century 
and generally known as the indenture labour system. See Schaannk, p.584; 
Labour Commission Report (Singapore, 1891), p.9; Purce ll, p.286, 287.
28. Hsia-men chih, 15;5.
33
29out to the sea.
Another a l ternat ive  for them was to hire sea vessels such as
30Hsin-hua ch'uans which were rented a t  a rate of 80 taels  each. The 
merchants of Fen-ping, Chien-ling, Shao-wu and Ting-chu prefectures 
frequently hired them to smuggle out to sea. They loaded the logs above, 
and the s i lk  and cotton underneath.
The enormous success of the Chinese overseas trade had drained a 
great many marine talents  into this channel. A Ming o f f ic ia l  s tar ted  to 
complain about th is :
"Good mariners found i t  more a t t r ac t iv e  to 
work in the private junks for they offered 
much handsomer pay and higher p ro f i t s .  On 
the contrary, the government's pay was so 
meagre, only 6 tae ls ,  which made them very 
unhappy to serve the government. Moveover, 
the government ship only made one t r ip  in 
several years and yet they were prohibited 
to do the i r  own trade. Therefore when the 
government recruited them, all  of the best 
mariners went into hiding. Despite the
29. Ibid.;
Chang Wei-hua interpreted t s 1ai-tung as big bureaucrats, landlords and 
merchants. This was inferred from that  during the reigns of Cheng-hua 
and Hung-chih (1465-1506), some rich and powerful families had gone 
abroad by big ships for overseas trade. Even with th is  kind of t s ' ai - 
tungs, the partnership system was the standard practice. Chu Huan, the 
Governor of Chekiang from 1547 to 1549, t e s t i f i e d  i t .  According to him, 
overseas traders used to borrow the capital from re t i red  o f f ic ia l s  and 
made use of the ir  ships and crews. When they returned with the ships 
and cargoes, they f i r s t  paid the original loan, calculated the in te res t  
due on the cap i ta l ,  and then divided the p ro f i t  in equal fashion. The 
system had i t s  Southeast Asian counterpart which was called commenda.
Mei1ink-Roelofsz believes that  the ent i re  overseas trade of the Chinese 
was carried on almost exclusively in the form of commenda. But we should 
bear in mind that  agent-captains and independant captains" were equally 
numerous. Moreover, the biggest t s 1ai-tungs in Chinese history such as 
Li-tan and cheng chich-lung s tar ted  from scratch, and none of them were 
bureaucrats or landlords in origin, cf.  Chang Wei-hua, Meng-tai hai- 
wai Mao-i chien-lun (A Brief Discussion on Ming's Overseas Trade) 
(Shanghai, 1955), p.76,p.82.
Mark Elvin, p.223, Mei1ink-Roelofsz, p.265.
30. MCSL:YP, pern 7, p.618.
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government attempt to round them up,only 
those incompetent mariners were caught ."3-^
Too l i t t l e  pay and too much re s t r i c t io n  had been the cause for the 
so-called ta len t -dra in .  Yet, what the Ming and Ch'ing court did was to 
suppress private part icipation in the overseas trade,  e i the r  by heavy 
taxation or total ban. Monopoly was th e i r  primary aim and when impossible, 
control .  All through the rugged years of suppression, the private overseas 
trade was thriving through the unchecked flow of ta len t s ,  piracy, and 
smuggling.
From the s t a r t ,  economic inequali ty was inevitable  in the partner­
ship system. Some partners might get more and some less in the share of 
p ro f i t .  Already in the mid 15th century, the rich families who afforded
the capital  to buy the cargo, reaped a full harvest of p ro f i t s .  On the
32other hand, the poor could only make a l iving out of i t .  However, as 
the overseas trade could yield pro f i t  over tenfold,  i t  provided a ladder 
to wealth. But this  kind of commercial adventurism was very hazardous and 
unpredictable:
"Suddenly rich and suddenly poor, i t  was
33so easy to r ise  and f a l l . "
In the l a t e r  centuries,  inequali ty in the profi t-sharing had grown 
more marked in the ch1uan-chu system. Crawford has taken note of i t  in a 
Chinese junk of 8000 piculs in weight:3^
31. Wang Shih-chen, Shih-hsüeh-chi p.35.
32. Chang Hsien, p.266.
33. Hsia-men chih , 15;5.
34. John Crawford, Journey of an Embassy to the Chinese Courts of Siam and 
Cochin-China, (Kuala Lumpur, 1967), orig. pub. 1828, p .412.
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Position Income
1. ch'uan-chu 100 piculs
+ $100-$200 (passage fees) 
10% commission on the net 
p rof i ts  of the voyage 
50 piculs 
$200 (salary)
50 piculs 
$100
15 piculs of f re ight  
9 piculs each 
7 piculs
2. huo-chang
3. t s ' a i - f u
4. captain of the steerage
5. captains of the anchor
6. Seaman
Although the economic inequali ty kept growing wider and wider 
within the system, until  early in the 19th century, the shipboard organi­
sation s t i l l  retained i t s  democratic features.  As late as 1831, the 
"democracy" s t i l l  made a profound impression on Gutzlaff:
"In fac t ,  the sa i lors  exercise full  control 
over the vesse l , and oppose every measure 
with which they think may prove injurious 
to th e i r  own in te res ts ;  so that  even the 
captain and p i lo t  are frequently obliged, 
when worn out with th e i r  insolent behaviour, 
to crave the i r  kind assis tance,  and to
35request them to show a be t ter  temper."
The "democracy" seemed to Gutzlaff to amount to a reign of anarchy;
"All of them, however stupid,  are commanders 
and i f  anything of importance is to be done, 
they bawl out the i r  command to each other 
t i l l  all  is u t te r  confusion." ^
35. Gutzlaff C., Journal of Three Voyages (London, 1838), p.83,84.
36. Ibid.
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The picture of them as without leadership may be exaggerated, but 
here the picture certainly ref lec ts  that  democracy in the Chinese junks 
was a way of l i f e .
In a comparison of the Western route to capitalism, Dr Tien blames
37the partnership system for the retarded growth of Chinese cap i ta l .  The 
blame is unfounded and biased. As a matter of fac t ,  owing to the system, 
the Chinese overseas trade went from strength to strength. The accelerated 
expansion gave r ise  to the Cheng maritime commercial empire.
A new era of merchant power emerged with the Cheng empire. Old China 
was stormed by many peasant uprisings but when they were gone new dynasties 
cropped up in th e i r  t r a i l .  The old feudal rule remained. In the Ming dynasty 
period there began a change. Now i t  was the merchant protest  movements which 
raged angrily.  They added a new form of struggle —  general s t r ikes  and 
demonstrations —  in the f ight  against feudal courts and rule. But, such 
storms were merely the explosions of the merchants or handicraft workers 
when wronged or overtaxed by the au thor i t ie s .  Their achievements were less 
impressive than the peasant uprisings in terms of a larger  scale or a change 
of dynasty. Only the Cheng regime climaxed the changes. I t  was the f i r s t  
time in Chinese history that  the merchant groups had ever achieved power, 
a power which was based on the partnership system instead of the imperial 
system.
37. Tien, p.280.
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CHAPTER I I I
The Fukien Sea Merchant  Kingdoms 
and the  Hakka Miner Se l f -Government
1. Kongsi in the Sea-merchant Kingdoms
A r ising t ide of ' wo-k'ou' or 'Japanese piracy'  in 1527 began to
invade the coastal provinces. I t  was indeed an uprising of Chinese sea
merchants who could find no way out but revol t  against  the increasingly
tightened ban on overseas trade.  Most of them were mainly from Linchou,
Shaohsing, Chang-chou and Chuan-chou, from Fukien province.'*' Less than
10% of them were actual ly Japanese. The revol t  of sea merchants gained
2
momentum a f t e r  1541 as the ban became more severe. More and more sea­
farers joined Hsü Tung who led the revol t .
After Hsü Tung was ki l led by the Ming forces,  Wang Chih, who had 
served as kuan-kuei, the accountant,then a mil i tary chief under Hsü, was 
elected to the leadership. Wang Chih was a man of Anhwei. He was reputed 
for his heroism in his youth and dist inguished himself as an expert in
3
t ac t i cs  and st rategy when he turned adult .  From 1540 to 1545, Wang Chih
1. Kobata Atsuhi, 'A Study of the history of Medieval Sino-Japanese Trade' ,  
p. 496.
The need of redefining the so-cal led 'wo-k'ou' (Japanese piracy) has so 
long been overdue. Happily, e f for t s  to correct  the conventional bias 
have been s tar ted.  As early as 1955, S. Katayama correct ly ident i f ied 
them as the independent merchants who were not under the economical con­
trol of the coastal gentry. They fought for the aboli t ion of the mari­
time ban which was the root of the i r  revol ts .  Go Kuan-wai contributes 
much of the devastation of the questionable term 'wo' in Chinese history,  
but leaves ' k1 23ou' there untouched.
Sei j i ro Katayama, in ~;8.yo .-.hlguKu Vol. 4, (Tokyo 1955), p.426.
Go Kuan-wai, Japanese Piracy in Ming China During 16th Century, (New 
York, 1975), p.212-217.
2. Ibid. ,  p .493.
3. Go is sympathetic with Wang Chih and his close associates.  He says: "An
objective perusal of his s tor ies  shows that  he was par t icular ly  interested 
in securing in legal izat ion of trade between the ordinary Chinese people 
and foreign t raders ,  that  i s ,  trade outside the t r ibute  system. He had 
given the off icials  al l  kinds of cooperation, such as the suppression of 
those pirates who obstructed t rade,  before he allowed himself to be placed 
in the hands of Hu Tsung-hsien. The same may apply to Wang's associates,  
such as Mao Hai-feng and Hsü Ch'uan." Yet, they remain in his eyes pi rates .  
Go, p.34.
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and his close f r iends, Yeh Chung-man, Hsü wei-hsüeh and so on entered a
partnership in overseas trade. They b u i l t  a big vessel in Kwangtung and
smuggled out gun powder and s i l k  to Japan, Thailand and other parts o f  
4
Southeast Asia. Wang amassed a great fortune through th is  means. The 
Japanese thus admired and respected him and cal led him wu-feng-chuanchü. 
Chuan-chu or Po-chu in th is  context was the t i t l e  used by the captain of 
a l l  captains, by someone l ike  Kapitan China. Thus, when Wang succeeded
5
Hsü, he was elected as the Po-chu to lead the whole f l e e t  of Hsü's vessels.
Wang Chih became crowned with unchallenged power in the sea a f te r  
he had el iminated his r iva l  sea lord ,  Chen Shih- t ing. Al l  the pr ivate  sea 
vessels from then on sai led under his f lag .  Wang Chih, the founder of th is  
powerful seaborne empire, claimed to be the King who clears the sea,
Chin-hai-Wang and establ ished his own government to r iva l  the Ming court. 
Under his protect ion, foreign ships could f ree ly  v i s i t  and leave China and 
foreign trade traders did th e i r  business in Su-chou and Hang-chou openly 
without fear. Streams of  people offered r ice and wine or even th e i r  own 
sons or daughters to Wang's f l e e t . ' * 67 Even the local defence o f f i c i a l s  also 
sent red blankets and jade belts as presents to Wang.
The t ides of  'wo-k'ou1 eventual ly subsided in 1567. Whether i t  had 
learnt  a lesson or not, the Ming court,  however, did relax the maritime ban 
and introduced the l icense system for  overseas trade on the recommendation 
o f  the Governor of  Fukien. However, Wang Chih had blazed the t r a i l  fo r  the 
la te r  bui lders of maritime empires in the ear ly  17th century such as Kapitan 
Li Tan, Cheng Chih-lung and Cheng Ch'eng-kung. Al l  of them personif ied the 
age of overseas adventurism. Before Wang Chih and his partners launched 
th e i r  partnership in overseas trade, he said to them: "The law in China
is fa r  too severe and in h ib i t i v e .  I t  is almost impossible to do anything 
without offending the law at a l l .  Why don't we go overseas to enjoy the
4. Ibid.
5. Wen-tai Wo-chi, v .1. wo-pien 2 in Hsuan Lan-tang ch'ung shu hsu c h i ,
v o l . 17.
6. Fan Puei, Shai-k'ou i -chien in Hsuan Lan-tang ch'ung shu hsu chi, vol. 15.
7. Ib id . ,  p .2.
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g
freedom?" These words must have found a reverberation in the hearts of 
hundreds of thousands of sea merchants and seafaring people.
In the 1610s, a maritime commercial empire of Kapitan China, Li Tan,
emerged from his f l e e t  of Chinese junks busily cruising to and from Japan,
9
Taiwan, P'eng-hu, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Manila and Batavia. In his
8. Fan Puei , 'Hai-k'ou i -kuo1 o p . c i t . ,  p . l .
Many histor ians are misled by Chu Huan into a be l i ef  that  the local gentry 
and o f f i c i a l s  were the greatest  organisers and protectors of the massive 
smuggling. Actually,  the local gentry and of f i c i a l  played only the support­
ing role.  For example, see Mark Elvin, p.222.
On the other hand, t o ta l ly  a winner history s t i l l ,  Hucker's a r t i c l e  tags 
a label ' ra iders '  to the rebel l ing sea-merchants. This is also very mis­
leading, which no doubt will leave us with the impression that  the so 
cal led ' wo-k1ou' were indeed pi ra tes .  A contemporary record,  Ch' ou-hai 
t 1u-p' ien has some kinder words to say about them:
"Since the shih-po was l i f t e d  in the early 
Chia-ching. . .  piracy has become common.
Why? I t  is because pi rates  and merchants 
are the same group of people. When trade 
is permitted, pi rates  become merchants.
When trade is prohibited,  merchants convert 
to pi rates .  The law was or ig ina l ly  aimed at  
suppressing the commercial a c t iv i ty .  But now 
i t  mainly deals with piracy. Rather than 
becoming bet ter ,  the piracy is gett ing more 
notor ious ."
I t  is about time that  history should c lear  t he i r  name.
Charles 0. Hucker, 'Hu Tsung-hsien' s Campaign Against Hsü Hai, 1556' 
in Kierman & Fairbank e d . , Chinese Ways in Warfare, (New York, 1974), 
p . 304-307.
Ng Chin-keong, ' Gentry-Merchant and Peasant-Peddlers - The Response of 
the South Fukienese to the Offshore Trading Opportunities 1552-1566' in 
Nanyang Ta-hsüeh-pao (Singapore, 1973), Vol.7, p .167.
9. Iwao Sei iechi ,  'Li Tan, Chief of the Chinese Residents at  Hirado' in 
Toyogakuho v.23. ,  p.395.
C.R. Boxer, 'The Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan' in Tien-hsia monthly,
11.1.;402,3.
The l i f e  of Captain Li Tan is s t i l l  surrounded with mystery. All that  we 
can establ ish is that  he was a man of Chuan-chou, who had establ ished him­
se l f  in Manila as a Chinese leader but los t  al l  his fortune to the value 
of 40,000 taels  to the Spaniards who put him in j a i l .  However, he made 
his escape to Japan where he became the China Captain respected by both 
overseas Chinese and foreigners.  At Nagasaki and Hirado, he had magnificent 
houses and pret ty wives. By that  time he was so wealthy that  he loaned 
60,000 t ae ls ,  a great sum of money to Feudal Lord Shimazu. As opposed 
against the mainland Chinese, he was already Christ ianised,  or at  leas t  
taking Christain name, Andrea Di t t i s .  His children were also given Christian 
names. See Seiichi Iwao, 'Li Tan, Chief of the Chinese Residents at  Hirado, 
Japan in the Last Days of the Ming Dynasty' in Memoirs of the Research 
Department of the Toyo Bunko, Tokyo, no.17, 1958.
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capacity as the most in f lu e n t ia l  overseas Chinese leader, he had acted as
the intermediary fo r  the B r i t is h  and Dutch to open up o f f i c ia l  commercial
intercourse with China.10 Despite his good o f f ic e s ,  the Ming o f f i c ia l
11
records s t i l l  slandered him as t r a i t o r ,  p ira te ,  bandit and so on. In
fa c t ,  he would never sa c r if ice  the in te res t o f Chinese sea merchants in his 
e f fo r ts  to bring about l ib e ra l po licy  in foreign trade. I t  is proven by 
his refusal to accept the Dutch proposal to end a l l  Chinese junk trade with 
Manila in the negotiation of 1624.12
His commercial empire was also founded upon the partnership system.
At the beginning o f his partnership, there were 28 people a ltogether. They
were Hsi Hsin-su, the Dutch agent-merchant who had gone to j a i l  fo r  L i ,  Yang
Tien-sheng, a ship captain, and Hong Sheng and Chang Hung and Cheng Chih-lung,
a l l  sworn brothers, and overseas traders in Japan. Captain Li Tan was th e ir
13leader and Cheng Chih-lung ranked the la s t  because he was the youngest.
Li Tan presided over a maritime empire comprised o f ten branches 
or t s 1a is . Each t s 'a i  was autonomous and headed by one o f his partners.
They were respective ly called je n , kindness, i_, lo y a lty ,  1i , ceremony, ch ih , 
in te l 1 egence, hs in , honesty, ch in , gold, mu_, wood, shu i, water, huo, f i r e ,  
t ' u ,  e a r th .14 These ts 'a is  were renamed hangs when Cheng Chih-lung succeeded
10. Iwao S e iich i,  p .412-415-
11. Ib id .
12. Dagh Register, gehouden in t  caste ll Batavia 1624-82 (The Hague, 1888), 
v . X . , p .143, 1624 9 A p r i l ,  p.140.
13. Shen Yün, T'ai-wan Cheng-shih shih-mo (Complete Record o f the Cheng 
Taiwan). TW, no .15, p.1.2.
14. Hua Chun, Tung Wan (Reminiscence) 1;35 in Shih-yen ts 'ung-shu, 11;1.
The early  l i f e  o f Cheng chi-lung was as much mysterious as that o f Captain 
China. We are to ld  that while he was a broker o f the Portugese in Macao,he was 
baptiseu. He then mi grated to Japan and worked fo r  Captain Li Tan. Soon his 
commercial a b i l i t y  and f i d e l i t y  won complete t ru s t  from Li Tan and his 
partners who entrusted him with more and more valuable cargoes to Cambodia 
and overseas. A fte r Li Tan's death, he succeeded to the leadership of L i ' s  
maritime empire not without opposition from L i ' s  eldest son Ausustin in 
1625. However, in 1627, his forces was said to have consisted o f almost 
400 junks and 60,000 to 70,000 men.
Seiichi Iwao, p.71-79.
Wu Fa's Taiwan L i-sh ih  Cha-chi (Hong Kong, 1976) is an in te res ting  and 
informative account of the Cheng Regime, although l im ited  to Chinese 
sources.
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Li Tan. As they were called hang, Kuo Mo-jc , the leading historian in 
China, has considered them as commercial firms. He admits that  he is unable 
to find out what these hang were all  about. In his own words: "Where were
these hang established and what kind of business were they dealing with?
I t  is regretted that  there is no detailed material for a further  inves t i ­
gation. I have consulted many experts but even they themselves do not have 
15a clue." I t  seems to be a deadlock here.
Fortunately, all  these problems can be solved. These hang were 
neither  commercial guilds nor firms in ordinary sense. As they were in 
part p i ra t ica l  and in part commercial, these hang were involved in a very 
intensive coastal and overseas trade on the one hand and collected protection 
fees from Chinese junks on the other. Nevertheless, piracy or protection 
fees was only the i r  sideline business. The t ick e t  fee or protection fee 
demanded by them for each junk was said to have been a thousand t a e l s . ^
Cheng Chih-lung is said to have demanded 3000 taels  from each junk as t icke t  
fee. His wealth was, there fore, as rich as a n a t i o n . ^
I t  is evidently an exaggeration, for even ocean vessels normally
carried cargo no more than tens of thousands of t a e ls .  Li Chih-chi, who refused
to surrender to the Ming court and broke away from Cheng Chih-lung, charged
t icke t  fees according to the size of the junk. The fees varied from 20 to 50 
18tae ls .  I think i t  is the standard practice not only carried out by Li's  
t s 1al but also by Cheng's regime which comprised 10 hang or t s ' ai . As Li 
Tan and Cheng Chih-lung were never regarded as merchants but pirates by 
off ic ia l  Chinese h is to r ians ,  i t  was no surprise that  they spread the myth that  
Li and Cheng derived the i r  wealth from t icke t  fees.
The Cheng regime was from f i r s t  t o ’l a s t  a maritime commercial empire 
which was supported by his armada to control the South China Sea. Overseas 
and coastal trade were i t s  l i f e l i n e .  The regime part icipated in Asian and 
Southeast Asian trade on a scale that  r iva l led  the V.O.C. Especially in 
Japan, the Dutch los t  out to the Cheng regime. Cheng Chih-lung derived great 
profi ts  from Si no-Japanese trade by concentrating his capital  on big ocean
15. Kuo Mo-jO , CKCS, v.3, p. 124.
16. Hua Chun, 1;35.
17. Li Yao, To-shih shih-i in MCSLCP, p .1576.
18. MCSL:IP,7;618.
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ships and valuable goods such as s i lk .  In 1641 six of his ships imported 90,920
19fan of fine s i lk  into Nagasaki whereas 91 other Chinese junks only 44,016 fan .
Seven of his ships and 34 other Chinese ships vis i ted  Nagasaki in 1643, his
ships accounted for one third of the to ta l  import by Chinese junks. Two
21of his ships in 1644 carried a cargo of 250,000 taels  to Japan. By contrast ,
generally a sea junk could load a cargo no more than 30,000 tae ls .
Also, Cheng's partnership conducted a brisk and intense commercial 
t r a f f i c  with Southeast Asian countries. In 1655 alone 24 of th e i r  trading 
junks were sent to countries all  over Southeast Asia. Seven se t  sai l to
21Batavia, two to Tokyo, ten to Thailand, four to Vietnam and one to Manila.
The crucial importance of overseas trade to the survival of the Cheng regime 
was highlighted by Cheng ch'eng-kung himself;
"The coastal areas are securely in our hands and we 
derived our fund from overseas trade. These advant­
ages will place us in a position that  we can e i ther
22advance or r e t r e a t  eas i ly ."
The mil i tary  forces of the Cheng regime comprised 400,000 men and 5000 
junks. The economic basis for th is  enormous mil i tary strength was the large 
scale par t ic ipa tion of one regime in coastal and overseas trade. The regime 
was reinforced by more and more rich merchants who joined in with the i r  own 
capi ta l .  In May 1647, the Dagh Register des comptoirs Nagasgue entered th is :
"Today, we heard that  Iquan's son and his brothers
led 700 small junks and a large army in Pescadores.
There were many rich merchants who brought great sums
23of money and goods to join them."
Cheng's commercial empire was a partnership complex which put out ten 
branches or hangs. All of them were in the charge of hu-kuan Cheng Tai, the
19. Yamawaki Daijiro, Nagasaki no To-jin boeki (Chinese trade a t  Nagasaki) 
(Tokyo, 1964), p.30.
20. Ishihra Mi chi hiro, 'Cheng Chih-lung's overseas trade in Japan and Southeast 
Asia' ,  in Minami Asia Gakuho, no . l ,  p .162-8.
21. Iwao Sei ichi ,  'Japan's foreign relations in early modern period' in Iwanami 
Koza, Nihon Rekishi, v.15, p.60,61.
22. Yang Ying, Ts' ung-cheng shih-1u 'Records of following the campaigns of 
Coxinga' (Peking, 1931 r e p . ) p.35.
23. Ur^Ken'ichi ,  "Yen-p'ing-wang hu-kuan" in T'ai-wan Feng-wu (March,
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t reasurer .  Five of them, j en , i_, TJ_, chin, hsin hangs were Hsia-men based 
and other five Hang-chou based Cheng Tai at  f i r s t  was the house-manager in
Cheng's family. With his outstanding ab i l i ty  as a financier or manager, he
24gradually became the most prominent partner and minister  to Coxinga.
Coxinga had such a complete t r u s t  in him that  he put al l  his money 
at  the disposal of Cheng Tai. Chai Cheng, who had gone to Japan to claim 
Cheng Tai 's money for Coxinga's son, Cheng Ching, t e s t i f i e s  i t  as follows:
"The coastal areas of Fukien province annually paid 
tax to Coxinga in r ice or money which were collected 
by Cheng Tai. He sent the ships overseas. On return,  
the chuan-chus, the captains, had to return the loan 
money with i n te r es t  to him. Not even a single cent 
was kept in Coxinga's house. Daily necessaries 
including r ice ,  logs, tea,  candles, clothes were al l
25handled by him. The whole of Hsia-men knew about i t . "
I t  was no strange thing that  Coxinga l e f t  al l  his money in the hands 
of Cheng Tai, his most t rusted huo-chi. This was ent i re ly  in the t radi t ion 
of the huo-chi system prevalent in his time.
What was new was the relat ionship between the King and his ministers,
which was based on partnership.  Cheng Tai, a mil l ionaire himself,  was the
No.2 man in the Cheng regime in which he headed the ministry of t reasury,
hu-pu. There were 15 o f f ic i a l s  who served under him, 2 shih-lang,  4 lang-chung 
26and 8 chi -shih . Apart from the population tax, coastal and overseas trade 
also fel l  into the realm of the ministry.
The ministry had framed a "nat ion"-wide network of capital  investment
in coastal and overseas t rade.  Merchants were enl is ted to become business
partners of the Cheng regime which supplied them the capi tal  at  low in te res t .
The famous five big merchants who establ ished t he i r  business in Peking,
27Su-chou, Hang-chou, Shanatung and other places,  were Cheng's partners.  They
24. Ibid. ,  p . 32.
25. Ibid.
26. Cheng-shih kuan-hsi wen-shu (Documents on relat ions with the Cheng family) 
TVW., no.69.,  p.4.
27. MCSL:TP, 3;215.
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apparently belonged to the Hang-chou based ch in , mu, shu i, huo, tu hangs.
One o f them in 1656 or a b i t  la te r  was arrested by the Ch'ing government.
Chen Ting-lao was arrested. Cheng had been supplied with capita l at
a monthly rate o f one candureen three cash per tael by the Cheng regime,
through the kuan-ku Wu I-sheh, the treasurer. Each time a f te r  the business
transaction was over, he had to return the loan money plus in te re s t before
he could have another loan. He had received 50,000 taels from the kuan-ku
in early May 1654 and the money was used by him to buy a ship o f cargo which
was to se l l  in Japan. In November o f the same year, a f te r  s e t t l in g  the old
account, he had a fresh loan o f 100,000 tae ls . Then, in 1655, he paid back
60,000 taels in terms o f s i lv e r  and a cargo o f s i l k .  The rest was given by
the Cheng regime fo r  the use o f spying and ra l ly in g  support fo r  the a n t i-  
28Manchu cause.
The hu-pu, the treasury department o f the Cheng regime, acted as a 
financ ia l bank o f some sort to finance pr iva te  investments. This contrasted vN\th 
the Ming and Ch'ing courts which did everything to k i l l  private incentive.
This, and only th is  made the Cheng regime a revolutionary breakthrough in the 
economic functions o f Chinese governments. The hu-pu as such functioned as 
a government bank which operated on the basis of the partnership system.
Yet, Chen, who had a partnership o f his own, was undoubtedly one o f the
big partners of the Cheng regime. His partnership had been stemming from
Cheng's partnership complex, although i t  somehow maintained separate accounts
and autonomy. There were about 8 people in his partnership to share the capita l
which was supplied by the Cheng regime. They were Wu C h ' i - l ia n ,  Chen Hsiao-wu,
29Kho Wen-1ao, Chen Mao-fen and Huang Sun-1ian. The same was true o f a l l  
Cheng's partners including Cheng Tai and the other four big merchants who 
were linked up with the regime through partnership. Each o f them was an inde­
pendent partnership in i t s e l f ,  although the Cheng regime acted as th e ir
supplier o f  finance. Hsi Shao-fang, Yen Tuan, and Fu Ts'en-i were three o f
29the four famous big merchants whose names have come to l ig h t .
28. Ib id.
29. Cheng-shih Kuan-hsi Wen-shu, p.19,20.
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Though Cheng Tai served Cheng Chih-lung and Coxinga fa i th fu l ly ,  he
also had his own ships and partnership within the Cheng commercial empire.
He had banked his own money 300,000 tae ls  in Japan before Hsia-men was los t .
He did not deposit the money by himself but through his partners;  Rung Erh-
l ian ,  Hung Wei-she, Chang Shih-kuan, Cheng Ping-kuan and Hung Tuo-lian who
30brought i t  in several instalments. After his death, both his descendants 
and Cheng Ching, (whose l i f e  was saved by Cheng Tai but who in return accused 
Cheng Tai for treachery which caused his death), disputed over the banked 
money. Cheng Ching's claim was represented by Chai Cheng in the above ment­
ioned quotation. But, i t  was only one side of the coin and the declaration 
of Rung Erh-lian revealed the other side:
"In the past,  both Coxinga and Ti-ya (Cheng Tai) 
had the i r  own junks sent overseas. Sometimes,
Coxinga and his cargoes attached to Ti-ya 's  ships, 
in which case he had his agents to follow the ships.
They also had dif ferent  names for the i r  own business 
concerns. I t  was called Tien Huang for Coxinga and 
Tung Li for Ti-ya. Thus, all  the previously deposited 
money were kept in the cases which bore the name of 
Tung L i ."31
Such evidence as there is proves beyond doubt that  the Cheng regime 
const ituted a radical a l te rna t ive  to the Ming and Ch'ing courts because i t  
was founded on the partnership system. P o l i t ic a l ly ,  Cheng Tai served the 
Cheng regime as the minister of treasury l ike a servant serving his master.
But the partnership system removed the servant-master rela t ionship between 
them economically. So far  as the business concerns went, Cheng Tai was an 
equal partner to the Cheng family whose role was no more than supplying capital 
with in te res t .  I t  therefore becomes abundantly c lear  that  each branch of 
Cheng's maritime commercial empire was an autonomous partnership in i t s e l f .
At the grass-root level,  each ship was a partnership. The partnership 
system served to cement chuan-chus, off icers  and sa i lo rs  in th e i r  loyalty to 
the Cheng Ringdom. Two trading junks of the Cheng regime which were captured
30. Ura Ren'ichi, p.44-47.
31. , p . 100,1.
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by the Ch'ing o f f i c i a l s  in Hsia-men confirmed th is .  The ships carr ied a great 
var ie ty  of goods in large volume from Taiwan to Japan and Thailand in 1683.
The ship under captain Huang Ch'eng belonged to an o f f i c i a l  o f  Cheng's govern­
ment service board, Hung Lei, who had then already surrendered to the Ch'ing 
court. Captain Lan Cheh's ship was owned by an earl o f  Cheng's regime,
Wu-p'ing Hou Liu Kuo-hsüan. The surviving o f f i c i a l  record has given a com­
plete name l i s t  o f  a l l  the o f f ice rs  and crew members in the ship under captain
32Huang Cheng. I t  has also l i s te d  in f u l l  the items of  cargo in the ship.
There were 67 persons altogether including o f f ice rs  and sa i lo rs ,  and accord­
ing to the name l i s t  given, 23 o f f ice rs  and 44 sai lors or Mu-shao. After 
going through the name l i s t ,  the record c lea r ly  dist inguishes the cargoes in to
3 categories; 1. the kongsi's cargo, 2. the attached cargo and 3. the
33sa i lo rs '  or mu-shaos' cargo. The kongsi ' s cargo here, i s ,  I th ink ,  that 
which belonged to a l l  the o f f ice rs  who shared i t  together. The attached 
cargo may have belonged to the Cheng family , or more l i k e l y  to Hung Lieh 
himself, the shipowner, or to both and others.
The use of the term kongsi in re fe r r ing  to the whole body of  ship 
o f f ice rs  heralded the use of  i t  in ca l l ing  a l l  o f f ice rs  in the mines of  Bangka 
and West Borneo where the e a r l ie s t  Chinese Kongsi emerged. Kongsi as a form 
of  self-government and partnership had long found i t s  existence in Chinese 
grass-root democracy in the Chinese mines and sea-junks since the 15th century 
or probably e a r l ie r .  A l l  that was lacking is the term Kongsi fo r  the 
belated recognit ion of  th is  fact .  And now there i t  i s ,  the e a r l ie s t  appear­
ance of  the term Kongsi in Chinese h is to ry !
32. MCSL:TP, 3;298.
33. Ibid.
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2. A Migration of Hakka Mining Traditions
Gold borne by the earth ,  
Riches hidden in mountains, 
Only hard work can earn us 
A livelihood from mines.
- Lo Fang-po
Most of the Chinese in West Borneo were Hakka. The Lang-fang kongsi
which was s i tuated in Mandor and the neighbouring d i s t r i c t s  had a majority
of the Chia-ying Hakka. But before 1777, they were not the majority. The
miners there had been largely the Chao-chou Hakka, dominantly in the mines
of Mao-ern-shan, Chu-ta-ya, Kun-jih, Lung-kung and Senaman. But a t  Ming-
huang and i t s  nearby areas, the Ta-p'u and Kang-chou Hakka were in the 
34majorit y .
In the Chinese d i s t r i c t s  in Sambas, such as Singkawang, Montrado,
35Lara, Loemar and Sepang, the Hui-chou Hakka forged the overwhelming majority.
A large part of them came from Hai-feng, Lu-feng, Hui-lai and Chieh-yang.
Two larges t  kongsi, Ta-kang (the great port) and San-t ' iao-kuo (the three 
ditches), were both under the i r  control.  Although in the pioneering days, 
the Chia-ying Hakka had been working gold mines in Montrado, in between 1772 
and 1774 part  of them were driven away. Thereafter,  the Hui-chou Hakka 
firmly entrenched th e i r  power and government in Montrado. However, shortly 
a f te r  1825, the Chia-ying Hakka did make a comeback, but no longer in a g r i ­
culture or mining. They went into the business of smuggling s a l t ,  opium and 
gunpowder between Mondor and Bengkajang.
The Chao-chou Hakka in West Borneo were a small number among the 
Chinese, i Those Chao-chou Hakka who lived in mining settlements were 
mainly t raders.  A s l igh t ly  larger number of them consisting of t raders ,  
farmers, handicraft workers and seamen could be found in Pontianak and the 
adjacent areas. Very few Hokkien migrated to West Borneo. Only in Pontianak
34.
35.
36.
37.
Lo, p .137. 
Schaannk, p .515.
p .514.
Ibid.
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88was there a small number of Hokkien inhab ifa ting  the town.
In West Borneo and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Hakka or the 
guest people were almost s ingu la r ly  the miners now and well in to  the 19th 
century. The Hokkien and Cantonese were the traders overseas. This 
occupational pattern was created by h is to ry . The Hokkien and Cantonese 
had, ever since the 15th century, established th e ir  leading roles in over­
seas trade, the crowning achievement o f which were the emergence of sea- 
merchant kingdoms during the Ming-Ch'ing t ra n s it io n  period. As the late 
comers in the seas, the Hakka found tha t while the others had made f ie ld s  
from the sea, they be better able to make th e ir  own from the mines. I t  was 
not because there was a lack o f ta le n t and s k i l l  o f the Hakka in overseas 
trade, but because in the f ie ld  o f mining th e i r  ancestral experience and 
passion could assure them a leading ro le .
In th e ir  homeland, the Hakka were reputed passionate miners fo r 
cen turies .
Chia-ying chou, where the Chia-ying Hakka came from, a mountainous
and barren country, had produced a breed o f freedom loving people, among
them the men o f Taiping including Hung Hsin-chuan. Many scholars, merchants,
miners sprang from i t s  s o i l .  I t  is said that the Chia-ying people l ived
39on nothing else but studies alone in Sung times. But in the Ch'ing period, 
the Chia-ying scholars had to make teaching th e ir  l iv in g  but even th is  was 
increasingly d i f f i c u l t  in the 18th and 19th century. Many o f them, as 
Wen Chung-ho observed, had already looked upon Nanyang or Southeast Asia as 
th e i r  second home.40
For example, the founders o f the Lang-fang kongsi, Lo Fang-po,
Ku Liu-po, and Liu Tai-erh a l l  came from a long l in e  o f scholars in th e ir  
fam ilies . Decending from a fam ily t ra d i t io n  o f studies wedding with farming, 
Lo Fang-po was born in Shih-shan-pou (castle o f stone fan ), an outlaying 
v i l la g e  fou rty  miles away from the c i t y . 4-*- He was thus brought up with the
38. Schaannk, p .515.
39. Chia-ying chou-chi 8:1.
40. Chia-ying chou-chi 8:1.
41. Lo, p .33,65,66.
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old c lassic  as well as martial  ar ts . Liu Tai-erh, the f i f t h  Kapitan of
the Lang-fang kongsi, came from Pai-tu-pou of  Chia-ying chou, being reared
42with the s im i la r  family t ra d i t io n  which was indeed the Hakka way of l i f e .
His successor, Ku Liu-po was from a prominent clan in Chia-ying chou. Ku
43clan was brought in to  prominence by the l i t e r a r y  fame of  i t s  decendants.
I t  was the Hakka way of l i f e  that ' the women worked in the f ie ld s ,
at bui ld ing houses, at porterage, whi le the men, cutlass or spear in hand,
44watched fo r  enemies or went f i g h t in g . '  The Hakka men studied fo r  degree
while th e i r  wives worked in the farms. Eighty per cent o f  the Hakka women
were the t i l l e r s  o f  the soi l  whereas only 20% of the Hakka men were farmers.
The men turned to handicraft  and business, scholarship and mining, and
45adventures in other land. So they were least t ied down by the land, 
when the d is tant  cal l  o f  opportunity reached them, they shipped o f f  to 
South Seas, or went away as pedlars, or dug fo r  gold in foreign s o i l .
Since overseas mining asserted a strong fascination on the Hakka, 
the scholars and the others a l ike turned th e i r  eyes to the land o f  promise 
across the ocean. Lo Fang-po wrote of himself and his migration to West 
Borneo in a poem:^
"I turned myself from a scholar to merchant,
Not worrying m i l l ion  miles of  journey,
I t rave l led  l i ke  a lotus lea f  without a home."
Many, however, were miners or handicraft  workers at home before
th e i r  migration to West Borneo. Chia-ying chou i t s e l f  boasted of  a wealth of
s i l v e r ,  lead, coal and iron ores. Wen Chung-ho was proud of  i t s  natural
47
resources in the past: '
"Chen-hsian (Chia-ying chou was named Chen- 
hsian in Ming times) was renowned fo r  i t s  
silkworm which was sold a l l  over China.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
, p . 79.
, p .80.
Han Suyin, The Crippled Tree, (London, 1965), p.27.
Lo Hsian- l in , K'o-chai Shih- l iao Hui-pien (Hong Kong, 1965), p.16,17. 
Lo, p .148.
Chia-ying Chou-chi, Preface, 2,32;14.
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I ts  s i lv e r  mines, lead mines, coal mines 
and iron mines were a l l  r ich  in the wood."
The o r ig in  of Hakka mining traces back to the 15th century. By 
1553, there had already 23 iron process tanks or l_u been established in 
Hui-chou by pr iva te  merchants. The local government levied a tax o f 10 
taels per tank per year.48 This priva te iron mining and processing had 
been blessed with o f f ic ia l  approval. But private p a r t ic ip a t io n  in s i lv e r  
mining was prohib ited by the Ming government which made i t  a government 
monopoly. This monopoly po licy  sparked o f f  endless miner r is ing s .
One which took place in Hui-chou in  1560, involved tens o f thousands
o f i l le g a l  Hakka miners. They occupied the s i lv e r  mines between Ch'ang*:lo
and Hai-feng by force. The o f f ic ia l  h is to ry  labelled them as hao-min \
(powerful people) or chien-min (cunning people). This kind o f people, such
as Wu Tuan, Lung T i , Hsieh Fi-hu were the miner leaders who l ik e  Teng Mao-
ch i,  Yeh Chung-1iu, arose from obscure backgrounds and proclaimed themselves
kings. There were several hundred groups o f miners, each varying from a
few hundreds to two or three thousands, each under the standard o f  a s e l f -
proclaimed king. They had 'ravaged' the countryside o f H s in - l in ,  Ch'ang-
4Qlo ,  Chieh-yang, Ho-yUan, Lung-chuan, Po-lo, Ku-shan and Hai-feng.
Their true id e n t i ty  as miner was obscured by the passage o f time,
but more so by the r i t u a l i s t i c  d is to r t io n  and slander o f the o f f ic ia l  h is to ry .
They were branded as 'band it ' by the Ming au tho r it ies  which eventually put
the r is in g  down in 1570.88 However, reports of Hakka i l le g a l  mining kept
flowing. A report tha t the unsettled people from Po-lo hsien i l l e g a l ly  opened
t in  mines again appeared in 1620. Another report came in 1626 that in the
52mountains of Ch'ang-lo the i l le g a l  t in  miners grew increasingly aggressive.
48. Hui-chou fu -c h i,  17;21.
49. , 17;22.
50. ChU Ta-chin, Kuantung hsin-yu, 7;36.
51. Hui-chou fu -c h i ,  17;43.
52. , 17;44.
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In 1640, a t  the end of the Ming dynasty, Po-lo hsien was ravaged by another
53storm of miner r is ing:
"At f i r s t ,  the bandits who occupied t in  mines 
by force kept a low prof i le  by pretending that  
they were there only farming. Soon, they 
gathered hundreds and thousands of lawless 
element. Oath or yüeh was made to bind them­
selves into a brotherhood named Ch1ang-hsin 
[eternal prosperi ty1. The brotherhood seized 
any good farm land that  came to i t s  notice, but 
refused to be taxed by the government. They 
destroyed graveyards, occupied farms in the 
mining area. Lawless miners even appropriated 
the land rents or taxes of the government and 
landlords. In res istance to o f f ic ia l  a r re s t ,  
they burnt down houses i^which by implication 
should be Landlords' residence and government 
o f f ice ] .  So formidable they were that  they 
not only dared to a r re s t  landlords and policy 
o f f ic ia l s  but also to repel or k i l l  the soldiers 
who had come to interferewith  them."
This probably was the e a r l i e s t  o f f ic ia l  record of the Hakka miner
brotherhood and self-government. A century l a t e r ,  we also hear of a
revival of Hakka miner brotherhoods in Yünnan and K^an^si, The copper
miners in Yünnan had been described by Lin Tse-hsü, the governor of Yünnan
54and Kui-chou, as mostly f ierce and cunning people:
53. Hui-chou fu -ch i , 17;22.
Of opposite ends of in te l lec tua l  spectrum in the in terpreta t ion  of 
Chinese bandits,  Chesneaux and Hobsbawm are s i t t i n g  on the l e f t  and 
Metzger on the r ight .  While the former romanticised Chinese social 
bandits,  the l a t t e r  vulgarised them, 
see Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (New York, 1969), p.64.
Thomas A. Metzger, 'Chinese Bandits: The Traditional Perception Re-
Evalued' in JAS Vol.XXXIII, no.3, May 1974, p.455.
54. CKCTSKS, p.340.
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"The custom of forming brotherhood was very 
popular in mines. I t  was a saying in YUnnan 
that no mine could be founded without an oath 
o f brotherhood. Their c o n f l ic t in g  in te res t 
sometimes tore them apart. However, they 
joined together to strengthen th e ir  position 
and control in the area. Gradually, they began 
to defy the law and au tho r it ies  there. Thus, in 
mining d is t r ic t s ,  not only the o f f ic ia ls  were 
worried about not to in te rfere  wi th them, but 
also the local gentry and residents were in 
great awe and keeping a wary eye on them."
The YUnnan copper miners included not only the impoverished YUnnanese,
55but also those coolies from Kwangtung, Kwangsi and other provinces. A 
s ig n if ic a n t  portion o f them must have been the Hakka who always pioneered 
the t r a i l s  o f mines in China and overseas.
In the mid 18th century, fo r  example, the Hakka miners brought a boom
of s i lv e r  mining to Vietnam. They had established the Sung-hsing (sending
stars) mining settlement in which they had th e ir  own ru le  and shops and
medical p ra c t i t io n e rs . Their organisation was also the k'o-chang system,
s im ila r  to that in YUnnan. One o f the k 1o-chang there, Chang Te-yi came
from Ch'ang-lo hsien o f Kwantung in 1761. A fte r working fo r  a while as coo lie ,
56he was selected by his own group o f miners as the k 1 o-chantj . However,
large parts of the miners there had been the Ch'ao-chou and Chao-chou Hakka,
57estimated tens o f thousands in to ta l .  Each of the mining brotherhoods such
as Chang's and his r i v a l ' s ,  was led by seven char,# or heads with an average
58 ^o f two to three hundred men in i t s  membership.
Hakka miner brotherhoods also found I W  way to Kwangsi during the 
reign of Tao-kuang (1821-1850) or e a r l ie r .  In Kuei hsien, the cradle o f the
55. CKCTSKS, p .339.
56. Shih-liao shUn-k'ang (Taiwan rep. 1963), p.425.
57. Tatsuro Yamamoto ed., (History o f In ternational Relations between Vietnam 
and China), (Tokyo, 1975), p.431.
58. Shih-1iao, o p .c i t . ,  p.425.
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the Tai ping revolution, the Hakka coal miners were said to have come from
59Chia-ying a f t e r  1723. The opening of s i lv e r  mines by the local magistrate 
in 1819 began the influx of Hakka miners from everywhere in China. The 
influx continued during the reign of Tao-kuang when the successive magistrate 
revived private mining. A stone tab le t  dated 1887 speaks of the migration
r  f) *
of Hakka miner brotherhoods:
"Rascals continued to come in flocks. Within 
one or two years, the deep valleys as well as 
the remote mountains had all  been inhabited 
by the yu-min (the wandering people). They 
were strong, muscular, single and very f ierce  
and violent.  They committed al l  sorts  of crimes; 
robery, plunder and founding brotherhoods. The 
local police dared not to go into mines to 
i n t e r f e r e ."
Hakka miners in Kuei hsien, coal or s i lv e r  miners, with a strong 
ancestral t i e  and schooling in a philosophy of sworn-brotherhood society 
were akin to Hung's revolutionary ideas. Soon they became the men of 
Taiping who sparked the revolution in Kuei hsien which aroused the whole of 
China to build a heavenly kingdom of brotherhood.
The Hakka were freedom loving and rebellious and they were proud of
what they were. The powerful t rad i t ion  of resistance was par t icu la r ly  the i r
pride. I t  was the i r  claim that  'the regiments which fought against the
Mongols were recruited from among them; that  the men who followed Coxinga,
the loyal Ming general,  to Formosa to r e s i s t  the Manchus, were Hakkas; Hung
Hsiu-chuan, as well as many other leaders of the Taiping uprising, were 
28Hakkas.' The claim of the i r  act ive part ic ipa t ion  in the Cheng regime might 
provide one of the possible links to the origins of kongsi. The Cheng regime 
was of course largely a Fukienese sea-merchant kingdom. I t  i s ,  however,
59. Tai-pinq T'ien-kuo Chi-yi T'iao-cha Pao-kao (Report of the finding of 
Taiping), (Peking, 1955), p . 107.
Lo, K'o cha i , p .417.
60. Tai-ping, p . 107.
61. Han Suyin, p.27, 28.
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certa in tha t there was a small number o f the Hakka in the regime, who held
o f f ic ia l  pos it ions. One th ird  o f the Taiwan population was the Hakka.
6 2Their migration began during the time o f the Cheng regime. Waves o f Hakka 
migration to Taiwan o f th is  period and la te r  brought the knowledge of 
Fukien Kongsi to th e ir  home countries and overseas.
And now, the Hakka, with th e i r  passion fo r  adventure, mining and 
brotherhood, had come to break the silence o f  the mountains in West Borneo.
62. Lo, K'o cha i, 12 13.
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CHAPTER IV
The Borneo ' F r o n t i e r '  and the 
b e g in n in g  o f  Chinese S e l f -G o ve rn m en t
1. The 'Free F ro n t ie r1 23 in Viest Borneo
Most wr i ters  disagree regarding the exact year in which Chinese 
gold mining in the area began. But they a l l  agree that Chinese miners 
were f i r s t  introduced by the Panemban of Mampawa. In about 1760, according 
to Veth, the Panemban who very possibly learnt  o f  the success of  the Bangka 
sultan in making a great fortune from Chinese t i n  mining there, inv i ted 
20 Chinese from Brunei to dig gold in the Doeri val ley. "The resu l t  was 
tremendous." said Veth, "As a re su l t ,  not only more Chinese were allowed 
by him to work gold f ie lds  in his kingdom, but also the sultan of  Sampas, 
Omar Akamadin, was happy to fol low his example by permitt ing the Chinese 
to establ ish a mining settlement in Larah around 1760."^
This date must have been a mistake, because the grave of a Chinese
?
miner near Montrado has been dated back to the 1740s. This evidence 
suggests that the beginning of Chinese gold mining in West Borneo was most 
l i k e l y  in the 1740s. Veth and Schaannk d i f f e r  in th e i r  accounts o f  how 
the Chinese gold mines spread in the pioneering period. The d i f fus ion  of  
early Chinese gold mines, according to Veth, was from Larah to Montrado.
But Schaannk believes that Seminis was the point o f  o r ig in  fo r  Chinese gold
3
mines in West Borneo.
The pol icy of the Malay rulers to encourage Chinese gold mining 
proved more than successful. At the outset, i t  was only a t r i c k le  of 
Chinese miners from Brunei, not more than 20 persons. But as soon as word 
went round along junk routes to China that r ich gold mines were discovered 
in West Borneo and Chinese miners were welcome, i t  turned in to  a f lood. As 
a resu l t  of a growing in f lu x  of Chinese miners, by 1764 there were 12 mining
1. Veth, V o l . l ,  p.298.
2. Schaannk, p .506.
3. , p.507.
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unions in Larah and 24 in Montrado.  ^ The Chinese population underwent a
rapid growth. At this time, each year at least 3000 Chinese arrived from 
n 5
China, wfereas only a few hundreds returned. More Chinese meant more
income for the Malay chiefs who seemed l i t t l e  worried about the Chinese.
They appeared unable to foresee that what they were doing was inviting ag
power which they would be in no condition to control in the future.
Since they would rather leave the Chinese alone in their own mining 
d is tr ic ts ,  they were not interested in ruling the Chinese pol i t ica l ly .  It 
was economic control which concerned them most. They granted mining rights 
to the Chinese on str ic t  conditions, which were essentially  a form of 
economic control over the Chinese. The Chinese were not allowed to engage 
in agriculture nor the whole-sale trade, so that they had to rely entirely  
on the sultan for their supply of provisions. The compulsory supply of 
provisions such as rice, iron tools, opium, blue linen and so on was often 
at highly inflated prices. Also, an annual tribute of 32,000 guilders had 
to be sent to the sultan.'7
All such measures of economic 'control' were aiming to put Chinese 
miners in a position of permanent economic dependence on the sultan in 
order to ensure a lion's share for him in the expanding mining economy. Yet 
the success of such an economic policy depended on Chinese obedience. Fears 
of Chinese resistance to such 'control' caused the sultan to prohibit the 
Chinese to have firearms and gunpowder. For the same reason, the sultan 
was said to have appointed Dayak chiefs to supervise or even exercise
o
authority over the Chinese. This, however desirable from the point of 
view of the sultans, seems doubtful in the light of an account given by 
the Larah Dayaks. That Dayaks were massacred by the Chinese in an insurrection 
in 1770 as retold by Schaannk, Veth, and De Rees, is even more doubtful.
4.
5.
6 .
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8 .
Veth, Vol .l ,  p .299.
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Veth's version is much less biased than De Rees's against the 
Chinese. In his account, the Chinese resented the prohibitions even during 
the reign of sultan Akamadin, who already found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to uphold 
economic control.  After 10 years of paying tr ibu te  re luc tant ly ,  the Chinese 
f e l t  themselves already strong enough to get rid of this  yoke. Their f i r s t  
move was to remove the Dayaks' supervision over them. So the story goes:
"On the occasion of the i r  annual feas t ,  the Chinese 
invited neighbouring Dayaks from Montrado to come 
over for the celebration. The Dayaks were allowed 
to enter the i r  fo r t i f i c a t io n  (which I think was 
the kongsi-house), only one by one. The Chinese 
had already armed themselves with weapons. All 
of a sudden, when the entrance was closed, they 
made a bloodbath upon the unsuspecting Dayaks.
The remaining Dayaks barely escaped the murderous 
Chinese by fleeing to Bintanan. I t  happened around 
1770 and since then the t r ibu te  to the sultan of 
Sambas decreased considerably and was collected 
with d i f f icu l ty ."^
The Bangka experience leads me to cast  doubt on th is  account. If  
the policy of encouraging Chinese gold mining was a leaf  taken out of the 
Bangka su l tan 's  book, the Malay chiefs in West Borneo must have also learn t  
about the kongsi system there. The Malay tikus or t reasurers in the court 
prac t ica l ly  l e f t  the administration of the mines to the kongsi which acted 
as i t s  a g e n t . ^  The kongsi there ,.being the representatives of the court 
of Palem bang, exercised absolute power over the miners, including the i r  
lives and propert ies .  The kongsi were themselves Chinese. Even so, even 
with th is  form of indirect  ru le ,  there were instances of revolts of the 
miners. The miners of Jebus, for instance, 'are par t icu la r ly  celebrated 
on account of the i r  obstinacy and impudence, and they have several times 
been riotous.'*'*' There were several outrages of the miners and Chinese
9. Veth, Vol .l ,  p .300.
10. Thomas Horfield, 'View of the Tin Mines on Bangka', in J . I .A . ,  1848, 
Vol.2, p .820.
11. Thomas, 820.
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inhabitants in the d i s t r i c t  of Pängkäi-pinang too. If indirec t  rule through 
the Chinese was already d i f f i c u l t ,  then to rule the Chinese through the 
Dayaks would certainly be almost impossible.
The Larah Dayaks told Schaannk the i r  own version of this  period of
history. The e a r l i e s t  Chinese gold mining, according to them, s ta r ted  with
the sultan of Sambas who sponsored 7 Chinese from Pinang island to dig gold
on his account. These 7 Chinese established a mine in mountain Si Benoewang,
halfway between Bangkajang and Sebelauw. They were supplied with r ice ,
12dried f ish and tools by the sultan.  The issue of provisions was made in 
advance a t  so high a price that  the miners had to give up a large part of 
th e i r  gain in return. I t  seems, however, much the same as the system of 
granting monthly advances of a r t i c le s  to t in  miners by the kongsi in Bangka. 
But, of course, there was a s ign i f ican t  difference in Sambas, where the 
sultan monopolied the supply of provisions by himself without an agency 
of kongsi.
The Larah Dayak's source has also told much the same story about the
gold rush and the prohibitions imposed upon the Chinese who were to be kept
s t r i c t l y  to gold mining. Yet fresh l igh t  is shed upon how the s i tuat ion
got out of the su l tan 's  hands as a resu l t  of the peaceful erosion of his
13power by the Chinese. We learn that
"while the sultan could see with joy that  his 
income increased, th is  joy did not l a s t  long 
as gradually the influence of the Chinese 
began to r ise  above him. The Chinese made 
every attempt to l ibe ra te  themselves from 
the extortion of the sultan.  They smuggled 
in th e i r  provisions and fra ternised with the 
Dayaks more and more. As a consequence, more 
and more Dayaks were won over by them and a 
large part  of the su l tan 's  influence was thus 
dimini shed."
12. Schaannk, p.561.
13. , p .563.
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The Dayak source had no recollection of Dayaks even being appointed 
to exercise control over the Chinese, who, in their earl iest  impression, 
were the coolies of the sultan. They only gradually came to know that the 
Chinese were well disposed towards them.^
The Chinese ascendancy which the Malay chiefs were unable to arrest
seems likely to have been due to the success of their fraternisation with
the Dayaks rather than a massacre as mentioned above. Moreover, we are
also told that the Chinese ascendancy was, i f  not directly, at least
indirectly responsible for the political eclipse of the sultan. Since
then, the sultan of Sambas found himself losing control over the Dayaks.
Encouraged by the example of Chinese resistance, various Dayak tribes in
Sambas ceased to wage war on each other and united to resist  the compulsory
15trade which brought profit only to the Malay sultan.
In general, the relationship between the Chinese and Dayaks was good 
and amicable. There were, however, times when the two groups were at war 
and times when the Chinese attacked the Dayaks or the Dayaks attacked the
1 F\Chinese. The Dayaks living in Chinese d is t r ic ts  or terr i tor ies  within 
the power of the kongsi were usually on good terms with the Chinese. They 
were often through marriage of their relations with the Chinese being invited 
to Chinese feast and became able to speak Chinese. On the other hand, the 
Malay sultans could not profit by the Dayaks other than the compulsory barter 
with which the Dayaks agreed. In this barter, the Dayaks in spite of
excessive high profit advanced by them, they could only get salt  and tobacco
in return. ^
Dayak supervision seems extremely uniikely, more especially when the 
Malay rulers were not interested in extending their administration to the 
Chinese at a l l .  What they sought after was only economic control. The kind
of economic control, which was in force at the beginning, was in fact a
form of feudal overlordship plus unequal partnership. In this unequal part­
nership, the Malay chiefs 'employed' the Chinese coolies by supplying pro­
visions and tools. This was possible only when the size of Chinese gold mine
14. Schaannk, p.563.
15. Ibid.
16. Yeh's Annuals in Lo, p.139, 142.
17. Veth, Vol.l, p.100.
Jackson, p.44.
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was very small, not more than a few hundred people. But when the mining
population expanded to tens o f thousands in the 1770s, i t  would be an
impossible task fo r  the Malay chiefs to supply the provisions and too ls.
I t  was c le a r ly  no longer possible fo r  the sultan to continue the monopoly o f
provisions. This means that he ceased to be the partner or 'employer' o f
the Chinese miners. A new form o f economic control over the Chinese miners
was therefore called fo r .  By the time Hunt v is i te d  West Borneo in 1812,
the sultan o f Sambas collected tr ib u te  and mine rents from the Chinese who
nominally recognised him as the feudal overlord and landlord of the mines.
The mine rent now was fixed a t the rate o f 50 bunkals o f gold per mine per
annum. In add it ion , a cap ita tion  tax o f 3 do lla rs  per head on every Chinese
miner was collected by him. But even such form o f economic control was
in doubt. As Hunt observed: "There are t h i r t y  thousand Chinese in the
Sambas d is t r ic t s ,  and they feel themselves strong enough to oppose or evade
th is  tax; i t  hence becomes a perpetual contest between greedy exto rtion
18on the one side and avaricious chicanery on the o ther."
We do not hear any more about the monopoly o f provisions by the
sultan. Already in the 1770s, the Malay chiefs were unable to enforce th e ir
ban on Chinese involvement in ag r icu ltu re . Beginning from the T 'ien-T i
Hui and the Lan-fang Hui which f i r s t  broke the ban, the other Chinese unions
19or kongsi a l l  sooner or la te r  stepped in to  ag r icu ltu re . I t  was a f te r  
1770 tha t the sultan ceased to be the 'employer' o f  Chinese miners, although 
he might s t i l l  have retained the monopoly of opium. The question of 
p o l i t ic a l  control did not arise u n t i l  th is  time because at f i r s t  the sultan 
recru ited  Chinese miners as his coolies in a number tha t was too small to 
have any p o l i t ic a l  s ign if icance . However, the expansion of Chinese mining 
was at a rate fa r  too rapid and o f a size fa r too big fo r  the Malay chiefs 
to exert p o l i t ic a l  con tro l. In other words, they were completely unprepared 
fo r  the emergence o f a new p o l i t ic a l  power - the kongsi - which was to 
overshadow them.
Their unpreparedness was not altogether due to a lack o f fo res igh t.
18. Hunt, in Moor, Appendix, p .18-
19. Schaannk, p .518.
To be sp e c if ic ,  i t  should be a f te r  the defeat of the T 'ien-T i Hui, which 
monopolied r ice  production, in 1775 that the r ice  production became free 
to a l l  kongsi. see Schaannk, p.520.
61
I t  had a lot to do with other no less important factors as well. Perhaps, 
the most important one should be sought in the breach of the kongsi system 
of Bangka by the Malay chiefs in West Borneo. The kongsi system in Bangka 
created a class of Chinese kongsi who used the authority of Malay tikus 
to run the administration of mines and to monopolise the supply of pro­
visions and tools. They owed their privileges and power to Malay rule, in 
which they clearly had a stake. The kongsi system there was s t i l l  very 
much in the tradition of the old Kapitan system or the traditional Chinese 
officer system. The Kongsi, like the kapitan, were appointed as the heads 
of the Chinese settlement by the Malay rulers. However, the Malay chiefs 
in West Borneo, who wanted a larger share of mining profit ,  refused to 
share the cake with a class of kongsi. They acted as direct 'employers' of 
Chinese coolies and took the monopoly of provisions completely to themselves. 
Yet they themselves were unable to f i l l  the administrative function of 
Chinese kongsi.
This breach of the old kongsi system left  the question of the admini­
stration of Chinese mines wide open. What were they to do then? They could 
not be bothered, and le f t  i t  to Chinese miners themselves to work out their 
own administration. The Chinese miners knew very well what to do for them­
selves. They elected administrators who were called kongsi and built their 
government which was called kongsi too. The breach of the old kongsi 
system by the Malay chiefs in this way raised the possibility of the emerg­
ence of a new form of kongsi or Chinese miner government, in which both the 
officers and miners united as one person.
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2. The Pioneering Period: Small Partnership, Shan-sha or Par i t
During the pioneering period, from 1745 to 1763, many small Chinese 
partnerships mushroomed in the go ld f ie lds o f  West Borneo. They were, no 
doubt, the very beginning of the Chinese kongsi 's evolut ion. Chinese 
kongsi names l ike  Shih-wu-fen ( f i f t e e n  shares) and Shih-san-fen ( th i r teen 
shares) are evident ly a re l i c  o f  th e i r  pioneering past. The tales of  f i r s t  
Chinese gold mines in Sambas and Mampawa, a l l  with no more than 20 miners 
under the Malay sponsorship, also points to th e i r  o r ig in  in small partner­
ships .
Whether already the small partnerships were cal led kongsi in th is
period, we are not cer ta in. However, we are to ld that they were d e f in i te ly
cal led Shan-sha (the sand of mountain) or Par i t  which in Malay means canal
20or mine. Lo Fang-po has l e f t  us a passage about Pari t  in his Poem:
"The customs of  naming things are so very 
d i f fe re n t  here. Seldom can the Chinese 
and the barbarian communicate. Yet the 
so-cal led Sha-liao are actual ly  huts fo r  
miners, and p a r i t  chin-hu (lakes of  gold­
f ie ld s )  by d i f fe re n t  name."
P a r i t , or Shan-sha, according to Francis, general ly was re ferr ing
to a small mine operated by 10 to 25 men who included the cook and handi- 
21c ra f t  workers. Such small mining operations were invar iably  organised 
on the basis o f  the t ra d i t ion a l  Chinese partnership system - the huo-chi 
system. So i t  appears in the oral t ra d i t io n  of the Larah Dayak that the 
miners were closely bound to each other by a spec i f ic  t i e ,  by which miners 
of  the same mine regarded one another as comrade or huo-chi.
As regards Shan-sha in th is  period, we are almost t o t a l l y  l e f t  in 
the dark. Much of those which we know are of  la te r  period. Veth, however,
20. Lo, p.148.
21. Francis, p.23.
Veth, p.333.
22. Schaannk, p.562.
23. Veth, Vol . 1, p .334.
63
"All these small mines were called shan-sha 
by the Chinese. They were different from the 
large mines of Nam by their insignificant 
amount of capi t a l ,their smaller number of 
labourers,their simpler structursof organis­
ation, and 1h6r lack of extensive waterwork, 
as a result, the water supply of which was 
very much dependent on the rain and V] *Heir 
exclusive working on the gold-ore which lay 
closer to the upperlayer. In general, the 
proportion was not unlike that which existed 
between the kulit- and kollong-mines in tin 
mining in Bangka."
Small mines or kulit mines generally suffered such drawbacks as
ettr'Vy exhaustion of the ore and often longer stoppage of the works because
of 4he small supply of water. However, the kulit mines on the hil l -
deposits are suitable for small capital. Although, when possible in this
early period, Malay rulers might have been acting in the capacity of
suppliers of tools, provisions and opium, similar to wo-tou in Ylinnan,
Chinese miners seemed to have raised capital for their mining operation by
themselves. They organised small partnerships not only for raising capital
but also for mutual support and help. The shareholders were called hun
25who participated in the loss or gain according to their shares. Every 
member had to work in the mine. Meanwhile, 'even those who had more than 
one share s t i l l  had to take part in the labour, until they employed workers
n r  t 27
to work for them." Their substitutes were called collie-hun.
The beginning of Chinese gold mining was started by Malay sponsorship. 
Later, however, most of the Chinese migrants came to West Borneo without 
the invitation or sponsorship by the Malay chiefs who of course s t i l l  welcomed
24. Posewitz, p.353.
25. , p .359.
26. Veth, Vol.l, p.303.
27. Posewitz, p.359.
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th is  new source of income. These Chinese small partnerships which did not
rely on the Malay chiefs for the supply of tools and cap i ta l ,  grew more
and more over time. They had to pay a certain amount of gold for the
r igh t  to mine and to put up with the compulsory trade through which the
28workers were supplied with the provisions a t  high prices.
Even that  small in scale ,  not more than 25, the Shan-sha had i t s
own administration independent of Malay rule. Not unlike the k'o-chang
29system in Yhnnan, in the Shan-sha or small partnership,
"Every shareholder had a vote in the a f fa i rs  
of the enterprise.  A clerk was elected for 
every four months to run the daily business 
and to keep the account of incomes and expenses.
He was temporarily considered as the head. But 
as soon as his term of off ice  finished, he must 
lay down his pen and go to work with a mattock 
as an ordinary member."
This clerk might be called kongsi or the o ff ice r .  He was not res ­
ponsible to Malay rulers but his partnership. The o f f ice r  of the pa r i t  
was almost indist inguishable from the re s t  of the partners who elected 
him as the head for only four months. To them, he was only a partner,  who 
had ju s t  as equal a say in the matter of the pa r i t  as any ordinary member 
had. In contrast ,  the Chinese mining off icers  in Bangka were divorced from 
the miners and formed a d is t inc t ive  class of the i r  own. There the Chinese
kongsi were vested by Malay tikus 'with authority to regulate everything
30re la t ing  to the mines and to the persons employed in them.1.
I t  was so not only because of the concentration of power in the hands 
of the kongsi who bu i l t  up a machinery of administration by appointing a 
number of wri te rs ,  store-keepers and ass is tan ts  to a s s i s t  him. Even in 
economic terms, the Chinese kongsi in Bangka were also an exploiting class .  
I t  was they who used the fund provided by his employer, the t ik u s , to supply
28. Veth, Vol.l ,  p . 333.
29. Veth, p .303.
30. Thomas Horsefield, p.820.
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the miners with ' the machinery of various kinds used in mining; besides
31furnaces, apparatus and implements of smelting of the o re . '  I t  was also 
they who by using the same fund supplied the t in  miners with monthly
32advances in r ice ,  s a l t ,  o i l ,  and clothes of various kinds a t  high prices.
This contrasts with the position of Chinese off icers  in West Borneo.
They were deprived by the Malay rulers of such an economic function on the 
one hand, and of such a concentration of po l i t ica l  power on the other.
These differences,  the lack of an instrument of Malay o f f ic ia l  control and 
the e lec tor ia l  power of miners over the off icers  led to a d ifferent  evolution 
of Chinese mining partnerships in West Borneo. The evolution of the Chinese 
kongsi in West Borneo was blessed with a good environment for self-government 
from the beginning. This position was not changed until  nearly a century 
la t e r  when the Dutch l e f t  no room for Chinese autonomy.
The spread and growth of Shan-sha or small partnerships continued well
into a much la te r  period when the large kongsi government had already evolved
from i t s  shan-sha origin . Within the kongsi, there were many independent
small mining partnerships growing like mushrooms under the shade of a ta l l
t ree .  Those independent shan-sha of Koelor, Sebawa, Seminis, and Siding
33lasted until  1850. The number of them, according to Veth, was very con- 
34siderable. These small mines within the kongsi were, however, obliged
35to give part of the i r  p ro f i t  to the kongsi for the grant of the mining r ight .
Before the emergence of Chinese mining brotherhood government in 1763,
the gold rush in West Borneo caused a sudden mult iplication of small mining
partnerships. Numerous stamgenoten or family or clan partnerships arose
from both the Chinese who wrote asking th e i r  clan members to come over and
36the newcomers who looked for the i r  re la t ives  and clan members. According
31. Ibid.
32. Thomas Horsefield, p.820.
33. Veth, Vol.l ,  p .334. 
Jackson, p.63, 64.
34. Veth, Vol. l ,  p .333.
35. , p.333.
36. Schaannk, p.564.
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to Schaannk, these clan partnerships were ruled by patria'chal government,
37in which the e ldest  and most venerable were naturally  the unchosen heads.
This, in fac t ,  was the k'o-chang system of t radi t ional  private Chinese
r 38mining, being mistaken by Schaannk for patriachal government. Hsieh Chincj-
kao a widely t ravelled sea-merchant from Chia-ying chou, who also had been
3Qto West Borneo, wrote in 1842:
"From Kuta to Wanlah, mountains linked 
together. People t ravelled  by land. In 
the d i s t r i c t  of Mondor, tens of thousands 
of the Chinese from Canton and Fukien were 
gold miners, farmers and t raders .  In countries 
of Tai-yen, Yi-hao, Hsin-tan there were also 
a few hundred Chinese in each place. They 
were free to move about regardless of bound­
aries between them. I t  was all  depending 
on where would they l ive that  year that  they 
paid the capita t ion tax collected by the 
k'o-chang of the place to the Dutch."
Hsü Chi-yü too ident i f ied  the Chinese kongsi administrators as the
k'o-chang. Without making i t  clear  when i t  was, he wrote in 1850:^
"In recent years, the Chinese from Chia-ying 
chou went into in te r io r  mountains to open up 
mines. More and more Chinese migrants se t t led  
down and became naturalised.  They at  f i r s t  
married with the Dayak women. When the popul­
ation greatly muliplied a f t e r  generations, they 
began to marry with the growing number of native-
37. Schaannk, p.565.
38. In order to refresh the memory, see Chapt.l ,  the section on the k'o-chang 
system.
39. Lo, p . 134.
40. Wei Yuan, Hai-kuo t 'u - c h i h , chuan 12, Hai-tao-kuo 2, p.5.
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born Chinese women. The population now has 
already exceeded twenty or t h i r t y  thousand.
They selected the elders fo r  the administration 
o f the kongsi whom they called by the name o f 
k'o-chang. In every one or two years, the 
o f f ic e rs  were replaced."
I t  is apparent in th is  description that the system was one in which 
the elders ranked high and venerable but also one that was fo r  the small 
and simple organisation. So, I th ink they must be ta lk in g  about the 
pioneering period although they themselves might not be aware o f the 
confusion o f time caused by th e ir  discursiveness. The head o f the small 
partnership or p a r i t  who was elected to run the da ily  business o f the p a r i t  
fo r  four months must have held the t i t l e  k1o-chang or k 'o - t 'o u . This 
t ra d i t io n  passed down well in to  a much la te r  time when the large kongsi 
federation incorporated both the kongsi p a r i t  and small pr iva te  partnerships 
which were independent. As opposed to the kongs i-parit tha t belonged to
41the kongsi, the small p r iva te  partnerships were s t i l l  called k 'o-tou p a r i t .
41. Schaannk, p.568.
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CHAPTER V
The Rise o f  B ro th e rh o o d  Government 
and Kongsi Governments
1. The Rise o f Brotherhood Government - Hui
In 1763 or thereabouts, there was a fu r th e r  development o f Chinese 
miner organisations. Hui - a form of miner brotherhood government emerged 
from the combination o f small partnerships. Hui, in Chinese, means union, 
which in i t s e l f ,  o f course, does not imply the largeness or smallness o f 
the organisation. Nevertheless, something in the nature of brotherhood 
government is being introduced by th is  new usage o f the old term.
The b ir th  of Chinese mining hui was p a r t ly  the re su lt  o f organis­
ational reform and expansion. Indeed, the rap id ly  expanding mining economy 
during the pioneering period encouraged the growth of la rger mining oper­
ations and organisations. There were fa r  greater advantages in organis­
ational reform. In order to be be tter able to deal w ith the Dayaks and 
rapacious Malay ru le rs , and to have more human resources fo r  large-scale 
mine work such as water networks, small partnerships began to unite in to  one 
single union or hui brotherhood.*
Although in general a mining hui brotherhood embraced 50 to 150 
2
members, twice or th r ice  as big as the shan-sha in 1763, many of the 24 
mining hui in Montrado were small in scale, perhaps no bigger than small 
partnerships. However, those which were o f greater means, labour and 
capita l as w e l l ,  b u i l t  the large mines on the re la t iv e ly  f l a t  va lley  plains 
where deposits were often th icker and deeper. This kind o f large mine,which 
was called Nam, never needed to stop work fo r  want o f water. I t ,  fu r th e r-
3
more, gave longer y ie ld  o f the ore than the shan-sha.
1. Schaannk, p.565.
2. Francis, p.23.
3. Jackson is r ig h t  to l in k  the emergence of the Nam with the growth of 
Chinese self-government. But i t s  appearance was not towards the end 
o f the 19th century but much e a r l ie r .  See Jackson, p.38.
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During the emergence of mining brotherhoods, violence erupted over 
conflicting claims to the mining rights by contending hui. Almost as a 
rule, the expansion of a mining brotherhood also meant the expansion of 
the mining terr itory,  even at the cost of the other mining hui. Thus, 
gradually in a specific d is t r ic t  only one brotherhood arose as the strongest 
who laid claim to the whole area of neighbourhood and more or less obtained 
the marked out territory.^ In the Chinese d is t r ic ts ,  the small partnerships, 
as Veth observed, regarded themselves the exclusive owners of the gold mines. 
As soon as the news that a gold mine was discovered, was reported to the 
kongsi or brotherhood, they hurried off. to occupy the mine and to apply 
for the kongsi's approval of their mining rights over the new mine.0
Within the territory of a kongsi,
"He who has neglected to report the discovery 
of a new goldfield to the kongsi whose territory 
their kampong or dessa belonged to, and he who
Cjin r\
takes the risk of being on his own authority 
to dig for gold in the new mine, be he a 
Chinese, Malay or Dayak will be penalised with 
a heavy fine and sometimes with horrible 
mutilation."
While more and more mining hui were expanding their te rr i to r ies ,  and 
therefore their members, the number of small partnerships standing by them­
selves certainly progressively dwindled. The small partnerships which had 
yet to join a hui brotherhood, would be persuaded by their own interest to 
do so. Even those which appeared more or less independent s t i l l  had to rely 
upon their alliance with one or another hui brotherhood for protection.
By 1774, after the defeat of the Lang-fang hui, the number of mining hui_ in 
Montrado was reduced from 24 to 12, which 3 years later had merged into 7.
4. Schaannk, p.565.
5. Veth, Vol. 1, p .333.
6. Ibid.
7. Schaannk, p.565.
8. Veth, Vol.l, p.299, 301.
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The exact number was, however, debatable. Schaannk strongly argued that 
i t  was 14 ra ther than 12 a f te r  1774. He nevertheless admitted o f the g
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f the existence o f 12 mining huj_ in Montrado before 1772.
The reason fo r  th is  is tha t not a l l  the new mining huj_ were formed 
by the u n if ica t io n  o f old partnerships. Some new mining hui were s p l i t  
from the old partnerships which had grown too big to remain one. Hsin-pa- 
fen (the new e ight shares) fo r  instance, was s p l i t  from the Lao-pa-fen 
(the old e ight shares). S im ila r ly ,  the Hsin-shih-ssu-fen (the new fourteen 
shares) stemmed from the pa-fen (the e ight shares) and shih-ssu-fen (the 
fourteen shares). The Lao-shih-ssu-fen (the old fourteen shares) was also 
the mother kongsi or hui o f the Hsin-wuk (the new house).10
The process of merging pursued no d e f in i te  pattern. An element of 
clannism was d iscern ib le  in the organisation of hui brotherhoods. Ta-kang 
(the great port) which emerged as the largest and strongest kongsi la te r ,  
consisted, fo r  the most pa rt,  o f the surname groups o f Wu, Huang and 
Cheng from H u i- la i and Lu-feng. A large part o f Shan-t'iao-kuo (the three 
ditches) likewise comprised the surname groups of Weng and Chu also from 
H u i- la i and Lu-feng. In Lang-fang (the orchard-fragrance) big surname 
groups o f Sung, Liu and Chiang from Chia-ying chou formed the m a jority .
Clannism in th is  early stage of the kongsi' s evolution was, however, 
not so strong as in the 1840s. The old and narrow concept o f hui_ brother­
hood based on regionalism or clannism was necessarily modified and enlarged 
by the expansion o f Chinese mining organisations in  West Borneo. The 
founding of the Lang-fang hui_was such an extension o f the hu i brotherhood. 
Although the nucleus o f the Lang-fang brotherhood was no doubt formed by 
over a hundred Chia-ying Hakka, i t s  growth was the continued extension of 
the brotherhood to the miners from other regions. Soon a f te r  th e ir  takeover 
o f the Shan-shin (the heart o f the mountain) mine, they treated the Ta-p'u 
Hakka there as th e ir  b ro the rs .* 11
Many other o f the same group, whether called Ta-p'u Hakka or Clvyong 
Njz? Hakka or Chao-chou Hakka, must also have been the rea fte r embraced in to  
th is  enlarged brotherhood in much the same way.
9. Schaannk, p.522, 523.
10. , p.523, 524.
11. Lo, p .138.
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Mining unions during this period were simultaneously called hui
and kongsi. Both Schaannk and Veth have pointed out that in i t ia l ly ,
12Chinese mining unions in West Borneo had been called hui♦ Yeh's Annals,
which also confirm this , say that Lo Fang-po, the legendary founder of
Lang-fang, was highly regarded by the Shih-ta Chia-wui (the four big
families) and the Ch'i-sheng kongsi (the accumulation of victories) when
13he f i r s t  arrived in Pontianak. The simultaneous usage of the terms kongsi 
and hui by the Chinese mining unions in West Borneo may sound confusing 
to us nowadays. But to the men of kongsi or hui, i t  was only a matter of 
different emphasis.
When they placed the emphasis on the meaning of brotherhood they 
used the term hui. But when they tried to distinguish their organisations 
from the hui brotherhoods in China, and to stress the significance of the 
extended partnership, they created a new usage for the old term kongsi.
For, unlike hui brotherhoods in general in China, theirs were at once 
extended mining partnerships and brotherhoods, the unity of which was 
symbolised in a Hall or kongsi-house. Yeh's Annals tell  a tale of the 
Lang-fang kongsi1s evolution from the foundation of the Central Hall or 
kongsi-house: ^
"After the occupation of Shan-shin gold mine,
Lo Fang-po erected stockades and walls around 
the houses there. He was conceiving a plan 
of gradual expansion to neighbouring areas.
Since then his reputation and influence grew 
daily. As he became a force to be reckoned 
with in the region, people from all over the 
region came to join him. They consequently 
founded the tsung-t1ing or the Central Hall 
of the Lang-fang kongsi at Mondor. With an 
increasing number of resident houses and 
shops built in the vicinity of the Central
12. Veth, Vol.l, p.310.
13. Lo, p. 137. or? K ^ t f ]
14. , p.138.
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Hall, a th r iv in g  township thereby emerged 
from the mine."
This version is ,  o f course, somewhat idealised. The expansion o f 
the Lang-fang brotherhood had, fo r the most pa rt,  not been peaceful.
Mao-ern, a prospering mining settlement comprising more than 200 shops, was 
added to i t s  t e r r i t o r y  by a surprise attack with the co llabora tion o f the 
Chia-ying Hakka from w ith in . I ts  m i l i ta ry  campaigns fo r  the expansion o f 
t e r r i t o r y  were not at a l l  smooth s a i l in g .  The war with the powerful 
brotherhood o f Liu Chien-hsian had been going on with ups and downs fo r 
years. At one po int the Lang-fang hu i was even in great danger of being 
wiped out by the joined forces o f L iu 's  brotherhood and other mining camps 
from Ming Huang to Liu fe n - t 'o u .15 The enemy forces were only a few hundred 
yards away. However, the scale o f war was f in a l ly  turned by a boost of 
morale on Lo's side. In the decisive b a t t le ,  Lo personally fought in the 
f ro n t l in e  and broke L iu 's  s ix  m i l i ta ry  camps and his a l l ie d  forces at a 
single stroke. The v ic to ry  not only recovered his loss in land but also 
put the en tire  Mandor region under his con tro l.
Chinese mining hui_ have mistakenly been regarded by Schaannk as a 
form o f patriachal government. They, indeed, were nothing but brotherhood 
governments. Their organisation as described by Yeh's Annals was as 
fo l lo w s : ^
"The mining settlement o f Mao-ern was ju s t  
prospering. There were two towns, the 
Oldtown and the Newtown. Oldtown was 
estimated to have had more than 200 shops 
and Newtown more than 20. The Hakka from 
Chao-yang, Chieh-yaang, Hai-feng and Lu-feng, 
had a m ajority  in Oldtown. Huang Kui-po 
was elected as the head or the tsung-ta-ko. 
The Chia-ying Hakka which fashioned the
15. L iu - fe n -t 'o u  was a very old mining brotherhood which was the mother-hui 
o f Shih-wu-fen (the f i f te e n  shares) to which i t  la te r  belonged.
See Schaannk, p.526.
16. Lo, p .138.
17. Ib id .
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overwhelming majority in Newtown were led 
by Chiang Mao-po who held the t i t l e  kung- 
yeh. They formed Lang-ho yin (Orchid- 
Harmony Camp). Four a ss i s tan t  heads called 
Lao-man (elder ass is tan t)  were elected to 
help him."
A botherhood like th is  was governed by a 5 man administration which 
seemed small indeed. We do not know how large the membership was. However, 
the number could be somewhere around two to three hundred people by in fe r ­
ence from the fact  that  there were no more than 20 shops in Newtown. The 
organisation was in part inspired by a heritage of the i r  fore fathers who 
had created the Eternal Prosperity Brotherhood a century e a r l i e r  in Hui- 
chou. The prototype had been a much larger organisation but nevertheless 
had a 5 man administration a t  the highest level.  The f i f th  leader too, 
had borne the t i t l e  Man-tsung or Wui-tsung, both of which meant a ss is tan t  
head.
Almost invariably all presidents of Chinese mining brotherhoods in
West Borneo carried the t i t l e  jxk The t i t l e  holders included presidents
of d if fe ren t  hu i , for example, Chiang Mao-po, Huang Kui-po, Lo Fang-po and
Hsieh Chieh-po. The succeeding presidents of the same brotherhood or
kongsi were also honoured with the t i t l e  by using i t  as the i r  l a s t  names,
a name habit which was uniquely Chinese, and clearly  associated with the
r ise  of a social group to d is t inc t ion .  Similarly, during the 16th and 17th
century, Chinese sea captains used the t i t l e  kuan as the i r  la s t  names, to
18distinguish the i r  rank.
19The new t i t l e  po_was recognised by Malays as equivalent to Kapitan.
The recognition represented a new and s ign i f ican t  change from original 
Maiay-Chinese rela t ionship in this  period of growing Chinese autonomy, and 
perhaps, independence, based upon the r i se  of Chinese mining brotherhoods. 
Though the t i t l e  Kapitan was old, the recognition that  a Kapitan or President
18. See Chen Ching-ho, 'Ching-chu Hua-po chi Chnag-chi Mao-I' (The Role of 
Chinese Junks in Nagasaki-South China Trade and Navigation during Early 
Ch'ing) in JSSS. Vol.9, p a r t . l ,  p . 15-50-
19. Schaannk, p.586.
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o f a Chinese brotherhood exercises absolute au tho rity  in i t s  own te r r i t o r y
was c e r ta in ly  new. One o f such recognitions was well documented in the
appointment o f Kapitan Bapa Wu, or Wu Yüan-sheng, by the Panembahan o f
20Mampawaas the absolute au tho rity  in Sinaman in 1770:
"The Panembahan has entrusted to Kapitan 
Bapah Wu a l l  the a f fa i rs  o f Sinaman and 
the administration o f ju s t ic e .  Whatever 
public announcements and command that 
would be made, they shall be made by 
Kapitan Bapah Wu and nobody else. For 
good or bad, i t  would res t w ith Kapitan 
Bapah Wu. Anyone who disobeys the order 
or command o f Kapitan Bapah Wu, w i l l  be 
considered ju s t  as much an offense to the 
Panembahan. I f  his offense is so grave 
tha t he should be put to death, he w i l l  
be executed, or tha t he deserves punish­
ment, then he w i l l  be punished, be he a 
Bugis, Malay, or Dayak or Chinese."
The Malay o f f i c ia l  recognition o f Kapitan's power as such departed 
sharply from the t ra d i t io n a l Kapitan system in which the Chinese kapitan 
was appointed to ru le the Chinese community only. Wu's brotherhood, how­
ever, must have established i t s  complete control over a l l  races in the 
te r r i t o r y  of Sinaman before the Malay o f f i c ia l  recognition o f i t s  power as 
an accomplished fa c t .  One a f te r  another Chinese mining brotherhoods l i k e ­
wise f e l l  away from Malay and Dayaks who l ived  w ith in  th e ir  te r r i t o r ie s .
I t  was from th is  point on that a new form o f p o l i t ic a l  power, the Chinese 
mining brotherhood or kongsi had become dominant in West Borneo.
The o r ig in  o f the term po was, no doubt, with the great founders 
who had been the f i r s t  to found a Chinese settlement or brotherhood, 
especia lly  those o f the Hakka. De Groot is  correct in pointing out that 
the founder was the Ta-po-kung or the patron-god o f the kongsi and that fo r
20. Schaannk, p.586.
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th is  reason, the founder o f the Lang-fang kongsi had been recognised as
21Lo Ta-po or Lo Po-kung. Many other great founders o f Chinese mining
brotherhoods in West Borneo had also been honoured with th is  term. Liu
Shan-po, the formidable founder o f the T ' ie n - t i  brotherhood, was one, and
22Hsieh Chieh-po, the founder o f the Ho-shun kongsi federation, the other.
In 1776, the Hsieh Presidency of the Ho-shun kongsi federation was 
in te re s t in g ly  associated with a union o f the t i t l e s  kapitan and ßo in his 
name, Hsieh Chieh-chia and Hsieh Chieh-po. At th is  juncture the men o f 
the kongsi had already created a more developed framework of organisation 
fo r  the greater union o f Chinese mining brotherhoods.
21. De Groot, p.120, 121.
22. Schaannk, p .520.
Ta-po-kung had been a Chinese d e if ica t io n  of great mariners in o r ig in .  
I t  had been variab ly  called Tu-kang in Sung times, Tu-kung in the Ming 
and Nu-kung from the end o f the Ming to the middle o f the Ch'ing. But 
since then i t  evolved in to  the enshrined memory o f the great founders 
o f Chinese settlements overseas. The e a r l ie s t  temple o f Ta-po-kung 
in Pinang was b u i l t  to de ify  a Hakka founder with the surname Chang. 
The men o f the kongsi in West Borneo s im i la r ly  honoured the founders 
o f kongsis w ith d e if ic a t io n .  Although Lo Hsiang-lin in s is ts  of 
Ta-po-kung being only the Tu-ti (earth god), my agreement is  with 
P urce ll 's  evolutionary image o f Ta-po-kung, which is  more h is to r ic a l .  
In the portrayal o f Purce ll, Ta-po-kung is linked with the h is to ry  
o f overseas Chinese: "He probably derives from Tu T i,  but overseas
he is  p r im arily  the s p i r i t  o f the pioneers. The Chinese pioneers 
o f the early days suffered te r r ib le  hardships and were honoured 
in memory by those who came a f te r  them. Toh Peh Kong seems to be 
the person if ica tion  o f the pioneer s p i r i t  generally and is  not the 
d e if ica t io n  o f a special person as Sam Po Tai Shan is o f Cheng Ho."
See Han Wai-toon, 'Ta-po-kung Kao' (Research on Ta-po-kung) in 
JSSS, Vol.1, p a r t .2.
Kuang Kuo-hsiang, 'P ing-lang-I Hai-chou-I Ta-po-kung' (Notes on 
Ta-po-kung in Tanjong Tokong, Penang) in JSSS, V o l.9, part 1.
Lo, p.89.
Purce ll, p.49.
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2. The Construction of an extended brotherhood - Kongsi Government
Significant changes occured in the 1770s when Chinese mining brother­
hoods moved speedily towards a greater  union. By this  time, most of the 
mining kongsi already had pret ty large membership by comparison. While 
during the period of small partnership, often a partnership had 20 to 50 
members, in the times of brotherhood, a brotherhood generally consisted 
of 100 to 200 men. Now, in 1774, a kongsi usually comprised 500 to 600 
members. We are told that  Ta-kang a t  this  stage had a membership of 500 
to 600, and Chi-lian (the Link), Shan-t1iao-kuo (the Three Ditches), Hsin-
23pa-fen (the New Eight Shares) and Hsin-wuk (the New House) each about 800.
This general trend of enlarging mining organisation in Montrado at  
lea s t ,  was part ly  in tensif ied  by a common fear of the Heaven and Earth 
Brotherhood amongst the smaller brotherhoods. After the defeat of the Lang­
fang hui, the Heaven and Earth Brotherhood had become the big bully of 
Montrado. This fear was said to have se t  in motion a process of incorporation 
and a ll iance  amongst smaller brotherhoods. The miners who saw much in te res t  
in extending th e i r  brotherhoods into a larger organisation formed, therefore, 
kongsi. As a re su l t ,  the number of small brotherhoods grew fewer and fewer 
until  there were only 14 kongsi in Montrado in 1774.
The Heaven and Earth Brotherhood which probably had a membership of 
500 to 600, had been imposing a monopoly policy of r ice and other items upon 
other mining brotherhoods. In 1775, not only was rice sold a t  high prices 
but also sugar-cane. In par t icu la r ,  sugar from the gardens of Rantouw was 
now and then not allowed in. I ts members even grew so aggressive to take 
l ib e r t i e s  with the women of other kongsi and to plunder other kongsi of 
th e i r  propert ies .  All these abuses and the oppression on the part of the 
Heaven and Earth Brotherhood certainly threw i t  into a violent coll is ion 
with the 14 other kongsi which a l l ied  together. The all iance of the 14 
kongsi must have been 10 times stronger than the Heaven and Earth Brother­
hood in terms of the i r  memberships and strength. They f ina l ly  defeated and
kil led  Liu Shan-po and some of his 500 sworn-brothers. The remainder of the
24Brotherhood were absorbed into the memberships of the a l l ied  kongsi.
23. Schaannk, p.520.
24. , p.520.
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In 1776, the temporary a l l iance of the 14 kongsi developed in to  a
kongsi federation of permanent nature. The federation was Ho-shun kongsi
which, in Chinese, means the federation of great peace and harmony, and
which embodied a f u l l e r  development o f  extended brotherhood and partnership.
The membership the Ho-shun federation in Montrado included the 14 mining
25kongsi as fo l lo w s :
1. Ta-kang (the great port)
2. Lao-pa-fen (the old e ight  shares)
3. Ch iu - fen - t1ou (the nine shares)
4. Shih-san-fen (the th i r teen shares)
5. Chieh-l ien (the l in k )
6. Hsin-pa-fen (the new eight shares)
7. Shan-t' iao-kou (the three ditches)
8. Man-ho (the perfect peace)
9. Hsin-wuk (the new house)
10. Kern-wui (the g o ld -p i t ' s  end)
11. Shih-wu-fen (the f i f te e n  shares)
12. Tai-ho (the peace and harmony)
13. Lao-shih-ssu-fen (the old fourteen shares)
The federation, by in fe r r in g  from the average membership of 500 to 
600 in each kongsi, must have embraced 8000 to 10,000 Chinese of  varied 
d i s t r i c t  or ig ins and occupations. The f i r s t  President o f  the Ho-shun 
federation was Hsieh Chi-chia. During his presidency, San-t ' iao-kuo, 
Ch i- l ien ,  Hsin-pa-fen, Hsin-wuk and Ta-kang had had the greatest influence 
at f i r s t .  But la te r  only three kongsi, Ta-kang, San-t ' iao-kuo and Chi- l ien 
were the foremost whi le there was s t i l l  a closer t i e  between Ta-kang and 
S a n - t ' ia o -ku o .^
The b i r th  of the Ho-shun federation brought a period of  great 
expansion to Chinese mining in Montrado. Many new mines were opened. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese kongsi in Larah had also now establ ished a closer 
t i e  with those in Montrado fo r  protect ion.  Just by invoking the name o f  the
25. Based on Schaannk, Jackson draws a map of the geographical locations 
of the 14 kongsi.
Jackson, p.55.
See also Appendix 1.
26. Schaannk, p.527.
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27Ho-shun, the Malay and Dayaks could eas ily  be awe-stricken.
There had been a s im ila r trend o f the kongsi in Larah towards a 
greater union. In 1776, the trend had already reduced the number of kongsi
oo
from the 12 o f 1763 to no more than 7 in to ta l ,  comprising:
1. Yüan-ho (the f i r s t  union)
2. Ying-ho (the amicable union)
3. Chan-ho (the support fo r  union)
4. Hui-ho (the benefic ia l union)
5. Sheng-ho (the r is in g  union)
6. Shuang-ho (the double harmony)
7. Hsia-wuk (the lower house)
A ll o f them came under the umbrella o f the leading kongsi in Montrado 
Hui-ho was protected by C h i- l ien . Yüan-ho, Chan-ho and Ying-ho were led by 
Ta-kang. Sheng-ho and Shuang-ho entered in to  an a ll iance  with San-t' iao-kuo 
Hsia-wuk was even called small San-t' iao-kuo because of the close re la t io n ­
ship between them. Despite th e ir  a ll iance  with the Montrado kongsi, they
remained in a l l  aspects independent and free to accept new members o f th e ir  
29own.
Every founding kongsi o f the Federation in Montrado had been called
Kai-hsian kongsi. Each one o f them consisted o f one or more kongsi mines
(also called kongsi) as well as o f private farmers, traders, handicraft
workers and miners. Some time, th e ir  priva te miners again formed large
30mines which also bore the name kongsi. Of such, the famous ones were:
1. Chin-ho (the gold union)
2. Ta-sheng (the great prosperity)
3. Kuan-ho (the wide union)
4. L iu - fe n -t 'o u  (the s ix  shares)
5. Pa-fen-t 'ou (the eight shares)
6. Chan-ho (the support o f union)
- 27. Schaannk, p .527.
28. Ib id .
29. Schaannk, p.528.
30. , p.526.
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Before, during and after the formation of the Federation, the dis­
tinction between a kongsi and a small private partnership was that a kongsi 
was an enlargement of brotherhood founded within a Chinese settlement and 
the temple of the Ta-po-kung.
Kongsi mines or kongsi parit were operated to bring benefit and pro­
f i t  to the whole union of the enlarged brotherhood which was called kongsi.
The profit was partly to meet general expenses of the kongsi. But although 
the private mines or k1o - t1ou parit had to pay mine rent to the kongsi, 
they were, in contrast, operated to the undertakers' own benefit. The new 
members or Hsin-k'o usually worked in the kongsi mines f i r s t ,  which provided
them with food and clothing and a pay of 4 reaal or 16 florins every four
31months. The old members or Lao-k'o were obliged to take care of the
mines. The kongsi mine was established by those who parted with their own
money to contribute to the fund. The shareholder each had a share of profit
32and a vote in the election of the heads of the mine.
It is clear that kongsi mines were not privately owned. Crawfurd's
picture that they were worked by companies of persons of property and capital,
33who employed monthly labourers, is therefore misleading. This is to 
transplant a westerner's view of capitalism to a Chinese communal enterprise 
which had distant roots in China. However, despite this note of skepticism, 
the following information from him is valuable:^
"The mode of paying the labourers is by 
monthly wages, with a supply of food. An 
inexperienced labourer receives for the 
f i r s t  four months two Spanish dollars, a 
month, for the second four months, four 
dollars, and for the remainder of the year 
five. Ever afterwards he received six, 
and i f  he has capacity and integrity to 
make an overseer,eight dollars."
They were paid by the kongsi with fixed wages and the supply of food
32. Schaannk, p.568.
33. Crawfurd, p.474.
34. , p.475.
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and c lo th ing  and accommodation. But fo r  those who worked in small partner­
ships on th e ir  own, they only shared in the gain and loss on terms of 
perfect equa lity .
In marked contrast to private partnerships, in every kongsi there 
was a kongsi-house or t 1in g . The kongsi-house served as the stockade to 
f o r t i f y  the mine, as the temple o f th e i r  Ta-po-kung, as the storehouse o f 
th e ir  weapons, too ls , provisions, gold and money, as the sleeping quarters 
o f o f f ic e rs  and part o f th e ir  workforce. I ts  s ign if icance in the l i f e
o f kongsi as an in s t i tu t io n  cannot be overstressed. Indeed, i t  'was a
-----J—  36v is ib le  mcmitestation of the whole kongsi system1. But most o f a l l ,  i t
was the embodiment of the whole kongsi or extended brotherhood. Often,
general meetings in the kongsi-house had the la s t  say in matters of great
importance.
Kongsi membership was open, but i t  required a fee of 4 f lo r in s  from
any one who chose to jo in .  The admission fee was called h u i - t i  (the
foundation o f brotherhood) or hui-hsin (the heart o f brotherhood). In
add it ion , every new member contributed ha lf  a f lo r in  to pay fo r  the person
who conducted the oath-taking ceremony which was to or ienta te  new members
to the brotherhood.38 The symbolism o f the extended brotherhood found f u l l
expression in the worship o f the Ta-po-kung, to whom every new member vowed
his lo y a lty .  However, in a manner cha rac te r is t ic  o f the Chinese, the men
of the kongsi even symbolised the kongsi way of l i f e  as kongsi r ice  in the
39catechism of i n t i t i a t i o n  r i tu a ls :
"Do you know i t  is  not at a l l  easy to eat 
kongsi rice?
" I f  a l l  the other brothers can, I ce r ta in ly  
w i l l ."
Then, the oath o f allegiance.
The heads o f brotherhood were extended to a wide range o f Chinese in
35. Schaannk, p.568. 
Jackson, p.69.
36. Jackson, p.70.
37. Schaannk, p.585.
38. Ib id .
39. Ib id.
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West Borneo. Almost all  the Chinese belonaed to one or another brotherhood 
there, farmers and handicraft workers in the neighbourhood of mines, traders 
and fishermen in the coastal kampongs, even the Chinese who lived in the 
midst of a Malay population in the c a p i t a l s . ^  All of them had been united 
as well as divided by the ever enlarging brotherhoods which grew increasingly 
larger  but fewer and which were called kongsi. The whole Chinese population 
in West Borneo was an extension of Chinese kongsi or brotherhoods.
Every kongsi had i t s  own administration f i l l e d  by the off icers  who 
again were also called kongsi. The off icers  varied in number according to 
the sizes of kongsi mines. Kongsi o ff icers  were all  elected by members 
through a general meeting held in the kongsi-house, the seat of kongsi 
government. The administration consisted of two or more clerks called 
djoeroe-toelis  or t s 1ai-ku who managed a c t iv i t i e s  of a day to day nature 
and finance. One or more overseers called ma11im or huo-chang were entrusted 
with the instruction of the mine labour and the collection of the gold-dust. 
Experience and honesty were required of him by the kongsi-mine workers .^
The tenure of office had usually been four months. Once the i r  term
of off ice had expired, they had to return to the rank of ordinary mine
workers although they were s t i l l  e l ig ib le  for re-e lec t ion .  If they caused
discontent in the ranks, the administrators could be dismissed by them
anytime through a general meeting. And those who were elected were obliged
42to accept the off ice .  The leadership was established on a consideration
of the substance and a b i l i ty  represented by the leaders. Age and venerabil ity
43did not count much.
All the kongsi o f f ice rs ,  except the honorary t i t l e  holders, were 
housed, c lother, paid and provided meals by the kongsi fund. I t  had been 
a very important part  of the kongsi establishment that  the kongsi off icers  
must live with the kongsi-mine workers in the kongsi-house. They not only 
lived under the same roof with the coolies but also ate at  the same mat
40. Veth, Vol.l ,  p .311. 
Jackson, p.68, 69.
41. Veth, Vol .l ,  p . 319. 
Schaannk, p .571.
42. Veth, Vol. l ,  p .319. 
Schaannk, p.575.
43. Schaannk, p.569.
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with them. This social equal i ty  of the l i f e  in the kongsi impressed Earl 
44profoundly:
"There appeared to be very l i t t l e  d is t in c t ion  
of  rank among the people, fo r  the Chinese 
ku l is  who carr ied my baggage, sat down to eat 
at the same mat with the governor, and f r e ­
quently dipped th e i r  chop-sticks in to  the same 
dish; th is  functionary, however, always occupied 
the upper end. The women joined in the meal, 
but they were ch ie f ly  employed in attending 
to the wants of the male portion of  the company."
A treasurer drew 16 f lo r in s  a month and an overseer 32 f l o r in s .  The
45Kapitan himself received as many as 40 f lo r in s  or more a month. Their 
pay as well as the expenses of  the kongsi-house were met by a kongsi fund 
b u i l t  up from the p ro f i ts  of the kongsi mines. However, the large kongsi 
levied a capi ta t ion tax of one or two f lo r in s  to add to the kongsi fund 
fo r  the general expenses of the k o n g s i The kongsi fund was spent on 
the salaries of o f f ic e rs ,  the reception o f  guests, the celebrat ion of 
fes t iva ls  and the expenses of war and so on.
Over the agr icu l tu ra l  population in the kongsi, the administrat ion 
was extended through the elders, the kongsi wine d i s t i l l e r y  heads, and the 
temple heads. The venerable elders were the re l i c s  o f  the old partnerships 
which formed the kongsi. They derived th e i r  command of  respect and author i ty  
not from elect ion but from th e i r  age. But during the la te r  period, the 
kongsi leadership was l i t t l e  in ter fered with by th e i r  dwindling in fu ence .^
The kongsi wine d i s t i l l e r y  heads or Chiu-lang were charged with the co l lec t ion  
o f  the kongsi taxes. The main responsibi 1i t y  of the temple heads was con­
ducting fes t iva ls  and con t ro l l ing  ceremonial funds. Both Chiu-lang and 
Fu-shou (the temple heads) shared with the venerable elders the au thor i ty
44. Earl,  p.291, 293.
45. Veth, Vol. , p .321.
46. , p.321, 322.
47. Schaannk, p.575.
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48in small matters and day to day administration. They all  seemed to have 
derived the i r  pay from their  own jobs and not from the kongsi fund.
When the kongsi went to war, the off icers  had to go down to become 
coolies, and they resumed the i r  off ice  only a f te r  the war was over. The 
war e f fo r t  was commanded by two elected mil i tary advisers called Chtin-shi. 
Under the Chün-shi, f ie ld  forts commanders called cha-chu again were appoin­
ted to take charge of the defence of the f i e ld - fo r t s  as well as the collect ion 
of import duties. In normal time, no garrison was stationed in the f ie ld -  
fo r t s .  Only a couple of sentr ies  were posted there and in case of danger,
the neighbouring town inhabitants,  farmers and workers were immediately
49called up for defence.
In wartime, the workers of the kongsi mines were, as a rule ,  the
50f i r s t  to take to the f ie ld .  Ta-kang, for example, always had about 3000 
f ighting men under command in i t s  l a t e r  period. Everyone in the kongsi, 
however, was obliged to take up arms, not ju s t  the kongsi miners. The 
f ighting men were paid and fed in wartime by the kongsi out of the kongsi 
fund. Prizes of enemy heads were offered to boost the i r  morale, two tae ls  
of gold for the head of a leader in the enemy camp, 4 f lo r ins  for tha t  of a 
Malay, 2 f lo r ins  for that  of a Dayak. However, the capturer of a Dayak 
women had to give her away to the kongsi. He received in return half of her 
dowry, when she was married by the kongsi la te r .
The normal l i f e  of the kongsi also stood s t i l l  under wartime regul­
ations. Not only the mine work was stopped, there was no business as usual:
no pig slaughtered, no wine d i s t i l l e d ,  so that  everyone else shared the
51hardship of war with those who were fighting in the b a t t l e - f i e ld s .  War
48. Schaannk, p.576.
49. , p.576.
50. , p .577.
Veth says that  the Petompang or mixed blood Chinese by Dayak mothers were 
usually the front  line f igh ters .  This, however, must have only happened 
in a l a t e r  period.
Veth, Vol.1, p . 323.
51. Schaannk, p.577.
These measures of aus ter i ty  exercised by the Chinese kongsi in wartime 
may also be part  of the Chinese mil i tary t rad i t ion .  The Wu-ei chi-yao 
enumerates th ir teen bans on normal a c t iv i t i e s  in the town which was besieged. 
See Herbert Franke, 'Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China' in 
Kierman & Fairbank ed.;  Chinese Ways in Warfare (New York, 1974), p .159.
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breathed more aus te r i ty  into the l i f e  in kongsi than usual.
In Mondor, Federalism also triumphed Only a year l a te r  than the
Ho-shun federation, the Lang-fang federation emerged there. The federation
was formed under the leadership of Lo Fang-po who united Nao-ern, Chu-ta-ya,
Kun-jih, Lung-kang and Salaman, e i the r  through mil i tary conquest or po l i t ica l
a l l iance ,  or a combination of both. The extension of Lo's brotherhood to
Mao-ern, for example, had been a successful mil i tary campaign supported by
52i t s  a l l iance  from within. But, Salaman, Chu-ta-ya, and other places 
seemed to have joined Lo's brotherhood by themselves.
The d i s t r i c t  head of Sinaman, Kapitan Bapah Wu had long been recog- T
nised as the absolute authority of Sinaman by the Panembahan of Mampawa
before the bir th  of Lang-fang. He was invited to join Lo's brotherhood
and helped Lo to expand the t e r r i to ry  of Lang-fang to the d i s t r i c t  of 
53Mampawa. Sinaman was made a province in the federation. The President
resided in the cap i ta l ,  Mondor. But the off ice of the vice-President was
in Senaman. Mao-ern was made a prefecture administered by a major Kapitan
or Ma-yao Chia-pi-tan. All the other d i s t r i c t s  in the federation each had
54a kapitan as i t s  head administrator.
The President of each administrative d i s t r i c t  in Lang-fang was assisted
by a vice-President , a Wui-ko (junior elder brother) and a Lao-ta (the e lder) .
These four men apart ,  there must be a t reasurer  or t s ' a i - ku in each d i s t r i c t
administration. For example, in Shan-hsin gold mine, Chang Ah-chai who was
or ig ina l ly  the mine head before the birth  of the Lan-fang kongsi, had now
55become the t reasurer  of Shan-hsin. However, only the t reasurer  and 
kapitans were paid out of the kongsi fund, and Lao-ta and Wui-ko were 
honorary t i t l e s .  I t  seemed that  each d i s t r i c t  administration evolved 
from a brotherhood in orig in ,  such as the Lang-ho camp with 5 man admini­
s t ra t ion .  There was a revolutionary change that  characterised Lang-fang.
52. Lo, p .138.
53. , p.38.
54. , p .158.
55. , p . 139.
56. , p .141.
De Groot, p .128.
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After their admittance into the territory of Lang-fang, each of them ceased 
to be a single brotherhood by i t s e l f  but only a dis tr ict  of Lang-fang. None 
of the old brotherhoods or kongsi retained i t s  name. Neither the Lang-ho 
camp nor the Four Big families kongsi 'reused,. -their names > after the 
birth of Lang-fang, which was the extension of one brotherhood to the rest. 
In contrast, the Ho-shun was formed by an alliance of 14 independent 
extended brotherhoods or kongsi, each retaining i t s  own name and autonomy.
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CHAPTER VI
Kongsi E ros io n  and the Kongsi 
In H i s t o r y
1. Discord Struck by the Growth of Towkay Influence
The b i r th  of Ho-shun (Harmonious Agreement) and Lang-fang (Orchid 
Fragrance) was a watershed in the growth o f  Chinese p o l i t i c a l  in s t i tu t io n s  
overseas. While the American people were gett ing r id  of  monarchy and 
aris tocracy and remodelling th e i r  p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t io n s ,  in th is  part 
of  the world, West Borneo, the Hakka Chinese were also bui ld ing a demo­
c ra t ic  l i f e .  Al l  sources agree that administrat ion of the kongsi at a l l  
levels was a representat ive government of a kind. I t  owed no insp ira t ion  
to the West, nor to the rebel l ious t r a d i t io n  of Chinese peasantry.
The foundation of  A Chinese kongsi had been i t s  free in s t i t u t io n  
that the kongsi o f f ice rs  must spend most of  th e i r  time l i v in g  in the kongsi- 
house with the kongsi-mine miners. They had the same meals with the cool ies 
at the mat. Every cool ie considered himself a master of the house. During 
his Sinkawan v i s i t ,  Earl 's  proposal to open a commercial intercourse with 
the B r i t ish  aroused a noisy discussion among the cool ies:*
"The court-house was now f i l l e d  with ha l f -  
naked Chinese, each o f  whom considered him­
se l f  authorized to jo in  in the discussion 
which ensued, and endeavoured to make him­
s e l f  heard above his neighbour. The noise 
at least became per fec t ly  deafening, and I 
was glad to escape i t ,  under the plea of 
wishing to inspect the town."
In the discussion were not only the kongsi-mine cool ies but also the towkay 
members in town. When a matter of signif icance unexpectedly arose, a l l  the 
kongsi members gather in the kongsi-house to hold a general meeting. Thus, 
the town was almost deserted by the men, 'who were a l l  in the court-house,
1. E a r l , p.208. 
Purcel1, p.424.
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and the shops were in the meantime taken care o f by the women, many o f whom
2were Chinese, though the m ajority  o f them were Dayaks."
The kongsi o f f ic e rs  l ived  with th e ir  wives in the kongsi-house. The
kongsi coo lies, however, fo r the most part were unmarried. The married ones
3
lived  in th e ir  own houses. The pay o f kongsi o f f ic e rs  was generally higher 
than that o f coolies. We have mentioned the salaries o f d is t r i c t  kongsi 
o f f ic e rs  in the la s t  chapter. The o f f ic e rs  in the central government 
fetched even high sa laries. In the Ho-shun kongsi-house at Montrado, every 
T1ing-chu, the representative sent by each member kongsi, was paid 80 
f lo r in s  a month.^
With such a kongsi-house t ra d i t io n ,  there was absolutely no ground 
fo r  any in d iv id u a l,  however outstanding, to claim a throne, especia lly  when 
each member was his own master in the kongsi. However, the force o f Lo's 
personality  was said to have persuaded his admirers, including o f f ic e rs  and
-\or -t-hfc
coo lies, to propose him  ^ throne. Lo Fang-po, l ik e  Washington who in 1782
5
had twice rejected the proposal tha t he ought to be king, declined theg
o f fe r .  Washington's refusal understandably stemmed from his f irm  b e l ie f  
in democracy. What gave ground fo r  Lo's re jec t ion  was his commitment to 
the brotherhood and i t s  philosophy. He saw in the establishment o f Lang­
fang in foreign so il not his personal achievement but the success that 
crowned the co l le c t iv e  e f fo r ts  o f his brotherhood. He, therefore , disdained 
the idea o f proclaiming himself king which appeared unworthyand se lf ish  to 
him. ^
In fa c t ,  had he claimed the crown, he would undoubtedly have been 
dethroned by a re vo lt  from the ranks sooner or la te r .  Happily fo r  himself 
and Lang-fang, he did not. However, in 1777 when Lang-fang possessed a 
vast t e r r i t o r y  and spheres o f influence and a population o f t h i r t y  to fou rty  
thousands, a new name had to be adopted to d is tingu ish  Lang-fang i t s e l f  and 
i t s  President. A consensus was achieved that the kongsi was distinguished
2. Earl, p .210.
3. Posewitz, T . , p .361.
4. Schaannk, p.570.
5. John R. Alden, Pioneer America (London, 1966), p.98.
6. Lo, p.38.
7. Ib id .
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by the name Ta-tsung-chih (president ia l system, or perhaps "Republic"),  andg
Lo himself by the t i t l e  Ta-tsung-ch1ang (the great president).
I t  was also possible that only to outsiders, Lo used the t i t l e  
Ta-wang (which in general means king in Chinese, but in th is  pa r t icu la r
g
context, governor), or the Ta-Wang of Pontianak. The t i t l e  put Lo on par
with the high posit ion of the Dutch Governor, whose governorship was also
through the elect ion by the o f f ic e rs ,  as they thought. The term Ta-Wang here,
too, had a h is tory .  The Dutch governor was t r a d i t i o n a l l y  cal led Ta-Wang
by the overseas Chinese in Indonesia, th is  being so with both the Annals
10and the Chinese chronology on Batavia. By using the same t i t l e ,  the men 
of  the kongsi must have seen Lang-fang as the equal o f  the Dutch Indies 
Company.
Another t i t l e  that the president of  the kongsi used to outsiders was 
Panglima. Between 1819 and 1822, during the c o n f l i c t  between the Dutch and 
the Chinese, the President or Kapitan-china of Mandor, Sung Cha-po was 
known to the Dutch as Panglima Tjap. Pangl ima in Malay means commander in 
ch ie f.  In 1822 when the kongsi negotiated peace with the Dutch, the Dutch 
ins is ted on a re -e lect ion of  the whole of  the leadership, and in pa r t icu la r ,  
the resignation of the anti-Dutch Panglima, Tjap. I t  was accepted and thus 
a pro-Dutch leadership was formed by Kapitan-Demang Liu Tai-erh. Liu was 
sworn in to  o f f ic e  under the supervision of  the Dutch Commissioner who handed 
over the great seal of the kongsi to him.**
This change of  leadership was to have a far-reaching impact in Lang- 
fang. Peace was retained at a very high cost. Lang-fang sovereignty and 
independence was los t  although i t s  autonomy remained. Cr i t ic ism of th is  
expensive and f ra g i le  peace was aired in a fo lk  saying: "What a blunder
in Cha-po's administrat ion that Tai-erh was trusted with the power of
d i s t r i c t  head! How ignorant and naive we a l l  were that our f l a a  pole was
12 > f l y in g  the Dutch f la q ! "  The apportion of blames seemed not l im i ted  to the
8. Lo, p.39. K
9. Lo, p . 159.
10. Kai-pa L i - t a i  Shih-chi (The early accounts of  the Chinese in Batavia) 
in JSSS, Vol .IX, p t . l ,  p.27.
11. Veth, Vol .2, p.80.
12. Lo, p . 153.
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leadership alone. The rank and f i l e ,  whose consent on a matter o f such 
importance must have been sought by the leadership, also take th e ir  share 
of re s p o n s ib i l i ty .
The p u r i ty  o f the kongsi in s t i tu t io n  was, as noted by De Groot,
eroded by th is  p o l i t ic a l  change too. The p o l i t ic a l  change enhanced the
influence o f the Kapitan over the e lectora te  to a very large extent. The 
13reason was tha t:
"Under the changed circumstance, the d ign ita ry  
was na tu ra l ly  the adviser in matter o f the 
appointment o f kapitans and he became the 
representative o f the w i l l  o f the Dutch govern­
ment before the e lectora te . Indeed, in la te r  
years, his influence had grown so strong that 
the appointment o f the lesser heads was e n t i re ly  
in his hands."
I t  was followed by a more serious erosion o f the kongsi in s t i tu t io n
in la te r  years. The res iden tia l t ra d i t io n  o f o f f ic e rs  was broken by the
increasingly in f lu e n t ia l  towkay groups whose in te res ts  were la rge ly  outside
the kongsi. In Lang-fang, Yeh Teng-hui was the f i r s t  to break i t .  During
his presidency (1843-1845), he l ived  in his own shop instead o f the kongsi-
house. The Annals say that he only turned up to attend something important
to the k o n g s i .^  C rit ic ism  of him by the History is  even more blunt and
15d ire c t:  "He had completely neglected kongsi a f f a i r s . "
His successor, Liu Ting or Liu Chien-hsin who took o f f ic e  in 1846
made deeper and wider breaches in kongsi t ra d i t io n s .  He renamed Lang-fang
16a fte r  a personal name o f his - Chien-hsin. Indications were tha t the 
erosion o f the very foundation o f kongsi - the kongsi-house t ra d i t io n  - 
ce r ta in ly  caused a decline o f Lang-fang. The kongsi-house f e l l  in to  ruin 
due to neglect. The kongsi suffered a defeat from the Dayaks in Landak.
13. De Groot, p.128, 129.
14. Lo, p .144.
15. , p .154.
16. , p .154.
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The members were a l l  demoralised, and there was a decline of population 
and income part ly  as the resu l t  of war destruction part ly  because of the
17
breaches of t rad i t ions .
In Montrado, the increasing influence of towkay groups within the
kongsi also wore away part of the free in s t i tu t io n s  of the kongsi. Some
rich merchants who owned the small market-town Shang-fu-tou, were said to
have rescued Ta-kang (the great port) kongsi, to which they belonged, from
bankrupcy by pouring in the i r  money. They were members of Wu, Huang and
Cheng clans. Kuan Ming-po, a wine d i s t i l l e r ,  had also once saved Ta-kang
18from a financial c r i s i s  which paralysed i t s  mine operation. By pulling 
the kongsi through financial c r i se s ,  the towkay groups gained more access 
to the leadership of Ta-kang.
They were given privileges that  members of th e i r  clans should be
placed in the kongsi mines' administrations. In a kongsi mine, one of the
two mineheads or huo-ch ang, one of the three t reasurers or t s 1a i - k 1u must
come from the surname groups of Huang, Wu or Cheng. Again out of the eight
foremen or ting-kung, two were distrubuted to Wu, two to Huang, two to Cheng
and only one l e f t  to any other surname groups. In a small mine there usually
were four posit ions of foreman, of which Wu, Cheng, and Huang clans each
19owned one respect ively and l e f t  one to minori ties.
The r i se  of towkay groups in the kongsi must have begun very early.
20During his v i s i t  to Montrado, Earl noted in April 1834 that :
"A company of individuals generally club 
together to work a mine, two or more of the 
share-holders being appointed d i rec to rs ,  these 
l a t t e r  generally being wealthy merchants, who 
purchase the shares of the miners a t  a r i sk ,  
supplying them with food and opium. I could 
not learn exactly the proportion in which 
the gold is d is t r ibuted  a f t e r  being washed, 
but believe i t  to be nearly as follows:-
17. Lo, p . 154.
18. Schaannk, p.571.
19. , p.572.
20. Earl, p.286.
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the government claims one-fourth, and of the 
remainder, the shares of the washer are two- 
thirds greater than those of the labourers 
who are only employed in mining."
This, of course, was a private partnership in the kongsi and not the
kongsi mine i t s e l f .  The leaders of private mines, usually wealthy merchants
or towkays, wrested control from the miners by purchasing th e i r  shares. At
f i r s t  the rich towkays made loans to private miners a t  a high rate  of
in te r e s t ,  24 to 36%. When private miners were unable to pay out the debts,
the towkays continued to lend money to them 'but under harder conditions,
21demanding also some of the shares for themselves.' The rich towkays may 
have gained control over kongsi mines by making loans to them at  high 
in te re s t  rates .
Kongsi mines did not have to pay tax to the kongsi government but
only to contribute part of th e i r  p ro f i ts  to the kongsi fund. Private mines
were taxed by the kongsi government. The tax had been varied from 1 f lo r in
22to 6 f lo r ins  per miner per month, depending on the yield of gold. In
Montrado the number of private miners, according to Schaannk's estimate,
23was 1200. Doubtlessly, the to ta l  which included those in outlying 
colonies of Ta-kang must have been larger than th is .
I t  is not c lear when the new system of representation by surname
groups began. Possibly, i t  occured in 1848 during the presidency of Kuan
Chih-I, a heavily b u i l t  man with great intellegence. His success in using
force to silence the vociferous party of miners of kongsi mines brought a
24period of re la t ive  peace to Ta-kang. Since then the influence of kongsi 
mine workers was sagging. In 1850, Cheng Hung-jen succeeded him. Only 
th is  succession and not those e a r l i e r  ones was evidence of a sor t  that  the 
new system was implemented.
Before the presidency of Kuan Chih-I, towkay groups in Ta-kang were 
unlikely to wield vast power. The rein of government remained held by the
21. Posewitz, p.360.
22. Schaannk, p.599.
23. Ibid.
24. Schaannk, p.551.
92
kongsi-mine miners. Their war e f fo r ts ,  more than anything else, contributed
to what Ta-kang had become - the government o f the whole o f Montrado and a
population o f 30,000 to 50,000. By 1837, a l l  the other member kongsi had
been e ith e r merged in to  Ta-kang or driven out o f Montrado. The powerful
voice o f the kongsi-mine workers d ictated po licy . Their mounting influence
even resented the President. Wen Kuan-shou, who f e l t  his presidentia l
25power unduly eclipsed by them, resigned in 1839.
However, less than a decade la te r ,  th e i r  influence became thinned 
by the power o f money. The men of money were the towkay groups, whose 
in te re s t  were not always in concert w ith tha t o f kongsi miners. Although 
they and kongsi-mine workers a l ike  were members o f the extended brotherhood 
- the kongsi, they worked fo r  th e i r  own account. Their t ie s  with the kongsi 
were only the taxes and the au tho r it ies  o f the kongsi government on them. 
They did not l iv e  in the kongsi-house but th e i r  own in town, not paid by 
the kongsi but by the p ro f i ts  o f th e ir  own business. Included among them 
were p r iva te  owners o f wine d i s t i l l e r ie s ,  opium dens, gambling booths, 
vegetable gardens, pig s t ie s ,  shop-houses and pr iva te  mines. A few, l ik e  
Kuan Ming-po, were very wealthy; but most o f them were not.
Wealthy or not, the l i f e  of towkays was the envy of mine coo lies,
who e ith e r worked fo r  the kongsi or the towkays. Only one-tenth o f miners
26had wives and th e ir  own houses. Towkays in the town, on the other hand,
were fa r  be tte r o f f .  The r ich  ones are said to have kept concubines in 
27d i f fe re n t  houses. The l i f e  o f not so r ich  towkays was also blessed with
the earth ly  b l iss  of th e ir  women, whose exotic beauty e l ic i te d  admiration
from both Earl and De Rees. The large footed Dayak wives o f the Chinese
28towkays appear under the pen o f E a r l :
"The countenances o f the Dayak women, i f  not 
exactly b e a u t ifu l ,  are generally extremely 
in te res t in g  . . .  In form they are unexception­
able, and the Dayak wife of a Chinese whom I 
met w ith at Sinkawan, was, in point o f personal 
a t t ra c t io n s , superior to any eastern beauty who
25. Schaannk, p.549.
26. Veth, V o l . l ,  p.314.
27. De Rees, p.53.
28. Earl, p.259.
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has yet come my observation . . .  Many of the 
Chinese on the west coast of Borneo are married 
to Dayak women, and th e i r  exemplary conduct 
both as wives and mothers, is very highly 
spoken of."
The mixed blood Chinese women borne by them, according to De Rees,
29excelled the pure Malay and Javanese in height and beauty. Not infrequently
the Chinese towkays took the parents or the whole families of the i r  wives
30to l ive with them. I t  was the Chinese custom that  a g i f t  of money to the
family of the bride must be given by the man who asked for her hand. The
money g i f t  of betrothal varied from one to four taels  of gold, or 80 to 
31320 f lo r in s .  Marriage was cer ta in ly  expensive in West Borneo, where i t  was
v i r tu a l ly  only the elder Chinese towkays in town, mostly in th e i r  50s and
3260s, who wore wedding rings.
Life without women had a bad influence on the morality of mine coolies,
although i t  could, on the other hand, arouse the i r  nostalgia and stimulate
33them to work doubly hard for  the i r  goals in l i f e .  Those Chinese coolies,
in tent  on se t t l in g  down a f te r  working in the mines for a long time to save
up money, l e f t  the mines and the kongsi-house. They moved into town to
34open a shop or to practise  a trade. They became towkays themselves, and 
although not necessarily prospering at  leas t  lived in re la t ive  comfort and 
pleasure. The change to towkays was an upward move for the coolie s »indeed to whom 
l i f e  in mines and the kongsi-house offered no comfort nor pleasure.
What was there was a brotherhood and hard work and aus te r i ty  to share. 
Early in the morning at  four o'clock the mine coolies got up to work until  
an interval of re s t  from 11 to 1, and they then proceeded on until  sunset.
Five meals a day were provided on the account of the kongsi. In the usual 
days, meals consisted of r ice ,  sa l ted and dried f i sh ,  and a drink from the
29. De Rees, p.49.
30. Earl,  p.293, 294. 
Jackson, p.44.
31. De Rees, p.51.
32. Ibid.
33. Veth, Vol. l ,  p . 314.
34. De Rees, p.51.
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decoction of  gojaver leaves. Tea and pork were served only on the day
of  gold-washing or pay-day, and on Chinese fes t iva ls  which were celebrated
35with feasts and banquets. Without sexual love, a large part of the 
cool ies solaced themselves with the indulgence in wine, opium or gambling, 
when they got th e i r  pay.
The co n f l ic t in g  in te res t  o f  towkay groups and kongsi miners tore the
kongsi fu r ther  and fur ther  apart. The in te res t  of  kongsi cool ies lay
e n t i re ly  in the kongsi-house. Through d is t in c t io n  in war, coolies were
rewarded with shares in the kongsi mines. A new member or Hsin* k 1o could
also become share-holder a f te r  a year working in the kongsi-mine. The
old cool ies who had re t i red  from work were given a share each fo r  th e i r
long service to the kongsi. The p ro f i t s  o f  kongsi-mines a f te r  sett ing
part o f  i t  fo r  the kongsi fund, were divided by the share-holders or mine
workers. When the p r o f i t  was huge, everyone of  them could expect a bonus
37to be added to th e i r  dividend. The kongsi-house provided them a roof 
under the sky, meals, democratic l i f e  and brotherhood and a share in gain 
and loss.
Towkays, unless they had bought a share in the kongsi mine, were
e n t i re ly  on th e i r  own. The kongsi-house, furthermore, levied on them a
capi ta t ion tax and a household tax to the amount of 2 f lo r in s  a year, from
which the cool ies, however, were exempted. In addi t ion, a l l  the towkays
had to pay a tax fo r  th e i r  pr ivate business, from which the cool ies, of
course, were free. A pr ivate miner had to pay 1 to 6 f lo r in s  in tax a year
to the government or kongsi-house, a pr ivate  farmer 2 f lo r in s .  The pr ivate
business taxes fo r  the towkay o f  wine d i s t i l l e r y ,  pawn-shop, gambling-house,
38and ar t isan ,  ranged from 1 to 32 f l o r in s .  The kongsi-house ra is ing taxes
on them fo r  revenue often injured the growth of  th e i r  money trees. Ind i rec t
taxes on them were high too; 1 f l o r i n  fo r  each pig slaughtered, fo r  each
gantang (=3.125 kg) of  o i l  5 duits (1 du i t  = ™ f l o r i n ) ,  each gantang of 
39 0Urice 2 du i ts .  The towkays grumbled at high taxation more especia l ly when
35. Veth, Vol .1, p.339.
36. Schaannk, p.572.
37. , p .573.
38. , p.599, 600.
39. Veth, Vol.1, p.321, 322.
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war and overspending by the kongsi-house imposed extra taxes on them.
The towkay domination of the kongsi-house ended the po l i t ica l  pa r t ­
nership of towkays and coolies. The r ise  of towkay influence undermined 
the free ins t i tu ion  that  the kongsi government and laws once stood for. 
Clanism and racialism creeped into the law of the kongsi widening the gap 
between the towkays and coolies. The new order favoured the large surname 
groups and China-born Chinese. Members of such clans supplied a new 
gentry in the region. The new law and ju s t ic e  were made in the i r  favour.
For example, the penalty for the murder of any member of the towkay e l i t e  
was cer ta in ly  death sentence, but only a fine 720 f lor ins  and caning for 
k i l l ing  a member of small clans. When the victim was a half-caste  Chinese
or Pan-Tang-fan, his l i f e  was only worth half  a package of red tabacco and
4048 f lo r ins  in the new law.
When clanism raised i t s  ugly head in the new order, the half-caste
Chinese organised underground opposition. In a number of places in Ta-kang
41they formed the i r  own secret brotherhood. I t  was only a matter of time
before they would r i se  in revolt .  1850saw more discords among the already
divided Chinese community in Montrado. Ta-kang was confronted with the
Dutch invasion. The Kongsi-house sent a delegation to the Dutch offering
unconditional surrender and control over the kongsi1s domestic a f f a i r s .  The
towkay e l i t e  wanted peace at  any price whereas San Tien-hui (three dots
brotherhood) of the underprivi1eged advocated armed resistance.  The towkay
42e l i t e  won th e i r  way. Ta-kang surrendered. The lack of will in the kongsi- 
house to offer  resistance brought an end to Chinese autonomy that  had lasted 
almost a century in West Borneo.
In Mandor, Chinese autonomy and public access ib i l i ty ,  though much
diluted by the growing Dutch influence, lingered on for another two decades
until  1875. The public access ib i l i ty  of the kongsi government continued to
survive the erosion from the top and from outside over time. The democratic
43s p i r i t  that  remained in Lang-fang was s t i l l  very much alive:
40.
41.
42.
43.
Schaannk, p.582.
, p.587.
Irwin, Nineteenth Century Borneo (Leiden, 1955), p.168, 169. 
De Groot, p . 140.
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"Every head, including the president, or Kapitai, 
was accessible to the public on every day and in 
any hour; not a shadow of submission was shown 
by any farmer or doolie when meeting on the road, 
but only politeness in their affable and intimate 
conversation. No headman would feel displeased 
when walking on the road nearby his residence any 
resident farmer came to talk with him. In short, 
the people always held, whether they let i t  show 
or not, the heads with a harmonious mixture of 
respect and free intimacy."
As my thesis deals only with the origins of Chinese kongsi, I should 
leave the story there. The intense growth of kongsi mining in Sarawak, 
Malay States and South Thailand well into the late 19th century, and the 
far-reaching impact of kongsi government after this ,  are, however, a 
story that should be told elsewhere.
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2. Kongsi : i ts. Place in History
One can hardly exaggerate the s ignif icance of  the emergence of  
kongsi federations in West Borneo, which was to shape Chinese l i f e  in 
Southeast Asia fo r  one and a ha l f  centuries. But as a p o l i t i c a l  s tructure , 
what is i t ?  Is i t  as a wide range of  scholars such as Veth, De Groot, 
Schlege, and Lo Hsiang-1 in see i t ,  some form of federal republ ic? Or, 
is i t  merely a large p o l i t i c a l  group in the mining d i s t r i c t s ,  as those 
who re je c t  the f i r s t  view would prefer to have i t ?  To answer th is  one..
know what is democracy, and furthermore, what form of  democracy the 
kongsi is and what form i t  is not? I think a controversy o f  th is  kind is 
f u t i l e .  However, whi le avoiding the comparison of the kongsi with modern 
republicanism and 'democracy1, I should also point out that the second view 
which leaves kongsi federations in a limbo of  vagueness and ambiguity, is 
no solut ion e i ther .
Therefore, I suggest a th i rd  approach, which rejects western termi­
nology fo r  th is  completely Chinese model o f  a modern p o l i t i c a l  state. In 
other words, we should not t ry  to f i t  kongsi government to western termi­
nology, nor to western models of  h is tory  - the ch ie f  point of or ig ins fo r
<10
western tem Pogy.  And indeed, i t  is a l l  too often misleading to translate  
h is to r ies  very d i f fe re n t  from that o f  the West in to  western terminology.
More especia l ly , his torians who u n c r i t i c a l l y  apply western models of  h is tory  
to other parts of the world, would in so doing, remind one of  a Chinese 
proberb which says: "Cutt ing the feet in order to f i t  the shoes."
«
Nor do I advocate an unc r i t ica l  acceptance of the autonomy of  Asian 
h is to ry ,  especial ly not to the exclusion of  some convergence o f  both Asian 
and European h is to r ies ,  such as trade and cu l tu ra l  contacts which go far  
back in time. But kongsi government, such as i t  was, was b u i l t  by the 
Chinese who were uninfluenced by western ideas and experience. Nevertheless, 
whether kongsi government is uniquely Chinese in West Borneo, or might be 
found in other parts o f  the world in h is to ry ,  is a question which I prefer 
to leave open.
Most early wr i ters  on th is  subject were impressed by the democratic 
r igh ts  o f  the members in a kongsi. Not s u rp r is in g ly , theyfreely compared 
kongsi with republ ics. Temminck, fo r  example, wrote in 1847: "These market-
towns kongsi o f  Borneo Chinese which are known as kongsis, vary in size of
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population; . . .  Jhese l i t t l e  republics formed in the common in te re s t  o f
adventurers obliged to defend themselves against the Dayak hordes, and the
Mohamedan princes."'*' Kongsi government, l ikew ise, struck Veth as something
of a republic which arose, undoubtedly, from the hope o f the Chinese to gain
strength by th is  vehicle in th e ir  resistance against Malay exto rt ion  and
the Dayaks who i n i t i a l l y  f e l t  hos ti le  towards these fore igners, who came
2
by repeated in fluxes in to  th e ir  midst.
De Groot holds a s im ila r  view. Furthermore, he t r ie s  to in te rp re t  
the term kongsi as a synonym fo r  republicanism in Chinese:
"Already the term kongsi i t s e l f ,  or, according 
to the Hakka d ia le c t ,  koeng-sji or kwoeng-sze, 
indicates perfect republicanism. I t  means 
exactly administration (Si_) o f  something which 
is o f co l lec t ive  or common in te re s t  (kong).
I t  has, therefore, also been used by large 
corporations and commercial f irm s. But when 
used as the term fo r  the p o l i t ic a l  organisations 
in West Borneo, i t  should be in terpreted as 
meaning an organisation fo r governing the repub lic ,
o
or the res pub)ic q "
Elsewhere, in the Beknopte Encyclopaedie Van Nederlandsche Oost-Indie, 
the term is  c le a r ly  defined as government by a general public or administr­
ation o f a f fa i rs  tha t belong to common in te re s t .^  Of course, tha t is not 
a l l .  Both the encyclopaedia and Veth have pointed out tha t kongsi is ,  at
the same time, a t i t l e  used by administrators who were elected by ordinary
5
members in the kongsi.
As has been shown in the f i r s t  se c t io n o f th e  th ird  chapter, the usage of 
kongsi has been found in the ships o f the Cheng regime, as early as 1683.
The term i t  seems, referred to ship o f f ic e rs  who shared cargoes among them­
selves, as d is t in c t  from the Mu-shao, the sa ilo rs  who again shared th e irs .
. . .  ,
1. Temminck, Coup-doeil General sur les Possessions NeerlandaisA swr V Inde 
ArchipelagTque, Tome 2, (Leiden.1847), p.167-174.
2. Veth, Vol.2, p.305, 306.
3. De Groot, p .138.
4. Beknopte Encyclopaedia Van Nederlandsche-Indid (Leiden, 1921), p.254.
5. Veth, Vol , 1, p.319.
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But when th is  term migrated to Bangka and West Borneo, the usage changed 
hands from ship off icers  to mining o f f ice rs .  The emergence of kongsi 
government in the 1770s, however, gave the term a new meaning, a radical 
change in continuity.
This new form of overseas Chinese government did not part with all 
Chinese t rad i t ions .  In fac t ,  as has been demonstrated in previous chapters, 
the roots of kongsi government lay in the t rad i t ions  of Chinese partnership 
systems and brotherhood soc ie t ies ,  and in pa r t icu la r ,  that  of a combination 
of both. While the Cheng regime can be seen as an extension of a single 
partnership, i t  was not an extended brotherhood. I t  was, nevertheless, an 
old po l i t ica l  framework which more or less s t i l l  retained a legacy of the 
Chinese imperial system. But, in sharp contras t ,  kongsi government has 
departed sharply from this  orthodoxy of Chinese po l i t ica l  t rad i t ions .  I t  
extended the equality of partnership and brotherhood to all  members. I t  was, 
in this respect,  a revolutionary change in the Chinese po l i t ica l  philosophy, 
which unfortunately did not have a Thomas Paine to a r t i cu la te  i t .
The revolutionary significance of kongsi government was not fu l ly  
appreciated, as i t  was interpreted as the k'o-chang system, in China, until  
one and a half  centuries l a t e r .  Only then there was a new appreciation of 
kongsi government among the generation who had been won over by western ideas 
of democracy and republicanism. But the appreciation of th is  generation was 
only p a r t ia l .  In 1911, in the f i r s t  year of the Chinese Republic, Lin Feng- 
chao hailed the advent of the Lan-fang Ta-tsung-chi (the Presidential System 
of the Lan-fang kongsi) as the e a r l i e s t  example of Chinese republicanism.
He says: "The Lan-fang kongsi was indeed a democratic republic, but, because
a hundred years ago the Chinese people did not know the precedence of America 
and France, i t  was seldom talked about as such a thing of great importance." 
More specif ica l ly  is his comment on the time-scale used by the Lan-fang 
kongsi:
"In the chronological year of Huang-ti 4471 
and that  of Chien-lung 42, Lo Fang-po from 
Kuantung Mei-shien had occupied Pontianak of 
Borneo. He was elected by the public as the
6. Lo, p .158.
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Ta-gang Tsung-chang (the President o f Great 
China). In th is  year, he founded thus the 
f i r s t  year of Lan-fang. The use o f Huang- 
t i ' s  chronological year was to praise the 
people o f the Lan-fang country. Why praise 
them? I t  was because they were able to fo llow  
the example o f Huang-ti to defeat barbarians.
Again, by using the term Kung-chi (public 
e lec tion) here, the author meant to demon­
stra te  the republican nature o f the Lan-fang 
kongsi. S im ila r ly ,  by using the term chien- 
ytian (founding the f i r s t  chronological year 
fo r  a new dynasty), i t  indicated independence , • 
from the Manchou government. The h is to ry  of 
the revolution o f the overseas Chinese began 
with Fang-po."'7 89
In the glow of his radical nationalism, Lin could see nothing but 
the resemblance to the republic in the kongsi. Twenty years la te r ,  Lo 
Hsian-1ing became interested in mining the h is to ry  o f the kongsi. In 1848, 
LÜ Chen-yti became aware o f the s ign if icance o f the kongsi in Chinese h is to ryg
from a Marxist point o f view. Lo, who belongs to t ra d i t io n a l scholarship,
seems content with a pa ra l le l with the western republic in the Chinese
kongsi. He does not ask himself where th is  form o f Chinese 'repub lic '
derived i t s  o r ig in a l i t y .  LÜ, at the other end o f the Chinese in te l le c tu a l
sprectrum,is a distinguished Marxist h is to r ian  in the generation o f modern
scholarship. Nevertheless, his conceptual tool - the Marxist system o f
h is to ry  - remains one o f Western terminology. He sees in the kongsi an
embodiment o f the ideas o f the Chinese shi-min or Chinese equivalent o f
g
European burgher class. The appreciation o f the kongsi as i t  ac tua lly  
existed in modern Chinese scholarship has been equally Eurocentric, although 
i t  stemmed from the Chinese themselves.
7. Lo, p .149.
8. Wang Gungwu, 'The Origins of c iv i l i s a t io n :  an essay on Chinese scholar­
ship in t r a n s i t io n ' ,  p.17.
9. LU Chien-yü, Chien-ming Chung-kuo Tung-shih (A concise History o f China),
(Peking, 1956), p.682 *
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All the same, both Western and Chinese scholarship fa i le d  to appreciate 
that the revolutionary s ign if icance o f kongsi government l ie s  e n t i re ly  in 
being something without pa ra lle l ism  with the West. In some sense, kongsi 
government was a part of Chinese popular t ra d it io n s  - partnership and brother­
hood. But in West Borneo, i t  stood out qu ite  c le a r ly  as a Chinese modern 
form o f representative government, a unique con tr ibu tion  o f the Chinese to 
the a r t  o f government in the world.
Modern western scholarship , however, does not f a i l  to see the demo­
c ra t ic  characters of kongsi government. Recent researchers such as Jackson 
and Barbara Ward have both placed great emphasis on the essential feature 
o f the kongsi - au thority  delegated upwards from b e lo w .^  This is true.
But i t  is  not th is  tha t makes the kongsi revo lu tionary.
More s ig n if ic a n t  than th is  are f ive  essential features tha t contribute
much o f what kongsi government has been. F ir s t  o f a l l ,  i t  is  the short
tenure of o f f ic e  fo r the administrators - th e o re t ic a l ly  at leas t, four months.
Once th e ir  o f f ic e  expired, they had to return to work l ik e  anybody else in 
11the mine. There was no so il in  the m inefie ld fo r  the growth of bureau- 
c ra t isa t io n ,  which has become a modern disease in fe c t in g  almost the whole 
world.
Secondly, administrators were a l l  dismissable by ordinary members
during th e ir  term o f o f f ic e .  This shows the extent to which kongsi members
could exercise checking power over the executives o f government. Not only
was a voice in the Kongsi-house enjoyed by every member o f the kongsi; i f
necessary the e lectorate could remove the o f f ic e  holders from power at any
12time they pleased. There can be no doubt tha t:
"When they (o f f ic e rs ) ,  however, gave cause 
fo r  the discontent o f th e ir  constituents, 
they would surely be dismissed even during 
th e ir  o f f ic e ,  and they were obliged to 
drop th e ir  o f f ic e  when i t  happened."
10. Jackson, p.66.
11. Veth, V o l . l ,  p .319.
12. Ib id .
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Kongsi government is most remarkable for the consensus process that
effectively limited bureaucratic power. It  was a vital aspect of kongsi
government that the administration was controlled by the public dictation
13of policy through the consensus process. Consensus or popular consent 
formed the core of kongsi philosophy and government - harmonious agreement. 
One step outside the consensus, the administration was exceeding its  powers. 
Should there arise anything important beyond what had been agreed upon by the 
consensus, a new consensus to deal with i t  must be sought by Kongsi-house. 
Here, there was only executive power in the hands of Kongsi-house. The 
public, constitutionally though not in writing, had the last words on legi­
slation and policy formulation. This was the vestige of i ts  partnership 
origins that the headmen had only executive power.
Kongsi government also offers a fine example of what we nowadays call 
collective leadership. In i ts  truest sense, i t  was far more collective than 
its  anachronistic equivalents. Decision on important matters must be 
collective, must be from Kongsi-house and not the Kapitan alone, no matter 
how capable and influential he was. For example, Kapitan Lo-phai, whose 
dynamic leadership earned him the confidence of the people and 10 years of 
office, was even more faithful to the principle of collective leadership.^ 
Not just because of the force of tradition did he refuse to determine the 
British proposal for a trade relationship in April 1843, but also because he 
himself did not wish so. This proposal was therefore put before a council 
meeting for a collective decision.
The collective leadership that consisted in kongsi government made a
15profound impression on Earl:
"That which they have adopted appears to be 
well suited to their situation, the territory 
being divided into d is t r ic ts ,  each of which 
is governed by several representatives, elected 
by the people, every male inhabitant having a
13. Veth, Vol.l, p .320.
14. Earl, p.291.
During 10 years of his presidency, he and his family lived in the Kongsi- 
house, which, according to Schaannk, was an exception among the presidents 
before him.
Schaannk, p.545.
15. Earl, p.290, 291.
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vote. The representatives, or Rung Se, 
elect the governor, who has the direction 
of all the affairs of the terr itory,  
domestic and foreign, but he is expected 
to consult the Rung Se when transacting 
any business of importance. The la tter  
are entrusted with the administration of 
justice in their respective d is t r ic ts ,  but 
capital offences are always referred to the 
governor. They continued in office as long 
as i t  suits the pleasure of their  constituents, 
who on suspicion of misconduct, will depose 
the obnoxious members and elect others in 
their room."
Later in 1847, Temminck also noted t h i s : ^
"The executive power of the kongsi community 
has devolved to a Chinese carrying the t i t l e  of 
captain. In all extraordinary matters, this 
man is bound to call an assembly of the clerks 
who must acquaint the members of their societies 
with the affairs in question; the opinion adopted 
by the members must be communicated to the captain 
who then acts on i t . "
In other words, the President had only executive power, with regard 
to both policy and justice, and so with the whole of the administration.
Rongsi officers were seen by the rank and f i le  as people who carried what 
they have all agreed out and not a ruling e l i te  to tell  them what they 
should or should not do. Every one of them, as an equal partner and brother 
in the kongsi, saw himself as his own master, and enjoyed a voice in kongsi 
poli t ics. It was they who were the masters of the Rongsi-house and not the 
administrators. Their loyalty to the kongsi sprang from a belief of collective 
self-mastery, which in no way diminished in strength the bold vision of
16. Temminck, p.397.
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17
extended brotherhood.
A b e l ie f  in universal brotherhood was old in Chinese l i f e .  A very
old Chinese saying, probably as old as ancient Greek stoic ism, was that
w ith in  a l l  the corners of the earth every man is a brother. What was new
was not the philosophy i t s e l f  but the practices o f extended brotherhood and
co lle c t ive  s e l f -d ire c t io n .  And what was the most exc it ing  breakthrough in
kongsi government was that i t  was not only a government by representation
but also a government by public opinion, or popular consent. Not only did
the public not see th e ir  representatives as the masters o f the Kongsi-house,
kongsi o f f ic e rs  themselves did not. They always sought fo r  co l le c t ive  ideas
and public opinion in the process o f government. Veth writes o f th is  unique
contr ibu tion  o f Chinese kongsi in West Borneo to the a r t  o f government in
18h is to ry , which, however, is  not widely known even now:
"In special cases, in which general regulations 
or guide lines are not provided, the central 
government called on the c lerks o f the d is t r ic t s  
fo r  consultation. I f  they s t i l l  could s e tt le  
i t ,  they subjected the problem to the opinions 
o f th e i r  constituents. The opinions were then 
reported to the Kongsi-house which accordingly 
adjusted th e ir  measures. In case the central 
government abused i t s  powers, i t  ran a great 
r isk  of being overthrown by a popular commotion, 
in which the ranks took th e ir  r igh ts  in to  th e ir  
hands. On such occasions, which fo r tuna te ly  did 
not happen frequently , general meetings were held 
and most o f them were so turbu lent and chaotic that 
they ended with bloodshed."
17. In Chinese dissent t ra d i t io n s ,  whether of popular or in te l le c tu a l ,  the 
absence o f the notion o f negative freedom is  apparent. On the other 
hand, the f r u i t s  o f European c iv i l is a t io n s  seems to be c i v i l  r igh ts  
established on the notion o f negative freedom.
See Uni ah B erlin , Four Essays on L ib e r ty , (London, 1969), p.131-136.
I 2. \ ) ejrV\ j V<4. V
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Kongsi government as i t  was, is indeed a po li t ica l philosophy, or a 
collective way of thinking in action, rather than in abstraction. I t  is a 
system of p o li t ica l ideas, which was evolved from the practices of brotherhood 
and partnerships by the overseas Chinese, and not from the Utopian scheme of 
any great philosopher. The founders constructed this form of government upon 
their notion of social justice (kung-ping) , for the Chinese until then were
€\ .S
alien to the concept of democracy, which nevertheless subsumed within the ir 
social justice. Their notion of social justice was a philosophy of public 
s p i r i t ,  which was as old as the origin of Chinese c iv i l isa t io n  i ts e l f .  An 
old Chinese saying, for instance, that i t  is to the public that the whole of 
China belongs, (T'ien-hsia Wei-kung) has long been the inspiration of the 
Chinese dissent trad ition . Criticism by outspoken reformist o f f ic ia ls  and 
scholars alike against the tyranny of the emperor and the monarchy system 
i t s e l f  mainly stemmed from this trad ition .
But of course thus far the philosophy had not been translated into a 
po lit ica l system that shaped the l i f e  of the Chinese people, who saw only 
dynasties rise and fa l l .  I t  is only in West Borneo that the Chinese philosophy 
of public s p i r i t  was used as a conceptual tool in the construction of a new 
form of government, a government of collective self-d irection. But then 
this po li t ica l philosophy in action is not the Chinese philosophy of public 
s p i r i t  in general, but one that is particular. Particular, because i t  
d irectly derived its  inspiration from the Chinese popular traditions rather 
than Chinese inte llectual traditions, whether of ancient sages or of contemp­
orary reformist thinkers. Particular, also because its  origins were with a 
happy marriage of brotherhood and partnership in Chinese l i f e  which formed 
the powerful idea of collective self-mastery.
By the time West Borneo evolved a kongsi system of government, the word 
kongsi was redefined by this maturing of the po li t ica l philosophy behind the 
system. Kongsi became taken to mean a government of public s p i r i t ,  public 
s p ir i t  in every sense of the word. In practice, the administration was the 
instrument of the consensus process. The power of directing the Kongsi-house 
was wielded by the hands of the public through the ir direct participation, 
election, crit ic ism  and control of the administration, which had only executive 
power. This alone is s ignificant. To world history the West supplied 
democracy from its  traditions of c iv i l  rights. The overseas Chinese, alien to 
c iv i l  r ights, contributed kongsi from the ir national heritage of partnership
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and brotherhood.. The kongsi is neither democracy nor republicanism, 
should give the kongsi a place which is rightfully her own.
History
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NOTE ON THE SOURCES
Yeh's Annals was f i r s t  published by De Groot in 1885. The Annals 
covers in a b r ie f  manner the h is to ry  o f Lan-fang from 1777 to 1856. I t  
was probably w r it te n  in the 1860s or 1870s. Throughout th is  work, there 
is  an obvious bias against the r iv a l  o f Lan-fang - Ta-kang. Yeh seems 
to ta l ly  pro-Dutch and pro-Manchu in th is  w r i t in g  too.
Apart from the Annals, L in 's  Hi story is the only surviv ing Chinese 
h is to r ic a l document on Lan-fang, but i t  came out much la te r ,  in 1911. The 
value o f th is  work is  mainly the inclusion o f the w r it in g  o f Lo fang-po 
himself. Again i t  is  a republican in te rp re ta t io n  o f the kongsi, which I 
have pointed out in the thesis.
I have drawn heavily on De Groot, Schaannk and Veth, in reconstructing 
the democratic l i f e  of the kongsi. A ll o f  them had personally v is i te d  West 
Borneo. While De Groot presented the Chinese point o f view of Mondore,
Schaannk projected that o f Montrado. In co l le c t in g  materials from the Chinese 
and Dayaks there, Schaannk has checked them with Veth who la rge ly  re lie d  on 
Dutch o f f ic ia l  documents. But on the other hand, he also checked the mis­
takes o f Veth in the l ig h t  o f his own f ind ings , such as the coin o f ho-shun 
14 kongsi.
I t  is fo r  th is  reason that I take exception to Irwin who c la ss if ie d  them 
purely as secondary sources.
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